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INTRODUCTION
The United S ta te s  o f  America fo rm ally  secured  i t s  independence 
from G reat B rita in  on January l i t ,  17%» On th a t  d a te , th e  Congress o f  
the  Ifcited  S ta te s  r a t i f i e d  the  .Tireaty o f P a rig j America gained i t s  
independence from G reat B r i ta in , which a lso  g ran ted  im portant though 
in  some in stan ces dangerously i l l - d e f in e d  t e r r i t o r i a l  concessions.
The Congress o f  the new n a tio n  which approved o f  th a t  T reaty  o f  P a r is  
had been opera ting  under the  A r tic le s  o f C onfederation s in ce  March o f  
1781, rep lac in g  the "ex tra  le g a l"  Second C o n tin en ta l Congress as the  
o v e ra ll  d ire c tin g  body fo r  the  R evolu tion .
The A r t ic le s  o f C onfederation r e f le c te d  th e  u n ity  o f  purpose 
c h a r a c te r is t ic  o f  the  th i r te e n  u n ite d  s ta te s  during  the  R evolution; but 
i t  r e f le c te d  the d e s ire  on the p a r t  o f those  s ta te s  to  m ain tain  t h e i r  
sep a ra te  and in d iv id u a l so v e re ig n tie s . The Art i c l e s  gave the new gov­
ernment considerab le  powers. Congress was e n t i t le d  to  make war o r 
peace and to  f ix  s t a te  quotas fo r  men and monies f o r  th e  n a tio n a l  arm ies, 
to  make t r e a t i e s  and a l l ia n c e s ,  decide i n t e r s t a t e  d isp u te s , l im i t  s t a te  
boundaries and admit new s t a te s ,  borrow money and regula,te the coinage 
o f the  United S ta te s , and e s ta b l is h  post o f f ic e s  f o r  th e  coun try . The 
r e a l  sense o f  th e  A r t ic le s ,  however, la y  in  the  p ro v is io n  th a t  "Each 
s t a te  r e ta in s  the so v ere ig n ty , freedom,, apd independence, ^ d  every 
power, ju r i s d ic t io n ,  and r ig h t  which i s  no t by th is  con federa tion  ex­
p r e s s ly  d e lega ted  to  the  U nited S ta tes, in  Congress assem bled,"^ Thus,
^Jonathan E l l io t  ( e d , ) , The Debates in  the  Several S ta te  Gonven- 
t io n s  on th e  R a ti f ic a tio n  of the  F edera l C o n stitu tio n  
P h ilad e lp h ia , 1876), I ,  79"
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th e  A r tic le s  o f  C onfederation acknowledged th a t  the  powers o f war and 
fo re ig n  a f f a i r s  were n a tio n a l in  scope, kep t a l iv e  th e  id ea  o f  union
2
during the  post-R evo lu tion  p e rio d  when th a t  idea  was a t  i t s  low est ebb, 
and u ltim a te ly  provided th e  means f o r  th e  o rd e r ly  t r a n s i t io n  from ru le  
by Parliam ent to  self-governm ent under the  C o n s titu tio n , N onetheless, 
i t s  basic  weakness remained un reso lved .
The e s s e n t ia l  d e fe c t o f  th e  A r tic le s  was theft they  opera ted  upon 
th e  s ta te s  in  t h e i r  co rpo ra te  c ap ac ity ; Congress under th e  A r tic le s  was 
n o t , in  f a c t ,  a  c e n tra l  government as such, but r a th e r  the c e n tra l  
agency o f  an a l l ia n c e  o f  sovereign  s t a t e s .  Consequently, even t^ e  
powers th e o r e t ic a l ly  belonging to  Congress were p r a c t ic a l ly  unenfo re- 
a b le , w hile  the th e o re t ic a l  scope o f  i t s  a u th o r i ty  was unduly narrow . 
Because taxes were to  be c o lle c te d  from the  in d iv id u a l s t a t e s .  Congress 
could n o t levy them; inasmuch as commerce was an a f f a i r  o f the  in d iv id u a l 
s t a t e s .  Congress could no t re g u la te  i t ;  t r e a t i e s  could n o t have th e  
fo rce  o f law sin ce  as t r e a t i e s  they  would have opera ted  d i r e c t ly  on 
in d iv id u a l s ta te s  by-passing  the  s t a te  l e g i s l a tu r e s .  In  s h o r t ,  a com­
mon p o lic y  in  th ese  f i e ld s ,  where such a p o lic y  was n ecessa ry —the  
source and c o lle c tio n  o f  revenues, re g u la tio n  o f commerce, fo re ig n  
r e la t io n s —was v i r tu a l ly  im possib le , fo r  the power o f  th e  A r tic le s  
remained w ith the  s t a t e s ,^  These weaknesses p layed d i r e c t ly  in to  th e  
hands o f th e  c h ie f  d e fe c t o f the  government o f  th e  s ta te s ;  a too g re a t  
co n cen tra tio n  o f  power in  the  hands o f l e g i s l a t iv e  departm ents o f  those
Edwin So Corwin, "The Progress o f  P o l i t i c a l  Theory Between th e  
D ec la ra tio n  of Independence and the  Meeting o f  th e  P h ila d e lp h ia  Conven­
t io n ,"  American H is to r ic a l  Review. XXX (192^), 527,
^ Ib id ,
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governm ents.^ D espite  i t s  d e fe c ts , and d e sp ite  those  American p o l i t i c a l  
le a d e rs  who, re fu s in g  to m inimize those d e fe c ts ,  saw th e  A r t ic le s  only  
as a  means to  a b e t t e r  p lan  o f  c e n tr a l  government, the  s ig n if ic a n c e  o f 
th e  A r tic le s  must no t be d iscoun ted .
The s i tu a t io n  in  1787-1788 was very  fav o rab le  fo r  th e  c re a tio n  
and adoption of a  new p lan  o f government. For, f i r s t ,  the experience 
gained from the  R evolutionary  s t a te  c o n s t itu t io n s  and from the A r t ic le s  
o f  C onfederation had accustomed the people o f  th e  U nited S ta te s  to  th e  
ide^a p f  fram ing government by choice and d e lib e ra tio n ^ : blending o ld  
in g red ien ts  from th e  c o lo n ia l p e rio d  w ith  new rep u b lican  elem ents, and 
fin d in g  th a t  th e  r e s u l ts  worked q u ite  w ell in  p r a c t ic e .  Secondly, the  
experience o f  about a  decade o f o p e ra tio n  o f the A r tic le s  had revealed  
th e i r  d e fe c ts , and in d e e d  among m a ^  Americans an in c l in a t io n  toward 
change. And th i r d ly ,  though the d o c tr in a ire  th in k in g  so resp o n sib le  
fo r  th e  A r tic le s  was s t i l l  w idely p re v a le n t in  the  U nited S ta te s , among 
many Americans th e re  e x is te d  a f l e x i b i l i t y  and r e c e p t iv i ty  to  new p o l i t ­
i c a l  ideas and in s t i t u t io n s ,  a sober bu t co n fiden t w i l l  toward p o l i t i c a l  
experim entation  along rep u b lican  l in e s .^  E ven tually  the d e s ire  o f  many 
Americans fo r  a s treng thened  c e n tra l  government culm inated in  th e  
Annapolis Convention o f Septem ber, 1786. C alled  o s te n s ib ly  to  achieve 
a more s a t is f a c to ry  re g u la tio n  o f i n t e r s t a t e  commerce on th e  Chesapeake,
^ I b id . . pp. 528-^29.
^The h is to ry  o f th e  fram ir^  o f  the  M assachusetts C o n s titu tio n  of 
1780 i s  an e x c e lle n t example o f p u b lic  d e lib e ra t io n  on th e  form ation  o f 
s t a te  governments and c o n s t i tu t io n s .  See Robert J .  T aylor ( e d . ) ,  
M assachusetts, Colouv to  Commonwealth? Documents on the  Form ation of 
i t s  C o n s titu tio n . 1 7 7 ^ 7 0 0  (Chapel H i l l .  19&1%
^C ecelia  M. Kenyon ( e d . ) ,  The A n ti f e d e ra l is ts  (New York, 1966), 
pp. x x x iii-x x x iv .
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th e  Convention ended w ith  a  p a l l  f o r  a new conventign^M  
mente f o r  th e  A r t ic le s ,  to  meet a t  P h ilad e lp h ia  th e  fo llow ing  May. This 
l a t t e r  convention, ^ e  C cm stita tio n a l o r F edera l o r  P h ila d e lp h ia  Çonvm- 
tio n  as i t  has been v a rio u s ly  c a l le d ,  convened f o r  work on May 2 ^  1787- 
T h e re a f te r , f o r  th e  n e x t fo u r  m onths, th e  d e legates to  t h a t  Convention 
were in  co n tin u a i se s s io n , s tru g g lin g  over a  p lan  o f  goveznment which 
one d e le g a te , a  fu tu re  A n ti-F e d e ra lis t ,  considered
would end e i th e r  in  monarchy, o r  a ty ra n n ic a l a r is to c ra c y , 
which, he was in  doubt, bu t one o r  o th e r  he was su re . 
C o n s titu tio n  had been formed w ithou t th e  knowledge o r idea  o f
+\na mo/\‘nn a _ #th e  peop le .
With th e  sign ing  o f  th e  C o n stitu tio n  by a l l  bu t th re e  o f  th e  d e leg a te s  
o f th e  Convention, th e  w>rk o f th a t  body was c lo sed . In  th e  fu tu re ,  
however, la y  an even more form idable ta s k —to  secu re  the  acceptance by 
th e  people o f the  new a r t i c l e  o f  government. This ta sk  would  occupy 
the  a t te n t io n  o f  those  supporting  th e  C o n s titu tio n , th e  N a t io n a lis ts ,
O
o r F e d e ra lis ts  as they  p re fe r re d  to  c a l l  thonse lv e s , u n t i l  August o f  
1788.
The s tru g g le  fo r  th e  r a t i f i c a t i o n  o f  th e  C o n s titu tio n , from the 
w in te r  o f  1787-1788 to  l a t e  summer o f  1788, was, in  essence, th e  f i r s t  
p o l i t i c a l  can^aig^ waged on a n a tio n a l  8cs0.e in  the  U nited S ta te s .  From 
th e  le v e l  o f dozens o f lo c a l  a re n a s , w ith  b a t t le s  fough t over lo c a l  and 
even p e t ty  is s u e s ,  the  s tru g g le  f o r  some manner o f  p o l i t i c a l  supremacy 
in  th e  country  moved in to  th e  n a tio n a l coliseum , where a l l  could  take
7james Madison, The Debates in  th e  F edera l Convention o f  1787 
Which Framed th e  C o n s titu tio n  o f th e  Tfaited S ta te s  o f America, G a illa rd  
Hunt and James Brown S co tt ( e d s .) ” (New York, 1920), p . ^76.
8See fo o tn o te  number one o f F o r re s t  MacDonald. "The A n ti-F ed era l­
i s t s , "  W isconsin Magazine o f H is to ry . XLVI (1963), 209.
^Kenyon, 0£ . c i t . ,  p . x x i i i .
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an a c tiv e  p a r t .  The p r in c ip a l  Issu e  a t  s tak e  appeared sim ple enough on 
the  su rfa ce —s h a l l  th e  C o n s titu tio n , as d ra f te d  by th e  F edera l Conven­
tio n  o f  1787, be adopted o r  re je c te d ?  But beneath th e  su rfa ce  o f  th is  
Is su e , and n o t a  very  g re a t  depth a t  t h a t ,  la y  a  much la r g e r ,  alm ost 
th e o re t ic a l  p o l i t i c a l  q u e s tio n . Accompanying th a t  p o l i t i c a l  q uestion  
was a  consuming p o l i t i c a l  s tru g g le  between two g re a t ,  opposing, though 
by no means c le a r ly  drawn n o l l t l c a l  f a c t io n s .
On th e  one hand were th e  su p p o rte rs  o f  th e  C o n s titu tio n , men o f
II I I .ill - I  -I - •     I. ,— «■ ■      .
a sm all, d ed ica ted , and r a th e r  c lo se ly  though In fo rm ally  a s so c ia te d , 
n a tio n a l I s  t-minded o rg a n iz a tio n . T y p ica lly  r a th e r  younger than t h e i r  
opponents , the  men o f  th is  p o s i t io n  and m e n ta lity  were m ostly  th e  p ro ­
ducts o f  the  R evo lu tion , and o f  the  p o l i t i c a l ,  economic, and s o c ia l  
re s h u ff lin g s  consequent o f t h a t  g re a t ev en t. A c le a r ly  overwhelming 
m a jo rity  in  the F edera l Convention, th e  C o n stitu tio n  r e f le c te d  t h e i r  
s tro n g ly  c e n t r a l i s t  p o l i t i c a l  Ideology to  no su rp r is in g  degree.
Opposing the N a tio n a lis ts  were th e men o f  the " e s ta b lish m e n t," 
o ften  men o f  the s t a te  and lo c a l  governments. These men, g e n e ra lly  o f
,I, ■■.■1111 lailli™ 11.1. , , 1̂, „  -------------------I y     - —- . — - ■■■    
pre-R evo lu tionary  War vi n ta g e , were a c tin g  to  m ain ta in  th e  p o s i t io n  o f  
the  s t a te  governments w ith in  the  framework o f  the  A r tic le s  and thereby  
a lso  m ain tain  t h e i r  own entrenched p o l i t i c a l  p o s i t io n .  These men r e a l ­
ise d  th e  th r e a t  posed by th e  C o n stitu tio n  to  th e  A r t ic le s ,  th e  supremacy 
o f  th e  s ta te  governments, and t h e i r  own entrenched p o l i t i c a l  m achines.
Roughly In  th e  mlddle_ofL±heae.. W a_nnnoajng .extrem es were a 
r e l a t iv e ly  few men. In  terms o f  numbers though c e r ta in ly  n o t In  terms 
o f  a b i l i t y ,  i n t e l l e c t ,  o r  n a tio n a l  renown. T y p ica lly , th ese  men were
^^MacDonald, c i t . ,  pp. 209-211.
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the  m oderates in  idie co n tro v ersy , tend ing  toward a  p o s i t io n  o f c l a s s ic a l ,  
d o c tr in a ire  republican ism . I t  was easy , and indeed n o t unexpected, fo r  
th ese  few men to  oppose the  C o n s titu tio n  on th e  grounds th a t  i t  con ta ined  
too many im perfec tions from th e  p o in t  o f  view o f  repub lican  p r in c ip le s  
o f  p o l i t i c a l  th eo ry . These men, ELbrldge Gerry o f  M assachusetts, Mel- 
ancton S a l th o f New York, J ohn Fran c is  M ercer o f M aryland, and George 
Mason and Edward Randolph o f V irg in ia , were men o f the  e ig h teen th  cpntury  
n a t io n a l i s t  t r a d i t i o n ,  reasoning  from p r in c ip le s  to  p a r t i c u la r s .  For 
th ese  men no n a tio n a l government was b e t te r  than an im perfec t one which 
m ight subsequently  degenerate  in to  ty ranny .
The men \Aio opposed the  C o n s titu tio n , those  o f  th e  l a s t  two des­
c rib ed  p o s i t io n s , have come to  be known as th e  A nti-Feder a l i s t s . That 
d e s ig n a tio n  s ig n i f ie s  on ly , as F o rre s t MacDonald has argued, th a t  t h e i r
p o s it io n  was opposed to  th a t  o f the  F e d e ra l is ts ,  n o t th a t  they  were
X2t r u ly  a n t i - f e d e r a l  in  t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  ideo logy . I t  was a name given 
tg_m§m_hy_.th9i.r_9PJBm@at&. and t h o u g k , J t o . r e E e a t e ^  
th ey , and no t t h e i r  opponents ,  were t r u ly  . f e d e r a l i s t s ,  th e  A n ti-F ed era l­
i s t s  never were q u ite  ab le  to  l iv e  th e  d esig n a tio n  down. A nti-Federalism  
was, th u s , as v a rie d  as the men re p re se n tin g  th a t  p o s i t io n .
I t  i s  the  purpose o f th i s  th e s is  to  exp lo re  and document the  
A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  f e a r  o f  th e  strong  c e n tra l  government proposed by the  
C o n s titu tio n . The problem in  a th e s is  o f  th i s  n a tu re  i s  the  m u l t ip l i ­
c i ty  and in te rn a l  c o n tra d ic tio n s  o f  th e  A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  arguments and 
o b je c tio n s , and th e  la c k  o f  trea tm en t o f  c e r ta in  m ajor to p ic s ,  n o tab ly  
ju d ic ia l  review . Thus, w hile  t h e i r  o v e ra ll  th e o re t ic a l  c o n s t i tu t io n a l
^^ Ib id .o p . 209. ^ ^ Ib ld .
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and p o l i t i c a l  p o s itio n  i s  q u ite  easy to  a r r iv e  a t ,  i t  i s  more d i f f i c u l t  
to  danons t r a te  and evidence to e  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  ' so m e ^ a t tm conscious 
fe a r s  o f  s tro n g  Only by a  c a re fu l  exam ination o f
A n ti= F ed era lis t l i t e r a t u r e  and speeches in  th e  r a t i f i c a t i o n  co n tro v ersy , 
to g e th e r  w ith  some understand ing  o f th e  man uho made the  o b je c tio n s , 
can an accu ra te  p ic tu re  o f th e  A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  f e a r  be determ ined<,
This th e s is  w i l l  examine th e  A n ti-F edera lists '*  f e a r s  o f  a  s tro n g  
c e n tra l  government in  th e  fo llow ing  fashion» Chapter one w i l l  be con­
cerned w ith  to e  b a s is  f o r  th a t  f e a r —toe A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  theo ry  o f
repub lican  government» A summary o f  th is  th eo ry  i s  ve ry  n ecessa ry  f o r  
the understand ing  o f the  A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  p o s it io n  on the C o n stitu tio n  
and th e  proposed fe d e ra l  government| i t  i s  a lso  im portan t i f  one i s  to  
comprehend th e  t ru e  s ig n if ic a n c e  o f  th e  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  in  th e  c o n s t i ­
tu t io n a l  development o f the  th i t e d  S ta te s  » C hapter two w i l l  deal w ith  
expressions o f  A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  f e a rs  o f  New England o r ig in ,  t h a t  i s ,  
from those  New England s ta te s  which d isp layed  any s ig n i f i can t An t i -  
FMer a l  1 s t  support (C onnecticut and, p a r t i c u la r ly ,  j0 ,s s a c h t^ e t ts ) » 
Chapters th ree  and fo u r  w il l  cover, re s p e c tiv e ly , the  A nti-Federalism  
of the  Middle A tla n tic  s ta te s  (Pennsylvania , New York, New Je rse y , and 
Delaware), and the  Southern S ta te s  (V irg in ia , North and South C aro lina, 
Maryland, and Georgia)» This s e c t io n a l  approach to  the  study o f A n ti-  
Federalism  prov ides th e  most c o n tin u ity  in  dem onstrating the se c tio n a l 
d if fe re n c e s  in  the  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  ° o b je c tio n s  to  th e  C onstitu tion»  
The concluding ch ap te r w ill  summarize b r ie f ly  the p o s it io n  o f A n ti- 
Federalism  in  American c o n s t i tu t io n a l  and p o l i t i c a l  development»
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
CHAPTER I
THE ANTI=FEDERALIST THEÛRT OF REPUBLICAN QOVERMMENT
The A n ti-F e d e ra lis t*s p o s it io n  on rep u b lican  government was 
c lo se ly  t ie d  tQ „.tha.iiidesp re M _ b e lle f ..th a t  JMpuJ^ifiSn^ggysîmeïÜLMS.
* « I ■ r m 1 - - - " » I mm I * #  l<
p o ss ib le  only In  sm aU , As rep u b lican s
in  the  c la s s ic a l  understand ing  o f th e  word, th e  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  read  
w idely in  th e  works o f  such well-known and w idely  resp ec ted  p o l i t i c a l  
and le g a l  th e o r i s t s  as John Locke and S i r  W illiam B lackstone» They 
were, however, p a r t ic u la r ly  im pressed by th e  works o f  Baron Montesquieu 
whose name c a r r ie d  g re a t w eight in  America. M ontesquieu 's op in ion  was 
c i te d  f re q u e n tly , p a r t i c u la r ly  th a t  on th e  n a tu re  o f  repub lican  govern­
ments
The natu r a l  prop e r t ie s  o f  sm all s t a te s  i s  to  be governed as a 
re p u b lic T " ^  m ones, to  be su b je c t to  a monarchy;' an 3 ^
o f la rg e  empires to  be swayed bv a despot p rin ce  » » » The 
consequence i s  t h a t ,  in  o rd e r to  p rese rv e  th e  p r in c ip le  o f th e  
e s ta b lish e d  government, the  s ta te  must be supported  in  th e  
e x te n t; and th a t  the s p i r i t  o f  the  s t a te  w il l  a l t e r  in  p ropor­
t io n  as i t  extends o r  c o n tra c ts  i t s  l im it» ^
The h is to ry  o f America re in fo rc e d  th i s  b e l i e f ,  and in  tu rn  le d  
to  fu r th e r  g e n e ra liza tio n s»  Before the  R evo lu tion , the  Americ a n s  en­
joyed self-governm ent on ly  as in d iv id u a l co lonies»  The A r t ic le s  o f 
C onfederation m ain tained  th a t  t r a d i t io n  o f  lo c a l  se lf-governm ent by 
se v e re ly  r e s t r i c t in g  th e  ex ten t o f  power ex erc ised  by the c e n tra l  
a u th o r i ty .  A J a ig g jz g p u ^ ic  w as^^^pqssible,. t^^^ argued,
^Jonathan E l l i o t  (ed» ), The Debates in  th e  S ev era l S ta te  Conven­
t io n s  on the R a ti f ic a tio n  o f th e  F ederal
i m r  â i î S e ï p h i a ,  i 8 7 é ) ,T r 7 T 2 î ;
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beeanaa_the c e n te r  o f  goverpment would tm avoidab lz .jzS L ^W ant th e
peop le . The in te r e s t  o f  th e  people would then  n a tu ra l ly  decrease , 
s e t t in g  th e  s tage  f o r  a change in  rep u b lican  government to  a r is to c ra c y  
o r  monarchy»^ Any se lf-g o v e rn in g  peop le  must be r e l a t iv e ly  homogeneous 
in  in te r e s t s ,  op in io n s , h a b i t s ,  and m ores. The A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  were 
h ig h ly  conscious o f  and emphasized th e  c u l tu r a l  d iv e r s i t i e s  o f  the Amer­
ican  peop le , and argued th a t  no one s e t  of laws could  o p e ra te  over such 
d iv e r s i ty  e q u a lly .^
The A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts “ f e a r  o f  the s tro n g  c e n tra l  government 
proposed by the  C o n s titu tio n  stanmed a lso  from t h e i r  conception o f 
human nature»  The ‘A n tis ” shared  w ith  t h e i r  opponents many o f  the  
assum ptions o f human n a tu re  c h a r a c te r i s t ic  o f  th e  l a t e  e ig h teen th  cen­
tury» Man”3 domonant m otive in  l i f e ,  they  believed^, was s e l f ^ ^ t e r e s t . 
The most extreme form o f  th is  s e l f - i n t e r e s t  m an ifested  i t s e l f  in  th e  
l u s t  f o r  p o l i t i c a l  power» R eferences to  t h i s  l u s t  f o r  power were r e -  
peatedly_mada by men on both s id e s  o f  the  r a t i f i c a t i o n  s tru g g le» ^
James Madison, a  lead in g  F e d e ra l is t ,  w rote in  F e d e ra l is t  Number $1;
M b itio n  [fo r  power in  government] must be made jW co u n te rac t 
ambitio n s  » The in te r e s t  o f  th e  man must be connected wïtïT^tHe 
éo n s titu E lo n a l r ig h ts  o f  th e  place» I t  may be r e f le c te d  on 
human n a tu re  th a t  such dev ices should be unnecessary  to  c o n tro l 
th e  abuses o f government » But what i s  government i t s e l f  bu t 
the  g re a te s t  o f  a l l  r e f le c t io n s  on human n a tu re . I f  men were  
a n g e ls9 no government  would be n ece ssa ry . I f  angels were to"' 
govern men, neïtK ef^ e x te rn a r^ o F 'in te rn a l  c o n tro l on government 
would be n ece ssa ry . ]ji fram ing a government which i s  to  be 
adm in istered  by men over men, the g re a t  d i f f i c u l ty  i s  th i s  g
^C ecelia M» Kenyon (ed » ). The A n ti f e d e ra l is ts  (New York, 1966]
P» x l .
3 lb id .
^ I b id . ,  PP» I x i i - l x i i i .
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3Dau,jmat.Xlrjfe_enaW^ the  ^ p v e ^ e n t  to  cont^l^^ 
andJui.^tM  B W . p lace  o b lig e  i t  to  c o n tro l i t s e l f
In  a passage s t r ik in g ly  s im ila r  to  M adison 's, the  New York A n ti-F eder­
a l i s t  le a d e r , John Lansing, J r . ,  sa ids
Samples would be im p e rtin e n t, arguments would be in  v a in , 
checks would be u s e le s s ,  i f  we were c e r ta in  our ru le r s  would 
be good menj bu t f o r  the  v ir tu o u s , government i s  n o t i n s t i ­
tu te d ;  i t s  ob.iect i s  to  r e s t r a in  and punish  v ic e , and a l l  
f r e e  c o n s titu t io n s  a re  formed w ith  th e  view s—to  d e te r  the  
governed from crim e, and th e  governors from ty ran n y .°
Because o f  t h e i r  skep tic ism  o f man's m o tiv a tio n , th e  A n ti-  
Feder a l i s t s  v i ewed rep re sen ta t iv e  governmen t  only  as a s u b s t i tu te  f o r-  —— ——  —— ' ■  r III -Tlf ' ' ***' " *' -  . . .1 .s..-, —
d i r e c t  democracy. They d e s ire d  th e  r e s t r i c t i o n  o f  th a t  governm ent's 
op era tio n  to  such fu n c tio n s  so n a tu ra l  in  scope as to  make th e  l e g i s ­
la tu r e  the  p e rs o n if ic a t io n  o f the people  them selves.^  The Antj.-F ed e r- 
a l l^ s ^  doubted th e  p e o p le 's  judgment o f th e  is su e s  in  r a t i f i c a t i o n ,  
indeed o f  the  n e c e s s i t ie s  and requirem ents o f  rep u b lican  government 
i t s e l f .  They i«3Q [ e _ ^ e p ^ a l  o f  tM  ,cap ac i%  as e le c to r s .
The 'A nti s '  d id  n o t f e e l  th e  peop le , as e le c to r s ,  were capable  o f 
p reven ting  .corruptio n  in  choosing th e  l e g i s l a t i v e  and execu tive  branches 
o f th e proposed fe d e ra l _gpyenimgn^ Indeed, co rru p tio n  was bound to  
creep in  and a f f e c t  even the s ta te  and lo c a l  governments, so deep d id  
th e  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts ' skep tic ism  re a c h , F in a lly ,  and perhaps most 
im portan t, was the  b e l ie f  th a t  the  p eo p le , v o tin g  in  th e  la rg e  c o n s t i ­
tu en c ie s  provided  by th e  C o n s titu tio n , would e i th e r  lo se  e le c to r s  to
^Alexander Ham ilton, James Madison, John Jay , The F e d e ra l is t ,  
C lin ton  R o ss ite r  ( e d . ) (New Yorfc, 1961), p . 322.
% l l o t ,  D ebates, I I ,  29S-296.
^C ecelia  M. Kenyon, "Men o f  L i t t l e  F a ith s The A n ti f e d e ra l is ts  on 
th e  N ature o f  P o l i t i c a l  Man, " The W illiam and Mary Q u arte rly , H I  (1955) 
10.
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th e  a r i s to c r a t s  o f  th e  country  because o f  th e  l e t t e r ' s  su p e rio r  organ­
iz a t io n a l  c a p a c ity , o r would f in d  them selves choosing re p re se n ta tiv e s
Q
s o le ly  from among a number o f  p ro ffe re d  a r i s to c r a t s .
For th ese  rea so n s , th e  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  were e s s e n t ia l ly  lo -  
c a l i s t s  on th e  m a tte r  o f re p re se n ta tiv e  government. They lacked  the  
f a i t h  needed to  extend the  p r in c ip le s  o f  rep u b lican  government beyond 
th e  s ta te  l e v e l .  T heir democracy was sm all, sim ple , and homogene-
O U S e
The c e n tra l  q u estio n , th en , th a t  tro u b le d  th e  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts ,  
was the  e x te n t o f  power to  be given to  th e  genera l government. The 
course o f  the  R evolution and th e  t r i a l s  which i t  p resen ted  were s t i l l  
very  d i s t i n c t  in  th e  minds o f th o se  Americans who l iv e d  through and 
took an a c tiv e  p a r t  in  i t .  P o l i t i c a l  power over th e  th i r te e n  co lo n ies  
had been tra n s fe r re d  from England to  the  th i r t e e n  s ta te s  o p e ra tin g  as 
se p a ra te , se lf-g o v e rn in g  p o l i t i c a l  e n t i t i e s .  Having su ffe re d  under 
what o f te n  seemed ^  o verly  c e n tra l iz e d , and th mrohy nnr a s tH  A+.ivm 
government, th e  A n ti°Feder a l i s ts.,.H:ere- loa the , to ..a ss ig n  any more power 
to  a new cen t r a l iz e d  government than  was n ecessa ry  f o r  th e  b e n e f i t ,  
s a fe ty , and continued l ib e r ty  o f  a l l .  The A r t ic le s  o f C onfederation 
had been in  e f f e c t  f o r  some y e a rs—c e r ta in ly  long enough to  show th a t  
i t s  powers fo r  d ea lin g  w ith  a l l  th e  problems fac in g  th e  young n a tio n  
were g e n e ra lly  I n s u f f ic ie n t .  The post-R evo lu tion  years under th a t  
a r t i c l e  o f government were years  o f  p e t ty ,  lo c a l  r i v a l r i e s  and scram­
b les  fo r  p o l i t i c a l  power. The A r tic le s  d id  l i t t l e  to  a l l e v ia te  th e
Q
Kenyon, The A n t i f e d e r a l i s t s , pp . x c i i - x c i i i ,
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power s tru g g le s s indeed, as th e  years  passed , those  s tru g g le s  only  
in te n s i f ie d ,  to  the de trim en t o f a l l . ^
The fram ers o f  th e  Consti tu t io n  considered  i t  as the  so lu tio n  
t o th e  in te r n a l  p o l i t i c a l  problems fac in g  the U nited S ta te s .  The 
C o n s titu tio n a l Convention evidenced th e  id ea  th a t  f o r  g r e a te s t  e f fe c ­
tiv e n e ss  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  reform must be n a tio n a l  in  scope and must
embrace the  e n ti r e  n a tio n a l  Anerican p o l i t i c a l  system in  a  s in g le  
10coherent program. The l a t e r  phase o f  th e  C onvention 's ta sk  was 
s ig n i f ic a n t  because i t  drew a t te n t io n  to  the most p e r s i s te n t  c o n s t i-  
tu t io n a l  problem o f  the  Ifiiited S ta te s —th e  ex is ten ce  o f  a Tupl t l p l i n l l y
o f lo c a l  le g is la tu r e s  w ith in d e f in i te  p o w e r s . T h e  C o n stitu tio n  was
designed and couched w ith  s u f f ic ie n t  working room f o r  c o n s tru c tio n  to
12supply th e  shortcom ings o f th a t  a r t i c l e  o f government. The C onsti­
tu tio n  p laced  undisputed  h ig h es t a u th o r ity  in  th e  n a tio n a l  government.
I t  was s ta te d ,  and understood by the  s ig n e rs  a t  l e a s t ,  to  be th e  
supreme law o f  the  la n d .
But was th e  United S ta te s ,  a  n a tio n  l i t t l e  more than  a decade 
o ld , ready to  rec e iv e  such a government as proposed by th e  C o n stitu tio n ?  
Could i t s  people , t h e i r  i n s t i t u t io n s ,  and t h e i r  degree o f  p o l i t i c a l  
awareness m ain tain  such c e n tr a l iz a t io n  w ithou t th e  accompanying lo ss  
o f p o l i t i c a l  freedoms and in d iv id u a l l i b e r t i e s  h i s to r i c a l l y  consequent
^Robert A llen R utland, The Ordeal o f th e  C o n s titu tio n s The A nti-  
f e d e r a l i s t s  and th e  R a ti f ic a t io n  S trugg le  o f  1787-1788 (Norman. 19^j%  
p .
^^Edward S. Corwin, "The P rogress o f  P o l i t ic a l  Theory Between th e  
D ec la ra tio n  o f Independence and the Meeting o f th e  P h ilad e lp h ia  Conven­
t io n ,"  American H is to r ic a l  Review. XXX (1925 )> 520.
^^ Ib id .g p .  513o ^^Xbid. .  p . 521.
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o f such c e n tra l iz a tio n ?  Power to  handle t h e i r  own a f f a i r s  had been 
w rested  f r m  th e  Mother Country on ly  w ith  g re a t s a c r i f i c e  and e ffo r to  
That power was n o t considered  a commodity to  be to sse d  about l ig h t l y .  
Thus 5 ih e  A n ti-TPaHAfai i a t s  th e  b a s is  f o r  c o n f l ic t  was t h a t  a
s trong  cent r a l  governme n t, given s u f f ic ie n t  tim e, wouM weaken and 
u l tim a te ly  d estro y  lo c a l  government and i t s  accompanying p o l i t i c a l  
freedoms and in d iv id u a l p e rso n a l l i b e r t i e s . O t h e r s  be lieved  th a t  
n a tio n a l  government mus t  become .an.aggrandiging.^ari3 to  th e
de trim en t o f those  hard-won freedom s.
.M ti-W g W = l8 ts _ in  th^^ Conventlcm were from the
s t a r t  § m _ ex ceed in g ]^ ^ ^  Indeed, at  th e  end on ly  George
Mason and Govem or.JW m m dJW dol^^ a n d ^ b r i ^ e  Gerqr
o f Jîasaachusatts,.râm ainedo Gone were JbbnJ^nnsijng, J r . ,  and Robert 
Ya te s  o f New York, and M aryland's L u ther M artin , d isappo in ted  a t  th e  
C onvention 's continued in s is te n c e  on c e n tra l iz e d  government. They 
need n o t have been su rp r is e d , however, nor f e l t  so bad ly , about the  
outcome o f th e  Convention, f o r  a rrayed  a g a in s t them was the g re a te s t  
c o lle c tio n  o f N a tio n a lis ts  ever c o lle c te d  to g e th e r  in  one p lace  in  
American h ist-o ry . R ichard Henry Lee, subsequen tly  one o f th e  forem ost 
o f the  A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  e s s a y is ts ,  d ec lined  a ttendance  a t  th e  Convention,
^% orton  Borden ( e d .) ,  The A n t i f e d e ra l is t  Papers (Ann Arbor, 
1961), pp . hO -hl. ~  _ _ _ _ _
James Madison, The Debates in  th e  F edera l Convention o f  1787 
Nhich Framed th e  C o n s titu tio n  o f  the  IM ited S ta te s  o f  America, G a illa rd  
Hunt and James Brown S c o tt (e d s .)  (New York, 1920), p .^^7^.
^^Edmund Randolph ap p aren tly  had second thoughts on th e  m a tte r  o f 
continued  opposition  to  th e  C o n s titu tio n  between th e  c lo s in g  o f  th e  
P h ilad e lp h ia  Convention and th e  opening o f  th e  V irg in ia  R a tify in g  Con­
v e n tio n . At l e a s t  he sa id  he d id . E l l i o t ,  D ebates, I I I ,  23=28.
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In  view o f  t h e i r  sm all number a t  th e  Convention, and in  view 
a lso  o f  the  stro n g  N a tio n a lis t  co n tin g en t, the  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  gained 
few successes in  t h e i r  e f f o r t s  to  thw art th e  c e n tra l iz in g  tendency o f  
th e  n a tio n a lis t-m in d e d  d e le g a te s . Qf thm ir many p ro p o sa ls , only th e  
ex c lu siv e  r ig h t  o f th e  House o f  R ep resen ta tiv es to  o r ig in a te _ ^ p ro p r ia -  
t io n  b i l l s  was accep ted j t h e i r  o th e r  p ro p o sa ls  found l i t t l e  support 
among th e  d e le g a te s . As i f  to  ven t t h e i r  d isappointm ent over th e  o u t­
come o f th e  Convention, th e  th re e  rem aining 'A n tis  ' re fu sed  to  g ive  
t h e i r  s i ^ e d  a ssen t to  th e  C o n s titu tio n  as i t  emerged from th e  s e c re t  
deba tes , nor d id  they  h e s i ta te  to  review the outcome o f  th e  proceedings 
in  th e  f i n a l  days o f the  Convention. Each o f  th i s  famous "d is se n tin g  
t r i o " expressed in  h is  own way grave concern over the  dangerous tendency 
toward c e n tra l iz a tio n  o f  a u th o r ity  adopted in  p a r t  o f th e  C o n s titu tio n !^
Though the Anti -F e d e ra l is t s  tr a n s fe r re d  t h e i r  o p p o sitio n  to  the  
C onfederation Congress, t h e i r  p reven t t  passage o f thO
Co n s t i t u t i o n .o n _ J ^ e  people f a i l e d .  But the  C o n s titu tio n  s t i l l  faced  
i t s  most d i f f i c u l t  t e s ts  r a t i f i c a t i o n  in  s p e c ia l  s t a te  conventions by 
the  req u ired  n ine  o f  th e  th ir te e n  s ta te s  rem ained. This p resen ted  the  
A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  w ith  t h e i r  f i n a l  o p p o rtu n ity  and t h e i r  s tre n g th , a b i l ­
i t i e s ,  and perseverance were p u t to  the  t e s t .
The A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  ga thered  a l l  t h e i r  de te rm ina tion  and f a c ts  
a t  c h e ir  d isp o sa l f o r  the  f i n a l  c o n te s t .  But t h e i r  n a t io n a l i s t  oppon­
en ts  were no le s s  a c t iv e . The F e d e ra l is ts ' s t ra te g y  was to  secu re  th e
l^ F o r the  o b jec tio n s  o f Edmund Randolph to  th e  C o n s titu tio n , see  
Madison, op. c i t . .  pp. ^7^-576. For George Mason's o b jec tio n s  to  the 
C o n s titu tio n , see I b id . .  p . 5?6. And f o r  th e  c r i t ic is m s  by E lbridge 
G erry o f the  C o n s titu tio n , see i b id . , pp . 576- 577 .
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e a r ly  c a l l in g  o f  th e  s t a te  r a t i f y in g  conventions and consequent speedy
ra t i f ic a t io n o  Thus, they  hoped to  b u ild  up a momentum o f  r a t i f i c a t i o n
idilch would be d i f f i c u l t  to  s to p .^ ^  The s t r a t e gy was a c t i on. % e^
A n t^ e d e ra U § i.5 ,,Q0_̂  ̂ fo r j ie la y ^  co u n se llin g  slow
18and c a re fu l  c o n s id e ra tio n  o f th e  new p lan  o f  government. The Feder­
a l i s ts *  s tra te g y  p a id  o f f ,  w ith  se v e ra l quick and r e la t iv e ly  easy 
su ccesses . But th e se  e a r ly  successes by no means d e te r re d  the  A n ti-  
F e d e ra l is ts ,  f o r  th ese  successes were c h ie f ly  in  the  sm all New Ehgland 
s ta te s  : th e se , w ith the  exception  o f  îfa ssac h u se tts , had been acknow­
ledged as give-aways from the f i r s t .  The ‘Antis* looked forw ard to  
the  la r g e r  s t a te s —New York, V irg in ia , North C aro lina—f o r  t h e i r  hopes. 
And they  came very  c lo se  to  success in  t h e i r  campaign.
17au tland , 0£ . c i t . , p . U9.
^^ Ib ld . .  p . 36 .
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CHAPTER I I
THE NEW ENGLAND STATES
The Federal Convention h e ld  i t s  l a s t  se ss io n  o f  debates on 
% ptem ber 17, 178?o The C o n stitu tio n  was then  p resen ted  to  th e  Confed­
e ra tio n  Congress, which q u ick ly  gave th e  new a r t i c l e  o f  government i t s  
app roval,^  and recommended th a t  th e  s ta te  l e g is la tu r e s  p lan  e le c tio n s  
fo r  d e leg a tes  to  th e  s p e c ia l  s ta te  r a t i f y in g  conven tions. While th ese  
proceedings were in  p ro g re ss , F e d e ra l is ts  throughout America were a c tiv e . 
T heir s t ra te g y , as o u tlin e d  in  Chapter I ,  had p rev io u s ly  been decided 
upon, and they moved s w if t ly  to  implement th a t  s tra te g y .. The F e d e ra l­
i s t s  o f the  fo u r New England s ta te s  were e sp e c ia l ly  a c t iv e , fo r  they
re a liz e d  th e  g re a t advantage p resen ted  to  them by th e  in te rn a l  s i tu a t io n  
2
in  those  s ta te s»  The p ro sp ec t o f e a r ly  and r e la t iv e ly  easy r a t i f i c a ­
tio n  was indeed th e  case in  New Ehgland, and th e  F e d e ra lis ts  planned to  
g e t th e  b a l l  o f quick r a t i f i c a t i o n  moving e a r ly  in  th a t  region»^
^D espite the  e f f o r t s  o f  R ichard Henry Lee and o th e r  A n ti-F ed era l­
i s t s  in  th e  C onfederation Congraas to  convince th a t  body n o t to  approve 
the  C o n s titu tio n , the  Congress
to  approve th e new a r t i c l e  o f government» The Congress se n t a re s o lu ­
t io n  to  th e  le g is la tu r e s  o f  th e  se v e ra l s ta te s  in s tru c t in g  them to  c a l l  
e le c tio n s  fo r  d e leg a tes  to  the  r a t i f y in g  conven tions. James Madison,
The Debates in  the  F edera l Convention of 1787 Which Framed the  C o n stitu ­
t io n  o f the  T hited  S ta te s  o f America, G a illa rd  Hunt and James Brown 
S c o t tT e d s ») (New fo rk , l9 § 0 ) , p» 6 k l »
^Robert A llen  R utland, The Ordeal o f  th e  C o n s ti tu tio n s The R a ti f -  _ 
Ic a tio n  S trugg le  o f  1787-1788 (Norman, 19^^)»
^Robert M orris i s  rep o rted  to  have considered  th a t  a l l  th e  s ta te s  
above New York, Rhode Is la n d  excep ting , la y  in  th e  F e d e ra l is t  Gamp» His 
e s tim a tio n  was very  a c c u ra te | indeed , on ly  M assachusetts and New Hampshire 
(unexpectedly) and Rhode Is la n d  (expectedly") “dem onstrated any A nti-Fed­
e r a l i s t  s treng th»  R utland, ib id » , p» SO»
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C onnecticut ; th e  f i r s t  New Bagland s t a te  to  c a l l  i t s  r a t i f y in g
convention , dem onstrated some meager A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  o p p o sitio n . The
C onnecticut ratiJfy ijig  convention re q u ire d  only  one week to  g ive  i t s
approval to  th e  C o n s titu tio n .^  I t  must n o t be thought from th i s  rap id
v o te , however, th a t  A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  o p p o sitio n  was lack in g  in  e i th e r
ex is ten ce  o r  s p i r i t ;  th e  sm all A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  co n tin g en t p re se n t In
th e  F edera lis t-dom inated  convention s tro n g ly  m ain tained  i t s  p o s i t io n .
The determ ina tion  shown by the  ‘A n tis ’ p re se n t in  H artfo rd  i s  a c re d i t
to  t h e i r  b e l i e f  in  t h e i r  p o s itio n  and to  th e  le a d e rsh ip  shown by General
James Wadsworth and h is  com patrio t. Judge E lip h a le t  Dyer. General
Tffedsworth was a capable d eb a te r, and h is  staunch o p p o sitio n  to  h is
F e d e ra l is t  opponents undoubtedly caused them some disparagem ent, though
he re a liz e d  th e  is su e  o f  r a t i f i c a t i o n  was never s e r io u s ly  in  doubt.
General Wadsworth‘s o p p o sitio n  to  th e  C o n s titu tio n  cen tered
e s p e c ia l ly  on th e  broad tax ing  powers g ra n te d  to  th e  proposed Congress.
In  g iv ing  Congress both the power o f the  purse  (A r tic le  I ,  se c tio n s  7
c;
and 8, o f  the F ederal C o n s titu tio n ) and the  power o f  the  sword (A rtic le  
I ,  s e c tio n  8 ) , ^  a  n e a r-d e sp o tic  a u th o r i ty  was g ran ted  to  the  n a tio n a l 
l e g i s l a tu r e .  Not only  was power o f such ex tensive  n a tu re  but one sh o rt
^Pennsylvania was th e  f i r s t  s t a te  to  c a l l  i t s  r a t i fy in g  conven­
t io n  (November 21, 1787), Delaware follow ed w ith  a c a l l  f o r  December 3, 
1787. The vo tes on r a t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  these  two s ta te s  came on December 
12 (ii6 f o r ,  23 a g a in s t ) ,  and Decanber 7 (unanimous approval o f th e  Con­
s t i t u t i o n ) ,  r e s p e c t iv e ly . New Je rse y  and G eorgia became th e  th i r d  and 
fo u r th  s ta te s  to  r a t i f y  th e^ C o n stitu tio n  on December I 8 , 1787, and 
January  2, 1788, re s p e c tiv e ly , and follow ed th e  example o f Delaware in  
r a t i f y in g  unanim ously. Conn e c t ic u t  c a lle d  i t s  r a t i f y in g  convention f o r  
January 1 , 1788; i t s  r a t i f io a t ld n  came on January 19, w ith  a v o te  o f 
128 f o r  r a t i f i c a t i o n  and UO a g a in s t .
E d i s o n ,  0£ , c i t . .  pp. 629- 630.
^ Ib ld .o  p , 630.
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s te p  from enfo rceab le  coercion  by th e  fe d e ra l government, Wadsworth 
charged, bu t th e  de lega tes  to  th e  F edera l Convention had no r ig h t  to  
d e leg a te  to  Congress th e  r ig h t  to  u ra rp  s t a te  p re ro g a tiv e s  o f  tax ing  
th e  c iti 'z e n s  o f th e  se v e ra l s t a t e s . F in a lly , he b i t t e r l y  concluded 
th a t  such ex tensive  a u th o r i ty  would serve in  the  l a s t  r e s o r t  to  b e n e f i t  
th e  South a t  the  expense o f  the  North
Wiadsïmrth .on th i s  m a tte r  o f  fe d e ra l  ta x a tio n  p a r a l le l s
c lo se ly  th a t  o f the  anonymous au th o r o f an essay  reproduced in  Morton
g
Borden “ s The A n ti f e d e ra l is t  Papers » The new government, the  au tho r
contended, would prove much more expensive than  th e  Confederationo 
Though Alexander Ham ilton, in  F e d e ra l is t  Number 13, reasoned t h a t th e  
government as proposed by the  C o n stitu tio n  would be f a r  cheaper to  
op e ra te  th an the o ld  C onfederation ^ o v e im  by v i r tu e  o f  i t s  s in g le
g
c iv i l  l i s t  assuming more powers, —n o t so conteM@dL_the A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  
e ssa y is te  For th e  h is to ry  o f  G reat B r i ta in , w ith i t s  scheme o f  re p re s ­
e n ta tio n  in  the  House o f Commons bore ou t th e  p o s it io n  th a t  a la rg e  
c iv i l  l i s t  i s  n o t n e c e s s a r ily  cheaper in  o p e ra tio n  than th ir te e n  se p a r­
a te  and le s s  pow erful governments <, Moreover, the w r i te r  asked, i s  i t  
p roper to  g ran t both power and p ro p erty  to  any group o f  men, befo re  the  
p u b lic  d eb t, in c lud ing  the  p re se n t and fu tu re  expenses o f th e  f e d e ra l
7%dsTimrth^ p re d ic tio n  was on ly  the f i r s t  o f  many, such p r e d ic  
t io n s  Jh a t p a r t i c u la r  s e c tio n s  o f th e  C o n s titu tio n  would b e n e f i t  the  
Southern s ta te s  a t  th e  expense o f th e  North (o r  v ice  v e rsa  depending 
upon whether the  source o f  th e  p re d ic tio n  was from the North o r  the  
South)» P re d ic tio n s  o f a s im ila r  n a tu re  w i l l  be p o in ted  ou t in  subse­
quent chap ters » R utland , o£o c i t . ,  pp , 70-7^.
8Morton Borden (ed») ,  The A n ti f e d e ra l is t  Papers (Ann A rbor, 
1961), ppo 35“36o
^Alexander Ham ilton, James Madison, John Jay , The F e d e ra l is t ,  
C lin ton  R o ss ite r  (ed») (New York, 1961), pp. 97=-99.
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government g i s  f u l ly  exp la ined  to  th e  p u b lic?  Even under th e  Confeder­
a t io n , no one, contended the  w r i te r ,  was quite.-S.ure o f th e  ex ten t o f 
thÆ juW ^.,^^ nor_whatJh9_expaaa9i4lf-..^i^ •
Prudence demands ,  he concluded, thmsA m a tte ra , o f the  g rav es t
economic im portance, b ^  knnwn Jgu% jp JiSfSXP th e  powers o f  ta x a ­
t io n  o f  th e  proposed fe d e ra l  government, and i t s  r ig h t  to  extend i t s  
uncon tested  a u th o r i ty  over th e  immense a re a  o f  th e  coun try , be g ran ted .
D esp ite  a l l  o f W adsworth's e f f o r t s ,  th e  r a t i f i c a t i o n  o f the 
C o n s titu tio n  by the  C onnecticut convention was assured  as a m a tte r  o f 
course , By th e  end o f  JanuarVf__12&8_. f iv e  s ta te s  had given th e i r  ap­
p roval to  the  C onstitu tion»  W ith th e  excep tion  o f  Pennsylvania, a l l  
these  s ta te s  which r a t i f i e d  th e  C o n stitu tio n  by January were re a l iz e d  
and accepted  by the  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  elsew here as give-aways» The r e a l  
show o f s tre n g th  was sh o r t ly  to  begin , however, fo r  among the  rem aining 
conventions to  be c a l le d  were the  s ta te s  th a t  could make o r break 
eitheg^^side iu  th e  c o n te s t—M assachusetts, New York, and V irg in ia»  The 
c o n te s ts  in  th ese  th re e  'l a r g e ' s t a t e s ,  n o t to  mention th e  sm aller 
s ta te s  o f  New Hampshire, M aryland, and North C aro lina, were recognized 
as extrem ely close» A se tback  in  any one o f th e  th re e  m ajor s ta te s
could ve ry  w ell be the undoing o f a l l  the  e f f o r t  and p lanning sp en t in
secu ring  r a t i f i c a t i o n  up to  th a t  time»
The f i r s t  o f  the  th re e  'l a r g e ' s t a te s  to  open i t s  convention 
proceedings was Massachusetts»^® Though the is su e  o f r a t i f i c a t i o n  in  
th e  s t a te  was in  doubt, th e re  was an o th e r f a c to r  o f  equal im portance in  
th e  f i n a l  outcomes The a c tio n  taken  by the  M assachusetts convention
^®The M assachusetts r a t i fy in g  convention opened on January 9 ,
1788»
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would v e ry  l ik e ly  determ ine, and was c e r ta in  to  in f lu e n c e , the  outcome 
o f th e  New York, V irg in ia , and Maryland conventions o
The F e d e ra l is t  ranks in  the  Boston convention su ffe re d  from no 
d e a rth  o f  w idely known, w ell re sp e c te d , and undoubtedly ta le n te d  men, 
f o r  men l ik e  N athan iel Gorham, F ish e r  Ames, Rufus King, Theodore Sedg­
wick, and F ranc is  Dana ro se  and spoke in  support o f  the  C onstitu tiono  
Though in  term s o f pure numbers the  F e d e ra lis ts  were a t  a  d isadvantage, 
th e  convention was he ld  in  s tro n g ly  F e d e ra l is t  Boston, and th a t  s in g le  
f a c t  was c e r ta in ly  o f  no sm all m oral value*
The A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts*  ranks lik ew ise  included  numerous w e ll-  
known and resp ec ted  man, though th e  most capable ‘A nti* , E lbridge G erry, 
f a i l e d  in  h is  b id  fo r  e le c tio n  as a de legate*  Then to o , many o f th e  
A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  p re se n t were m oderates, tend ing  towards v a c i l l a t in g ,  
and a sudden s h i f t  in  F e d e ra l is t  s t r a te g y  aimed a t  cap tu rin g  th e  sup- 
p o r t  o f  th ese  men caught the  A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  le a d e rs  o f f  t h e i r  guard*
The r e s u l t ,  as w i l l  be seen, was d is a s te r  to  th e  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts ‘ 
a s p i r a t io n s ,
The M assachusetts A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  were extrem ely s tro n g , v o ca l, 
and p r o l i f i c  in  t h e i r  p o s i t io n , p resen tin g  a  s iz a b le  q u a n tity  o f l i t e r ­
a tu re  in  the  form of essay s, l e t t e r s ,  b roadsides, and pamphlets to  the
^^During th e  l a t e r  course o f th e  d eb a tes , tW  F e d e ra l is t  le a d e r ­
sh ip  in  th e  convention convinced Governor John Hancock, whose support 
was v i t a l  to  th e  F e d e ra l is t  cause , to  p re se n t c e r ta in  ^endm ents to  the  
C o n s titu tio n  In  r e tu rn  f o r  W iich .the  F e d e ra lis ts  promised t h e i r  support 
in  secu ring  Hancock an appo in tive  p o s it io n  in  th e  a d m in is tra tio n  o f 
George Washington as P residen t*  F o rre s t MacDonald, "The A n ti-F ed era l­
i s t s , "  The Wisconsin Magazine o f  H istory* XLVI (1963), f  »n. Though th e  
amendments were only  recommendatory, th e  move was su ccessfu l in  changing 
the  minds o f a , s u f f ic i e n t  number o f ‘Juatis^ to  g ive  the  F e d e ra l is ts  th e  
v o tes  th ey  needed f o r  r a t i f ic a t io n *  See Jackson Turner Main, The A n ti-  
F e d e ra l is ts  8 C r i t ic s  o f ^  C onstitu tion*  1781-1788 (Chapel H i l l , ’ 19^1},
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publico  Both th e  su p p o rte rs  and th e  opponents o f  th e  C o n s titu tio n  had 
more than  s u f f ic ie n t  tim e to  p repare  t h e i r  re sp e c tiv e  arguments f o r  
d issem ination  to  th e  p u b lic  befo re  th e  convention began, and both s id e s  
were ex tra n e ly  busy in  doing so . The m a jo rity  o f  the s t a t e 's  newspapers 
were lo c a te d  in  F ed era lis t-d o m in a ted  Boston, and consequently  r e f le c te d
the  N a tio n a lis t  p o s i t io n .  The bulk o f  th e  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts*  w ritin g s
XPwere found in  a s in g le  p ap e r, Edward Power's American H erald , but 
ag a in , they  were numerous.
The a b le s t  A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  pam phleteers were E lb ridge  Gerry and 
Agrippa, and both were extrem ely a c tiv e  in  t h e i r  e f f o r t s .  G erry, the 
n o rth ern  member o f th e  "d isse n tin g  t r io "  a t  th e  F edera l Convention, 
rep e a te d ly  evidenced h is  f e a r  o f th e  p o ss ib le  consequences o f adopting 
a C o n s titu tio n  which was both ambiguous and, to  h is  mind, incom plete.
As he explained  in  h is  l e t t e r  to  the  M assachusetts ' L e g is la tu re , h is  
re fu s a l  to  a f f ix  h is  s ig n a tu re  to  th e  C o n s titu tio n , "h is  only m otive 
fo r  d is se n tin g  from th e  C o n s titu tio n  was a firm  persu asio n  th a t  i t  would 
endanger the  l i b e r t i e s  o f America. . . .  He was n o t ,"  he con tinued , 
"au th o rised  to  an a c t ,  which appeared to  him was a su rren d er o f  l i b e r ­
t ie s ." ^ ^  Close exam ination o f  G e rry 's  pamphlet to  th e  p re s id in g  o f f ic e r  
o f the M assachusetts L e g is la tu re , e n t i t le d  "O bservations on the  New 
C o n s titu tio n  and on th e  F edera l and S ta te  Convention," makes fo r  h ig h ly  
illu m in a tin g  read in g . More im portan t, however, i s  the key th a t  i t  p ro ­
v ides f o r  the understand ing  o f the  man h im se lf .
^^R utland, o£. c i t . . pp. 66-7S.
13Paul L e ic e s te r  Ford ( e d . ) .  Essays on th e  C o n stitu tio n  of the  
Iftiited S ta te s  (Brooklyn 1892), pp. 127-127. "
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Independently  w ealthy , w ith  a  prosperous m ercan tile  business in  
Boston, and w ith  no apparen t p o l i t i c a l  a s p ira t io n s ,^ ^  (Jerry’s re fu s a l  
t o ^ i ^  an a r t i c l e  o f government which appeared so improper a ffo rd ed  
him l i t t l e  b e n e f i t  but much p e rso n a l r i s k .  Thilike many o f  h is  oppon­
e n ts ,  and many o f  h is  co lleagues in  a l l  f a i r n e s s ,  who served to  p r o f i t  
from a p o l i t i c a l  o r  economic stan d p o in t from t h e i r  re sp e c tiv e  p o s it io n a , 
G erry’s opp o sitio n  was q u ite  conv incing ly  derived  from a genuine f e a r  
o f th e  e f fe c ts  th e  C o n s titu tio n  would have upon the  people and t h e i r  
freedom s. His p o s i t io n , th en , ranks him as one o f the  very  few t ru e  
^ statesm en in  th e  country  on ei t h e r  s id .e.
G erry’s '*O bservations” d e ta i l  a  number o f o b jec tio n s  which th e  
au tho r b e liev es  re q u ire  immediate c o rre c tio n . A g re a t many o f h is  ob­
je c tio n s  were repea ted  again  and again  during the  m onth-and-a-half 
long convention, and th i s  th e s is  w il l  a ttem pt to  c o r re la te  h is  “Obser­
v a tio n s” w ith  s im ila r  ones p resen ted  in  th e  convention.
By no means the  l e a s t  o f h is  and o th e r  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts ’ o b jec ­
t io n s  to  the C o n stitu tio n  concerned th e  proposed House o f R epresent­
a t iv e s .  So im portant do th ese  o b jec tio n s  become in  A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  
speeches and w r i t in g s , in  M assachusetts and elsew here, th a t  some 
re c a p itu la t io n  o f  A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  theory  o f re p re se n ta tiv e  government 
Is  v a lu ab le  h e re .
Both th e  F e d e ra l is ts  and the  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  were in  agreement 
th a t  w hatever government opera ted  in  the  Ifiiited S ta te s ,  i t s  b asic  form 
must be rep u b lican . For men o f  both p o s i t io n s ,  a ls o , the  lower house 
o f th e  l e g i s l a t iv e  branch, on both th e  s t a te  and n a tio n a l le v e ls ,  the
l% o r r e s t  MacDonald, %  People (Chicago, 19^8), p . ^9.
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houses b road ly  re p re se n ta tiv e  o f  th e  peo p le , was understood  to  be th e  
dominant house. This was a ca rry -o v e r from c o lo n ia l  tim es and i t  was 
u n th in k ab le , to  the  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  a t  l e a s t ,  th a t  th e  power o f  th e  
lower houses be s ig n i f ic a n t ly  r e d u c e d . A  p a r t  o f t h i s  a sp ec t o f  
A nti-Federalism  was th e  p r in c ip le  th a t  th e  government should r e s t  on 
the  consent o f  a t  l e a s t  a  s u b s ta n t ia l  p ro p o rtio n  o f  th e  governed, though 
j u s t  what segments o f the  f r e e  a d u lt  male p o pu la tion  m ight be excluded 
from th e  f ra n c h ise  was no t agreed  upon.^^
As c la s s ic a l  r e""bl inanm, t.h» A n tt-F e d a ra lis ta  ware n a tu ra l ly  
very  concerned wjj;b.Jhe_^zl m W & _ w h is ^  people^KOJild, bji
rep re sen ted  in  th e  proposed fe d e ra l  government, and th e  degree to  which 
th ey  would e x is t  as th e  a u th o r i ty  behind th a t  government. The fram ers 
o f th e  C o n s titu tio n  designed the House o f R ep resen ta tives as th e  house 
o f  the peop le ; indeed, i t  was the  so le  house over whose members the  
people had a d i r e c t  s e le c t io n .  The House, acco rd ing ly , g re a t ly  con­
cerned th e  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  o f M assachusetts.
The p ro spec t o f b ie n n ia l e le c tio n  o f  re p re se n ta tiv e s  was the  
f i r s t  o f  G e rry 's  many c r i t ic is m s  of the  C o n s titu tio n .
[W]hen s o c ie ty  has depu tied  a c e r ta in  number o f  th e i r  equals 
to  take ca re  o f t h e i r  p e rso n a l r ig h ts ,  and th e  in te r e s ts  o f  
the  whole community, i t  must be considered  th a t  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  
i s  th e  g re a t s e c u r i ty  o f in te g r i ty  and honor, and th a t  annual 
e le c tio n  i s  the  b a s is  o f  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty .17
l^ C e ce lia  M. Kenyon, The A n ti f e d e ra l is ts  (New York, 1966), pp. 
xxv-xxvi.
^^Ib id o B p . x x v i i i .
^7paul L e ic e s te r  Ford ( e d . ) ,  Pamphlets on th e  C o n s titu tio n  o f  
th e  U nited S ta te s  (Brooklyn, 1891), p
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The problem o f  the  frequency o f  n a tio n a l  e le c tio n s  was h o tl ĝ  
d isp u ted t hroughout the  F edera l Convention, and continued to  form the 
su b je c t o f ex tensive  debates and exhaustive  coverage in  w r itte n  form in  
most o f th e  s ta te s  during the  r a t i f i c a t i o n  s tru g g le . I t  was, moreover, 
a problem which was never answered to  many A n ti -F e d e ra lis ts ” s a t i s f a c ­
tio n  during th e  course o f th e  r a t i f i c a t i o n  movement. Mon te s q u ie u 's
epigram, "The g rea tn ess  o f power must be compensated fo r  by th e  b re v ity  
1 fio f  the d u ra tio n 9* was repea ted  again  and again  as the maxim f o r  the
19guarantee  o f con tinued  p o l i t i c a l  l i b e r ty  and p e rso n a l freedom.
I t  was no t uncommon throughout the  th ir te e n  s ta te s  to  f in d  p u b lic  
o f f i c i a l s  whose term s o f  o f f ic e  req u ired  re e le c tio n  every s ix  monthsj 
annual e le c tio n  to  n a tio n a l  and e s p e c ia lly  s ta te  o f f ic e s  was the  ru le.^O  
The An ti°F e d e ra l i s t s  o f  M assachusetts, however, appeared to be p a r t ic u ­
l a r l y  concerned w ith  th e  nroblem o f e le c tio n s  to  n a tio n a l  o f f ic e s ,  and 
were extrem ely vexed w ith the  p ro v is io n  o f  A r tic le  I ,  se c tio n  2, o f  the  
C o n s titu tio n . C uriously  enough, r e la t iv e ly  l i t t l e  was made o f  th e  p ro -  
v is io n  fo r  b ijn n ia l_ q le e tio n s  o u tside_ the  Bay s ta te ,. I t  may be, as 
C ece lia  Kenyon suggests in  h e r in tro d u c tio n  to  The A n t i f e d e ra l is ts ,
Jonathan E l l io t  ( e d . ) ,  The Debates in  the  Several S ta te  Conven- 
t io n s  on th e  R a ti f ic a tio n  o f  the  F ederal C o n stitu tio n  v o ls . .  1076- 
i m r  P h iH d e lp h ia , 1Ü76),— l T 3 ,  13, 1 $ - ! ^ ------ ---------
^^Ford, E ssays, p . ^9.
^®The M assachusetts C o n s titu tio n  o f  1780, f o r  example, p rovided 
th a t  th e  members o f  both the  Senate (Chapter I ,  se c tio n  I I ,  a r t i c l e  I )  
and the  House o f R ep resen ta tiv es (C hapter I ,  s e c tio n  I I I ,  a r t i c l e  I )  
were to  be e le c te d  to  th e i r  o f f ic e s  an n u ally . Robert J .  T aylor ( e d . ) , 
M assachuse tts, Colony to  Commonwealths Documents on the Formation o f i t s  
C o n s ti tu tio n , 1775-1780 (Chapel H i l l ,  19^1), pp. 133 and 13$, re sp ec - 
t iv e iy .
21Kenyon, o£„ c i t . , p . I v i .
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th a t  th e re  seemed to  be a g re a te r  w illin g n e ss  on the  p a r t  o f  th e  A n ti- 
F e d e ra l is ts  to  concede the  leg itim acy  o f  th e  F e d e ra lis t  argument th a t  
the  d i f f e r e n t  circum stances o f a c e n tra l  government and th e  len g th  of 
time req u ire d  f o r  re p re se n ta tiv e s  to  t r a v e l  from th e i r  home d i s t r i c t s  
to  th e  s e a t  o f government j u s t i f i e d  th e  lo n g er terms o f o f f ic e .  
C e rta in ly , on the  o th e r  hand, i t  seems ju s t  as expected th a t  in  th e  
th ir te e n  s ta te s  o f America, only M assachusetts A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  would 
p ro te s t  th e  C o n s ti tu tio n 's  ignoring  o f  the  s a fe ty  and se c u r i ty  provided 
fo r  in  annual e le c t io n s . The exp lanation  fo r  th is  conduct may l i e  in  
Robert Brown's th eo ry  th a t  the  Bay s t a te  dem onstrated more m id d le -c lass  
democracy than d id  h e r s i s t e r  s t a t e s M o r e  l ik e ly ,  however, the  
conduct o f  th e  Massach u se tt s  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  a rose  from the  c o n s t i tu ­
t io n a l  h is to ry  o f the  s t a t e ,  which had h i s to r ic a l l y  d isp layed  a r e l a ­
t iv e ly  w ider su ffra g e  than  the  o th e r  s ta te s  o f  America. Indeed, the  
r e s t r i c t io n s  on su ffra g e  were one o f the  main reasons f o r  the  r e je c t io n  
by the people o f  th e  M assachusetts C o n s titu tio n  o f  1778.23 The A n ti- 
F e d e ra lis ts  o f th e  Bay s t a te  were th e o re t ic a l  in h e r i to r s  o f  th is  
t r a d i t io n ,  and as such th e i r  o b jec tio n s  to  A r t ic le  I ,  se c tio n  2, o f  
the C o n stitu tio n  a re  e n t i r e ly  p re d ic ta b le .
As a c o llo ra ry  to  th is  c r i t ic is m  o f th e  proposed re p re se n ta tiv e  
n a tu re  o f the government, i t  was w idely  agreed th a t  only one re p re se n t­
a t iv e  per t h i r t y  thousand in h a b ita n ts  o f  a s t a t e 's  popu la tion  was
22Robert Brown, Middle C lass Democracy and the R evolution in  
M assachusetts , I 68I - I 78O (I th a c a , 195
23The in h a b ita n ts  o f th e  town o f Mendoy, W orcester County, s a id , 
f o r  example, th a t  " i t  appears to  us th a t  i t  i s  very  unreasonable th a t  
no person  s h a l l  be allowed to  g ive h is  vo te  f o r  Governor, L t. Governor 
o r Senators . . . u n le ss  he make oath  th a t  he i s  q u a lif ie d  v iz  th a t  he 
i s  worth <^0o" T aylor, c i t . , p . 62.
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e n t i r e ly  too sm a ll. Agrippa complained th a t  given th a t  r a t io  o f
re p re se n ta tiv e s  to  p o p u la tio n , i t  was u n lik e ly  th a t  the re p re se n ta tiv e s
would m ain tain  any a f fe c t io n  fo r  t h e i r  c o n s titu e n ts ,^ ^  As General
Heath exp la ined , during the e a r ly  days o f th e  debatess
I t  i s  a novel id ea  th a t  re p re se n ta tiv e s  so chosen fo r  a  con­
s id e ra b le  tim e, in  o rd er th a t  they  may le a rn  t h e i r  du ty . The 
re p re se n ta tiv e  i s  one who appears in  b eh a lf  o f ,  and a c ts  f o r ,  
o th e rs j  he ought, th e re fo re ,  to  be f u l ly  acquain ted  w ith th e  
f e e l in g s ,  c ircum stances, and in te r e s t s  o f th e  persons he 
rep re se n ts  I and th is  i s  l e a m t  among them, no t a t  th e  d is ta n t
c o u r t«^5
P re c is e ly  because few men would re p re se n t many, ihey should re tu rn  
o ften  to  th e  people from whence they  came and consequently  be more 
re sp o n sib le  to  them. Annual e le c t io n s , th e re fo re ,  were favorgd
among A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  in  M assachusetts,
Then to o , given the  power g ran ted  Congress by A rtic le  I ,  se c tio n  
ii^^-“ '*The Time, P lace , and Manner o f holding E le c tio n s  f o r  Senators and 
R epresen tatives s h a l l  be p re sc rib e d  in  each s ta te  by th e  L e g is la tu re  
th e re o f j  but the  Congress may a t  any tim e by Law make o r a l t e r  such 
R egulation , . . was i t  n o t l ik e ly  th a t  Congress could v i r tu a l l y  p e r­
p e tu a te  i t s e l f  in  power in d e f in i te ly ,  o r  a t  b e s t so re g u la te  the  tim e,
p la c e , and mode o f e le c tio n  so as to  ensure the  e le c tio n  o f  such o f f i -
27c ia ls  as i t  d esired ?  I t  was a p o in t o f te n  repeated  in  the deb a tes , 
and in  th e  p u b lic  e s s a y s . M o s t  o f te n , th e  suggestion  was to  w i# h o ld
^^Ford, E ssays, p . $ho 
^ % l i o t ,  D ebates, I I ,  13.
^ ^ a d is o n , 0£ . c i t . , p . 628.
^"^E llio t, D ebates, I I ,  22, 23, 2$, 30-31 < 
^®Ford, E ssays, p . lOS.
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
27
such power which i f  chosen could be so g re a t and dangerous, and th a t
29th e  people had b e s t to  hold  such powers»
The ere^htest f e a r  o f  the  M assachusetts A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  was 
t h e i r  b e l ie f  th a t  t he proposed fe d e ra l  government would u lt im a te ly  
r e s u l t  in  a c o n so lid a tio n  o f  the  s t a t e  governments* The s t a te  govern- 
m ents, Agrippa so ab ly  exp la ined , were MsJborJ,caX3^,J^^^^ 
source o f  p ro te c tio n  o f th e i r  c i t i z e n s ' r ig h ts  and freedom s, and had 
proven them selves v igorous in  handling  problems o f  a l l  k i n d s M o r e ­
over, no ex tensiv e repub lican-governed empire had p reserved  i t s  p p l i t -  
ici^.,%i%Wm8 of..gonfede^r#lpns o » Only
by lo c a l  laws made by lo c a l  re p re se n ta tiv e s  could  the  p e o p le 's  happ i­
ness be m aintained*
Di h is  s e r ie s  o f L e t te r s ,  Agrippa p resen ted  a r a th e r  comprehen­
s iv e  exam ination o f ü ie  C o n stitu tio n  in  h is  endeavor to  dem onstrate i t s  
c o n so lid a tin g  nature*  Though s im ila r  o b jec tio n s  were voiced during  the  
d e b a t e s , A grippa' s arguments were f a r  su p e rio r  in  terras o f b read th  
and a n a ly t ic a l  reasoning* For th is  reason , th i s  th e s is  w il l  examine 
th a t  a sp ec t o f A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  f e a r  o f th e  C o n s titu tio n  p r im a rily  fipm 
h is  L e tte rs*
Agrippa was e s p e c ia l ly  concerned w ith th e  e x te n t o f  ju d ic ia l  
power g ranted  by the  C o n stitu tio n  to  th e  fe d e ra l ju d ic ia ry *  Indeed, 
in  the  eyes o f the  n o tab le  A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  w r i te r ,  the p ro v isio n s fo r
^ ^ E ll io t ,  Debates « I I ,  37*
^^Ford, E ssays, p* 63*
^ I b td * a p* 61i*
3 2 E llio t,  Debates* I I ,  63, 69, 73, 77, 80-81,
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th i s  fe d e ra l^ ju d ic ia l  th e  mgs t  o f  a l l  poyera. p f
th e  cantral-^gojAnament enumerated by th e  C o n s titu tio n . A r t ic le  I I I  o f 
33the C o n stitu tio n  proposed th e  estab lishm en t o f  a fe d e ra l  ju d ic ia ry  
w ith  a  s in g le  Supreme Court on top  and an u n sp e c if ie d  system o f  in f e r io r  
fe d e ra l  co u rts  beneath . The Congress o f  the fe d e ra l  government possessed  
th e  r ig h t  to  make laws which would in  no u n c e r ta in  term s be the  supreme 
law of th e  lan d , s t a te  c o n s titu t io n s  and s t a te  laws to  the  co n tra ry  
no tw ith s tan d in g . The fe d e ra l ju d ic ia ry  was bound by the  C o n stitu tio n  
to  support these  law s, again  no s t a te  c o n s titu t io n s  o r  laws to  the  con­
t r a r y  n o tw ith stan d in g .^^  On th ese  p ro v is io n s , Agrippa was vocal in  h is  
c r itic ism s?
Questions o f every kind re sp ec tin g  p ro p e rty  a re  determ inable 
in  a c o n tin e n ta l c o u rt , and so a re  a l l  kinds o f c rim in a l c ase s .
The c o n tin e n ta l l e g i s la tu r e  h as , th e re fo re , a  r ig h t  to  make 
ru le s  in  a l l  cases by ^ i c h  t h e i r  ju d ic ia l  c o u rts  s h a l l  proceed 
and decide c a se s . No r ig h ts  a re  reserved  to  the  c i t iz e n .  The 
laws o f Congress, a re  in  .aj.! case3,J.a.J?.9, tha,,gup^r law., o f th e  
land  g and paramount to  the  c o n s t itu t io n s  o f th e  in d iv id u a l s t a te s .
The Congress may i n s t i t u t e  what modes o f t r i a l  they  p le a se , ^ d
Agrippa d id  n o t, by any means, s top  w ith  th ese  few o b je c tio n s , however.
In  L e t te r  Number V, he begins a c a re fu l ly  co n stru c ted  exam ination o f
th e  fe d e ra l  ju d ic ia r y 's  powers under th e  C o n stitu tio n s
Causes o f a l l  k in d s, between c i t iz e n s  o f d i f f e r e n t  s t a t e s ,  a re  
to  be t r i e d  before  a c o n tin e n ta l c o u r t .  This c o u rt i s  no t 
bound to  t r y  i t  according  to  the  lo c a l  laws where th e  co n tro ­
v e rs ie s  happen^ f o r  in  th a t  case i t  may as w ell be t r i e d  in  a 
s t a te  c o u rt . The ru le  which i s  to  govern th e  new c o u rts , m ust, 
th e re fo re , be made by th e  co u rt i t s e l f ,  o r  by i t s  employers, 
th e  Congress. I f  by the  form er, th e  l e g i s l a t iv e  and ju d ic ia l
^% adison , c£ . c i t . ,  p . 635. 
^ I b i d o q p . 631.
% o r d .  Essays, pp. 6ii-6S.
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departm ents w i l l  be blended; and i f  by th e  Congress, though 
these  departm ents w i l l  be kep t se p a ra te , s t i l l  th e  power o f 
l e g i s la t io n  d eparts  from the s ta te s  in  a l l  c a s e s .
The Congress o f  the  proposed fe d e ra l  government. Agrippa con tinued , has
the  power to  make ru le s  f o r  try in g  qu estio n s o f  any n a tu re  re sp ec tin g
p ro p e rty  o f  any kind  o f c i t iz e n s  o f  two d i f f e r e n t  s t a t e s .  Because
37A rtic le  VI o f th e  C o n stitu tio n  s p e c i f ic a l ly  prov ides th a t  th e  Con­
s t i t u t i o n ,  any law , and any t r e a ty  made under th e  C o n stitu tio n  a re  th e  
supreme law o f th e  lan d , s t a te  judges a re  bound to- su p p o rt them.
The ju r is d ic t io n  of the  f e d e ra l  c o u rts  thus supercedes th a t  o f  
the s t a te  c o u rts . Agrippa concluded;
As no a u th o r i ty  remains to  the  s t a t e ,  indeed, but to  decide 
questions between c i t iz e n s  o f the  same s t a t e ,  and those judges 
a re  to  be bound by the  laws o f Congress, i t  c le a r ly  fo llo w s,
The same ru le  o f  procedure would apply in  cases between a s t a te
and i t s  own c i t iz e n s ,  namely, the  su p e r io r  p o s it io n  o f th e  fe d e ra l
c o u rts  to  the  s t a te  c o u r ts .  This c o n tra s ts , Agrippa concluded, w ith
th e  u su a l procedure o f handling  such cases—the  p e t i t io n in g  o f  th e
UO
supreme a u th o r ity  o f  th e  s t a t e s .
In  cases o f  c rim in a l p ro secu tio n s w ith  the  s t a te  as p l a i n t i f f  
and th e  accused the defendant, th e  procedure would be fo r  the a ttorney^ 
g enera l o f  th e  s t a te  to  commence h is  s u i t  befo re  th e  n e a re s t fe d e ra l 
c o u rt. To th a t  c o u rt  th e  defendant must t r a n s p o r t  h im self and h is  w it­
n e sse s . Because th e  t r i a l  would tak e  p lac e  among s tra n g e rs , who in  no 
way know w hether the  defendant i s  a  good o r bad man, the e f f e c t  o f  th e
3^I b id . , p . 66. 37I b i d pp.  66-67. ^ ^ Ib id .,  p . 67.
39 ib id . ^° I b id . .  pp . 67-68.
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p ro ced are . Agrippa argued, would be th e  derangement o f  l ib e r ty ;  f o r  the  
defendant must ru in  h im self to  prove h is  innocence before  th e  fe d e ra l  
co u rt
Agrippa, as weM_ ,so_mem o f the_toU^^^^^ was f irm ly
cpDvlpced th a t  the  in te n tio n  o f those who framed the  C o n stitu tio n s 
c e r ta in ly  one u ltim a te  e f f e c t  o f  th a t  a r t i c l e  o f government, was th e  
congglW a^cm  o f th e  s t a t e s . For one th in g , the new p lan  i s  to  be 
considered  as an e n t i r e  system w ithou t any o th e r  sources o f exp lanation ; 
only by comparing th e  se v e ra l p a r ts  o f the system to g e th e r  can th e  whole 
of i t  be u n d e r s t o o d , W i t h  t h i s  in tro d u c tio n , the  M assachusetts "Antis" 
launched in to  a  new s e r ie s  o f observations on th e  C o n s titu tio n ,
The Congress o f th e  f e d e ra l  government i s  empowered to  e s ta b l is h  
such fe d e ra l  co u rts  as i t  f e e ls  a re  n ecessa ry . This power to  e s ta b l is h  
c o u rts . Agrippa argued, im plies the  power to  d e fin e  th e  ju r is d ic t io n  o f 
th e se  cou rts  and to  determ ine the  ru le s  by which t h e i r  judgment w i l l  be 
re g u la te d . I t  i s  an accepted  p ra c t ic e ,  in  common law , f o r  the l e g i s l a ­
tu re  to  a l t e r  t h a t  law. For t h i s  reason , and th is  g e ts  to  th e  h e a r t  o f 
th e  f e a r s  o f such men as George Mason and E lb ridge  G erry, a d e c la ra tio n  
o f r ig h ts  i s  so badly needed fo r  th e  C o n s titu tio n ; i t  e s ta b lis h e s  those 
p r in c ip le s  which th e  c e n tra l  government may never invade w ithout a lso  
v io la t in g  th e  fundam aita l compact between the people and th e i r  govern­
m ent,^^ But th e  re a l  evidence o f the  in te n t  o f c o n so lid a tio n  la y ,  
Agrippa vehemently argued, in  the  r ig h t  o f  Congress to  re g u la te  commerce, 
M assachusetts was a s t a te  well-known throughout the  Iftiited S ta te s  
f o r  i t s  hardy s e a fa re r s ,  Boston was one o f  the  lead in g  p o r ts  o f America
^ 4 b i d , ,  p , 69, ^^ Ib id , ,  pp , 69-70, ^ ^ Ib id ,,  p . 71.
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and enjoyed a considerab le  fo re ig n  trade*  Agrippa* as a  good son o f 
M assachusetts, was proud o f h is  s t a t e 's  re p u ta tio n  as a commercial 
le a d e r , n o t only o f  New Ehgland bu t o f  the  e n t i r e  country  as w e ll. 
A r tic le  I ,  se c tio n  8, o f  th e  C o n s titu tio n  v e s ted  in  Congress idie v i r ­
tu a l ly  u n lim ited  r ig h t  to  re g u la te  e x te rn a l and in te rn a l  com m erce.^
I t  i s  q u i te  understandab le  th a t  Agrippa should express f e a r s  on th is  
m atte r, f o r  the  power reserved  to  Congress was very  c lo se  to  those 
M gu la tp ry  powers plam@d.j?y # e  ^  before
the R evolutionj
Though th is  power [to  re g u la te  tra d e ]  under c e r ta in  l im ita t io n s  
would be a p ro p er one fo r  the  departm ent o f  Congress; i t  i s  in  
th is  se c tio n  c a r r ie d  too f a r ,  and much f a r th e r  than  i s  neces­
sa ry  . . . The new c o n s t itu t io n  n o t on ly  p ro h ib its  v e s s e ls , 
bound from one s t a te  to  an o th e r, from paying any d u t ie s ,  but 
even from en te rin g  and c le a r in g . The only use o f  such a  regu­
la t io n  i s  to  keep each s t a te  in  complete ignorance o f i t s  own
reso u rce s .
Freedom o f  a c tio n  in  th e  f i e l d  o f  commerce. Agrippa m aintained*
has a tw o-fo ld  e f f e c t :  business w il l  f in d  the  means f o r  i t s  g r e a te s t
g a in , and in d iv id u a ls  in  commerce would a l l  have a f a i r  share  o f  the
a v a ila b le  o p p o r tu n it ie s . He continued:
I t  i s  va in  to  t e l l  u s t h a t  we ought to  overlook lo c a l  in te r e s t s .
I t  i s  only by p ro te c tin g  lo c a l  concerns th a t  the  in te r e s t  o f 
th e  whole i s  p rese rv ed . No man when he e n te rs  s o c ie ty  does i t  
from a  view to  promote thq  good o fp o th e rs , b u t he does i t  f o r  
h is  own good. A ll men haying the , same viaw a re  bound eq u ally  
to  promote th e  w elfare  o f the  lA o le . To secu re  them to such a  
p r in c ip le  as th a t  lo c a l  in te r e s t s  must be d isreg ard ed , i s  r e ­
q u irin g  o f  one man to  do more than an o th e r, and i s  subverting  
the  foundation  o f f r e e  government.^®
The s ig n if ic a n c e  o f  th e  l a s t  phrase  o f the  l a s t  sentence i s  p a r t i c u la r ly
in te r e s t in g ,  fo r  i t  seems a lso  to  d is c lo s e  the  c h a ra c te r  o f th e  w r i te r
^^4iadison, 0£ . c i t . * p . 630,
^^Ford, E ssays, p . 70. ^ ^ Ib id .* pp. 72-73.
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—a man irtio though concerned w ith probable  r e s t r i c t io n s  on th e  economic
gain  to  be had by h is  s t a t e ,  acknowledges a t  th e  same tim e th e  im port-
ance and w orth o f  th e  in d iv id u a l in  government. I t  i s  a theme th a t
would be repea ted  again  and again  by A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  in  o th e r  s t a t e s ,
as George Mason and R ichard Henry Lee o f  V irg in ia  s tre s s e d  th e  n e c e s s ity
o f a b i l l  o f  r ig h ts .^ ^
The p e rfe c tio n  o f  a government depends on th e  e q u a lity  o f  i t s  
o p e ra tio n , as f a r  as human a f f a i r s  w il l  adm it, upon a l l  p a r ts  
o f  the  empire and upon a l l  c i t iz e n s  . . . sm all e n q u a le tie s  
[s i c ] may be e a s i ly  compensated. There ought, however, to  be 
no in e q u a lity  in  th e  law i t s e l f ,  and the  government ought to  
have th e  same a u th o r i ty  in  one p la c e , as in  an o th er. . . .
The most p la u s ib le  argument in  favour o f  th e  new p lan  i s  drawn 
from th e  in e q u a lity  o f i t s  o p e ra tio n  in  d i f f e r e n t  s t a te s .
Agrippa continued by lay in g  ou t in  concise form th e  sources o f  fe d e ra l
c o lle c tio n  o f revenues in  se v e ra l s ta te s  to  prove h is  con ten tions
“C onnecticut have been to ld  th a t  the  bulk o f the  revenue w il l  be ra is e d
by imposed and e x c ise , and, th e re fo re , they  need no t be a f r a id  to  t r u s t
li9Congress w ith  the  power o f  levy ing  a  dry ta x  a t  p le a su re ."  But New 
York and M assachusetts a re  commercial s t a te s ;  C onnecticut n a tu ra l ly  
hopes th a t  those two s ta te s  w i l l  pay the  bulk o f  the c o n tin e n ta l ex­
pense. But i f  th e  tra d e  i s  no t overtaxed , th e  consumer pays the  ta x .
on the  o th e r  hand, the  tra d e  i s  o v e r-tax ed , tra d e  la n g u ish e s , and 
th e  fa rm er,to o , lo s e s  h is  m arket. In  sh o r t , th e  proposed p lan  o f tax a ­
t io n ,  and th e re  a lso  the  power o f Congress to  re g u la te  both in te rn a l
See George Mason’s "The O bjections o f  the  Hon. George Mason to  
th e  Proposed F edera l C o n s titu tio n ; Addressed to  the  C itiz en s  o f V ir­
g in ia ,"  in  Ford, Pam phlets, p . 329. A lso, R ichard Henry Lee, "L e tte rs  
o f a F edera l Farm er," in  Ford, Essays, p . 200.
^®Ford, E ssays, p . 7li.
^ ^ Ib id .
t
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and e x te rn a l taxes i s  d e lu s iv e , unequal, and u l t im a te ly  d e trim e n ta l to  
th e  coun try  as a whole.
A ll s ta te s  have c e r ta in  in te r n a l ,  lo c a l  advantages. Agrippa con­
tin u e d  in  a  l a t e r  L e t te r ,  and can to  a considerab le  degree supply each 
o th e r 's  w ants. F rien d ly  in te rc o u rse  between the in d iv id u a l s t a t e s ,  
th e re fo re , can be very  e a s i ly  e s ta b lis h e d . The U nited S ta te s , under 
th e  A r t ic le s ,  e x is ts  as a  t ru e  f e d e ra l  rep u b lic s  each s t a te  w ith in  i t s
own l im i ts  m ain tains so v ere ig n ty  over i t s  own c i t i z e n s ,  W iile some
<1
genera l concerns a re  g ran ted  to  Congress. I t  i s  t r u e .  Agrippa re a d ily
adm itted , th a t  Congress has p a r t i c u la r  d e f ic ie n c ie s ,  bu t:
I f  the  new system should be adopted, the whole im post, w ith an 
u n lim ited  claim  to  e x e rc ise  and dry  ta x , w il l  be given to  Con­
g re s s . There w i l l  remain no adequate fund fo r  th e  s t a te  d e b t, 
and the  s ta te  w il l  be su b je c t to  be sued on t h e i r  no tes . . . 
i f  we su rren d er the  im post, we s h a l l  s t i l l ,  by th is  new c o n s t i­
tu t io n ,  be h e ld  to  pay our f u l l  p ro p o rtio n  o f the  rem aining 
deb t, as i f  no th ing  had been p a id . The impost w il l  n o t be 
considered as being p a id  by th is  s t a t e ,  but by the  c o n tin e n t.
The f e d e r a l i s t s .  Indeed, t e l l  us th a t  th e  s t a te  deb ts w i l l  a l l  
be inco rpo ra ted  w ith  th e  c o n tin e n ta l debts and a l l  pa id  out o f 
one fund , . . Not one word i s  s a id  in  the  book in  fav o r o f  such 
a sdxeme, and th e re  i s  no reason to  th in k  i t  t r u e .  Assurances o f 
th a t  s o r t  a re  e a s i ly  given and as e a s i ly  fo rg o tte n .^2
A conso lida ted  government, such as proposed by th e  C o n s titu tio n , 
argued Agrippa,
i s  in ap p lica b le  to  a g re a t  e x te n t o f country ; i s  u n fr ien d ly  to  
th e  r ig h ts  o f  both persons and p ro p e rty , which r ig h ts  always 
adhere to g e th e r ; and th a t  being c o n tra ry  to  the  i n te r e s t  of th e  
extreme o f  an empire, such a  government can be supported only  
by power, and „ , . commerce i s  the  tru e  bond o f  union fo r  a 
f r e e  s t a t e . ^3
The C o n stitu tio n  i s  c le a r ly  a co n so lid a ted  government. Agrippa continued:
^°Ib id . ,  pp. ^ I b id o, pp. 76-77.
^^Ibid ., pp. 77-78. ^3 ib id . , pp. 82-83.
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By A r t ic le  3 , se c tio n  2, Congress a re  empowered to  appoin t 
c o u rts  w ith  a u th o r i ty  to  t r y  c i v i l  causes o f  every k ind , and 
even o ffences a g a in s t p a r t i c u la r  s ta te s»  By th e  l a s t  c lause  
o f A r t ic le  1 , se c tio n  8, which d e fin e s  t h e i r  l e g i s la t iv e  powers, 
th ey  a re  au th o rized  to  make laws c a rry in g  in to  execution  a l l  
th e  "powers v ested  by th i s  c o n s t i tu t io n  in  th e  government o f 
th e  D hited S ta te s , o r  in  any departm ent o r o f f i c e r  th e re o f ;"  
and by A r t ic le  6 , th e  judges in  every s t a te  a re  to  be bound by 
th e  laws o f C ongress,5a
Agrippa employed a t o t a l  o f  twelve L e tte r s  in  h is  a n a ly s is  o f 
th e  C o n stitu tio n ; he concluded h is  s e r ie s  o f L e tte r s  w ith an a n a ly s is  
o f man as a p o l i t i c a l  being in  r e la t io n  to  th e  new a r t i c l e  of govern­
ment, inc lud ing  w ith in  those  l a s t  L e t te r s  a number o f  charges which, 
fo r  h is  suppo rt o f  th e  C o n s titu tio n , would have to  be adopted, p re fe r ­
ab ly  by a second convention . The o b je c t o f every j u s t  government, he 
wrote is
to  render the  people  happy by securing  t h e i r  persons and pos­
se ss io n s  from wrong. To th is  end, i t  i s  necessary  th a t  th e re  
should be lo c a l  laws and in s t i tu t io n s ;  f o r  a people in h ab itin g  
v a rio u s c lim ates w i l l  unavoidably have lo c a l  h a b its  and d i f ­
f e r e n t  modes o f l i f e ,  and th ese  must be consu lted  in  making 
th e  law s, » . , I t  i s  p la in ,  th e re fo re , th a t  we re q u ire  fo r  
our re g u la tio n  laws which w i l l  n o t s u i t  th e  circum stances o f 
our sou thern  b re th e m , and th a t  laws made f o r  them would no t 
apply to  u s . Unhappiness would be the uniform  produce o f such
la w s ,55
Agrippa continued , "We may go f u r th e r ,  and say th a t  i t  i s  im possible 
fo r  any s in g le  le g i s la tu r e  so f u l ly  to  comprehend the  circum stances o f 
th e  d i f f e r e n t  p a r ts  o f  a very  ex ten siv e  dominion as to  make laws adapted 
to  th ese  c ircum stances,
Of th e  choices o f  government o ffe re d  to  the  people o f the U nited 
S ta te s , inc lud ing  th e  C o n s titu tio n , a "Federal Republick" i s  b e s t adap­
ted  to  the  o b je c t and purpose o f  secu ring  th e i r  persons and p o ssess io n s .
5^ Ib id , , p .  83 . 5S ib id . ,  pp , 91- 92 . 5 6 ib id ,,  p . 92 ,
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th is  k ind o f  government each s t a te  r e ta in s  to  i t s e l f  th e  r ig h t  o f 
making and a l te r in g  i t s  laws f o r  in te rn a l  re g u la tio n , and the  r ig h t  o f  
executing  th ese  laws w ithou t any e x te rn a l r e s t r a i n t . ”"̂ This i s  th e  
form o f  the  C onfederation; th e  advantages, s e c u r i t ie s ,  and freedoms 
o ffe re d  by i t  to th e  people o f th e  U nited S ta te s ,  Agrippa u rged , ought 
n o t be surrendered  re a d i ly  w ithout c lo se  reasoning  o f  and adequate s a fe ­
guards over th a t  system o f  government "vriiich i t  i s  proposed be accepted 
nowo^
Agrippa qp^iplu^d.edju^residg^^ 
and idien they  appoin t some o f t h e i r  number to  ad m in is te r th e  government 
fo r  them, they  d e leg a te  a l l  th e  powers o f government n o t ex p ress ly  r e ­
served .
A con s t i t u t io n does no t in  i t s e l f  imply any more than  a d e c la r­
a tio n  o f the  r e la t io n  which th e  d i f f e r e n t  p a r ts  o f the  government 
bear to  each o th e r , but does no t in  any degree imply s e c u r i ty  to  
tJh9.jr,ight.s o f in d iv id u a ls  . . . in  doub tfu l cases th e  d ec is io n  i s  
to  fa y p r .o f  the  g o v ,™ e n t,S 9   ̂ '
The b i l l  o f r ig h ts  to  th e  C o n stitu tio n  o f M assachusetts in co rp o ra te s
t h i r t y  a r t i c l e s ;  y e t i t  i s  proposed and advocated s tro n g ly  th a t  the
people o f the  S ta te  o f  M assachusetts consent to  give f a r  g re a te r  powers
than those  of th e i r  s t a t e 's  c o n s t i tu t io n  to  a new a r t i c l e  of government
upon which is  ex erc ised  f a r  few er c o n tro ls .
The com plaints a g a in s t th e  sep ara te  governments, even by the  
f r ie n d s  o f th e  new p lan , a re  n o t th a t  they  have n o t power
enough, bu t t h a t  t h ^  a re  disposed to  make a bad use o f what
power Jbhey have. Surely  [the advocates o f the  C o n stitu tio n ] 
'^ a s o n .J a d ly j  .whm they  propose to  ..se t , up a goyernm m tjppsseaaad. 
[s i c ] ^ fjm ch -Jm re . earbens than  the p re s e n t ,  and sub­
j e c t  to  much sm alle r checks.
^7I b id . ,  p . 93. ^^ Ib id . ,  pp . 121-122.
^^ Ib id o, p . 112. ^ °Ib id . ,  p . 113.
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New Hampshire and Rhode Is la n d , too^ 
a l l s t . s uppor t .  I to fo rtu n a te ly  f o r  American h is to ry ,  A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  
l i t e r a t u r e  from the  form er s t a te  i s  sc a rc e , # i i l e  th e  reco rds o f  the  
debates a re  only  very  fragm entary , Hhode Is la n d , h i s to r i c a l l y  a  g o - i t  
-a lo n e  colony and s t a t e ,  p resen ted  no A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  l i t e r a t u r e  f o r  
exam ination; indeed, th e  s ta te  le g i s la tu r e  d id  n o t even c a l l  a  conven­
t io n ,  bu t r a th e r ,  subm itted  th e  C o n stitu tio n  d i r e c t ly  to  the  people  f o r
N e ith e r s t a te ,  consequently , w i l l  be d iscu ssed  in  
t h i s  th e s is .  The scene s h i f t s ,  th e re fo re , in  th e  n ex t ch ap te r to th e  
Middle A tla n tic  S ta te s .
k _
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CHAPTER I I I
THE MIDDLE ATLANTIC STATES
This ch ap ter w i l l  examine A nti-Federalism  o f th e  Middle A tla n tic  
s t a t e s ,  i . e . ,  Delaware, New Je rse y , New York, and Pennsylvania. As 
w ith a l l  s ta te s  in  th e  l a t e  e ig h teen th  cen tu ry  America, thsg® .s ta te s  
were la rg e ly  r u r a l .  A few la rg e  urban a re a s . New York and P h ila d e lp h ia , 
were p re se n t o f co u rse , and t h e i r  growth was q u ite  ra p id , but they  con­
ta in e d  on ly  a  r e la t iv e ly  sm all segment o f the p opu la tion  in  t h e i r  r e ­
sp e c tiv e  s t a t e s . These urban a re a s , and in  general term s the  e a s te rn  
a reas o f the s ta te  in  which they  were lo c a te d , were th e  p r in c ip a l  
sources o f support fo r  the  C o n stitu tio n  in  the  s t a t e s ,  and c e r ta in ly  
in  New York and Pennsylvania, The s tru g g le  over r a t i f i c a t i o n  in  these  
two s t a t e s ,  th en , was waged between the e a s te rn  commercial, banking and 
m arket in te r e s ts  in  support o f  th e  C o n stitu tio n  and th e  w estern a g r i ­
c u l tu r i s t s  in  o p p o sitio n ,^
Delaware^a^d New Je rse y  w ere, re s p e c t iv e ly , tiie  f i r s t  and th i r d  
s ta te s  to  r a t i ^  the  C o n s titu tio n , N e ith e r o f  th e  s ta te s  showed any
Since C harles A, Beard pub lished  h is  in f lu e n t ia l  work, to  Eco­
nomic In te rp re ta tio n  o f the  C o n stitu tio n  o f  th e  United S ta te s  (New York, 
1913) ,  and w ith in  th e  l a s t  two decades e s p e c ia l ly , th e re  has been an 
in c re a s in g ly  concen tra ted  study in  th e  h is to ry  o f  th e  events and con­
d i t io n s  o f  the  l a t e  C onfederation and e a r ly  C o n s titu tio n a l p e rio d s o f 
American h is to ry .  As p a r t  o f th i s  concen tra ted  s tu d y , th e re  has been 
much h is to r ig ra p h ic a l  d isp u te  o f the  sources o f F e d e ra l is t  and A n ti-  
F e d e ra l is t  support in  the  se v e ra l s ta te s  o f  th e  tftiion. Sees Jackson 
T urner Main, The A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts : C r i t ic s  o f the  C o n s titu tio n , 1781- 
1788 (Chapel H i l l ,  1961); F o rre s t MacDonald, We th e  People (Chicago. 
19^9 ) î  and Robert A llen R utland, % e Ordeal o f  th e  C o n s ti tu tio n s The 
R a ti f ic a t io n  S tru g g le  o f 1787-1788 (Norman. 1966), fo r  some in d ic a tio n  
o f th e  n a tu re  o f  th is  d isp u te .
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A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  o p p o sitio n  a t  a l l ,  f o r  th e  conventions o f  both s ta te s
2
r a t i f i e d  unanim ously.
Pennsylvania was t he f i r s t  s t a te  o f th e  C onfederation to  c a l l  . 
i t s  r a t i f y ing  convention# The circum stances surrounding th e  c a l l in g  o f 
th a t  convention cannot in  any way be c a l le d  hono rab le ,^  The events 
lead in g  to  th e  c o n v a itio n , and th e  speed w ith which i t  d e lib e ra te d , 
accounts in  g re a t p a r t  fo r  th e  s c a rc i ty  o f  A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  l i t e r a t u r e  
from Pennsylvania, I t  ex p la in s a ls o , in  p a r t ,  th e  la c k  o f A nti-F eder­
a l i s t  o p p o sitio n  in  th e  convention . The e a r ly  d a te , November 20, 178?, 
allow ed s u f f ic ie n t  time fo r  th e  canvass o f  only  th e  p ro -C o n s titu tio n  
e a s te rn  a re a  o f  th e  s t a te ,  bu t n o t o f  th e  c e n tra l  and y e s te m  a reas  
which were dominated by a n ti-C o n s t i tu t io n  a g r i c u l t u r i s t s . ^
Because o f th is  lack  o f  A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  o p p o sitio n  in  the  r a t i ­
fy ing  convention , and the  s c a r c i ty  o f  A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  l i t e r a t u r e  which 
appeared in  the s t a t e ,  any in v e s tig a tio n  o f  Pennsylvania A nti-Federalism  
i s  n e c e s s a r ily  handicapped from the o u ts e t .  Indeed, th e  n a tu re  o f th e  
A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  opp o sitio n  in  th e  convention can only  be a rr iv e d  a t  from 
an e x tra p o la tio n  o f  the  counter-argum ents o f  the  F e d e ra l is ts  in  the  
convention . That i s ,  only from what James Wilson and h is  co lleagues
^The Delaware r a t i f y in g  convention f i r s t  met on December 3, I 787 . 
I t s  f in a l  vo te  came on December 7, I 787 . The debates o f th e  New Je rsey  
r a t i f y in g  convention were December 11 to  December 18, The conventions 
o f  both s ta te s  gave unanimous approval to  the  C o n s titu tio n .
% hose members o f the Pennsylvania Assembly who opposed th e  Con­
s t i t u t i o n  walked ou t o f th e  Assembly, thereby p reven ting  th e  quorum 
n ecessa ry  fo r  th e  vo te  on the s t a t e 's  r a t i f y in g  convention . That n ig h t  
a mob s to m e d  th e  residences o f two o f th e  A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  d e le g a te s , 
c a r r ie d  them to  th e  Assembly's m eeting p la c e , and convinced one to  s ta n d  
fo r  the  ro le  c a l l ,  th ereby  c o n s t i tu t in g  the n ecessa ry  quorum fo r  th e  
vo te  on th e  r a t i f y in g  convention to  be tak en . Main, o£. c U . ,  p . I 78 .
^R utland, 0£ . c i t . , p . $1.
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
39
s a id  in  r e fu ta t io n  o f t h e i r  opponents* o b jec tio n s  can th e  n a tu re  o f  
those  o b jec tio n s  expressed  in  th e  convention, e sp e c ia l ly  th e  f e a r  o f 
th e  c e n tra l  government proposed in  the  C o n s titu tio n , be deduced. The 
no tes  o f  the  debates o f  th e  r a t i f y in g  convention include  only th e  Fed­
e ra l is ts *  speeches. Furtherm ore, such Pennsylvania A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  
l i t e r a t u r e  as d id  appear was la rg e ly  pub lished  o u t o f the s t a t e ,  so 
com pletely F ed era lis t-d o m in ated  were th e  s t a t e 's  newspapers. The r e a l  
n a tu re  o f  Pennsylvania A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  o b jec tio n s  can be drawn, conse­
q u en tly , only ve ry  im p e rfec tly , and only in  q u ite  sketchy foim .
The form is  f e d e ra l ,  th e  e f f e c t  c le a r ly  n a tio n a l ,  contended A 
Farmer, who, to  prove h is  co n te n tio n , p resen ted  q u ite  a  so p h is t ic a te d  
argument. The F e d e ra l is ts argued th a t  th e  s t a te  l e g is la tu r e s  chose 
th e i r  re sp e c tiv e  s e n a to rs , and could  n ev er, th e re fo re , be a n n ih ila te d . 
To A Farmer, however, 1imtu.power, .of ,jse le c tio n  was . m erely ..a m i n i s t e r ^  
one. For those same s ta te  le g is la tu r e s  had no power to  d i r e c t  o r  even 
in s t r u c t  th e i r  s e n a to rs , o r  "üie power to  censure o r  rep lace  them fo r  
m isconduct. The e x e rc ise  o f  the  power o f  s e le c tio n  i s  n o t , th e re fo re ,  
in d ic a t iv e  of th e  s t a t e 's  so vere ign ty ; only  in  the power of choosing 
and d ire c tin g  those  to  lAom a u th o r i ty  i s  d e lega ted  i s  th a t  sovere ign ty  
p reserv ed . In  f a c t ,  A Farmer con tinued , the  sen a to rs  do n o t even v o te  
as s t a t e s ,  but as in d iv id u a ls , no r do idie s ta te s  pay t h e i r  s a l a r i e s .  
The e f f e c t  i s ,  then  in d isp u ta b ly  n a t io n a l .^  Furtherm ore, tiie power o f 
th e  s t a te s  in  o f f ic e r in g  and tr a in in g  th e  m i l i t i a ,  and in  handling 
s t a te  a f f a i r s ,  does n o t in  any way c o n s t i tu te  sovereign  powers; l ik e
N o r to n  Borden, The A n t i f e d e r a l is t  Papers (Ann Arbor, 1961).
pp . 105-106.
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th e  power o f appo in ting  th e  s t a t e 's  s e n a to rs , th ey  a re  m erely m in is te r ­
i a l  powers, w hether they  be taken to g e th e r  o r  s e p a ra te ly . F u rth e r , the  
s t a t e  governments a re  d e s t i tu te  o f  a l l  sovereign  command o f and c o n tro l 
over th e  sources o f  revenue, and o f p ro te c tin g  t h e i r  c i t iz e n s  and t h e i r  
p ro p e rty  from th e  n a tio n a l  law . The powers o f making laws o f trea so n  
a re  l e f t  s o le ly  in  the  hands o f  th e  c e n tr a l  government, 3n a l l  th ese  
re s p e c ts , the e f f e c t  contem plated by the  C o n s titu tio n  i s ,  argued A 
Farmer, th e  co n so lid a tio n  o f  the  se v e ra l s ta te s  under a n a tio n a l gov­
ernm ent,^
What w il l  be th e  e f f e c t  o f  th a t  n a tio n a l ,  co n so lid a ted  govern­
ment? M  Old Whig in s i s te d :
I t  i s  beyond a doubt th a t  th e  new C o n s titu tio n , I f  adopted, 
w i l l  in  a g re a t  measure d e s tro y , i f  i t  does n o t t o t a l l y  ann i­
h i l a t e ,  the  se p a ra te  governments o f the se v e ra l s t a t e s .  W  ̂
s h a l l  in  e f f e c t  become one g re a t re p u b lic . Every measure of  
any impm^^tahce w il l  be c o n tin e n ta l . What w i l l  be th e  conse­
quence of th is ?  One th in g  i s  ev id en t—th a t  no rep u b lic  o f  so 
g re a t ..jaagnitude ever d id  o r ..c .a n ..g v e r ,^ is t  . . .  A confederacy 
o f rep u b lic s  must be th e  estab lishm en t in  America, o r  we must 
cease a lto g e th e r  to  r e ta in  the rep u b lican  form o f  government. 
EroDLJbhejmmmt we became one g re a t re p u b lic , e i th e r  in  form 
o r in  substance , th e  p e rio d "^Is 
s h a l l  s ink Xi r s t J j n t p  m d  Ih e ii  in ta  d
A fte r some h i s to r ic a l  study  o f  a n c ie n t and contemporary re p u b lic s . An
Old Whig concluded:
Before we e s ta b l is h  a  government, whose a c ts  w il l  be the 
supreme law o f  th e  lan d , and whose power w i l l  extend to  
alm ost every case  w ithout excep tion , ye ough t  c a re fu l ly  to  
guard ou rse lves by a  b i l l  o f  r ig h ts ,  a g a in s t th e  invasion  of 
th ose l ib e r t ie s  which i t  i s  e s s e n t ia l  fo r  us to  r e t a in ,  which 
i t  i s  o f no r e a l  use fo r  g^ovemment to  deprive  u s ; but which,— mil     ~ ~    — - —I - - ■-  —  ^  «V.» ». J •*<- • . ' “ • ■ f  ■■ f
in  th e  course o f  human e v en ts , have been too o ften  in su lte d  
w ith  a l l  th e  wantoness o f an id le  barbarity ,®
^ Ib ld . ,  p .  106. ^ I b id . ,  pp . k6 -h7^
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James Wilson rep e a te d ly  contended during  th e  debates th a t  in  view
o f th e  n a tu re  o f man as a s o c ia l  being , and th e  n a tu re  o f  human s o c ie ty ,
government must be so designed as to  bind the  in te r e s t  and a u th o r ity  o f
th e  whole community upon every p a r t  o f  th a t  community. In  forming the
system , i t  i s  im portan t to  g ive m inute a t te n t io n  to  the  in te r e s ts  o f a l l
p a r t s .  But a duty o f  s t i l l  h ig h e r importance i s  to  f e e l  and dem onstrate
predom inant regard  to  th e  in te r e s t s  o f  th e  w hole.^
But John deW itt had o th e r  thoughts on the m a tte r , and argued them
w ith  equa lly  cogent s k i l l .  Under se c tio n  8 o f A r t ic le  I  o f  the  C onsti- 
10
tu t io n .  Congress was given the power o f o rg an iz in g , arming, and d is ­
c ip lin in g  th e  m i l i t i a  o f th e  se v e ra l s t a te s ,  and o f governing them when 
in  the  se rv ic e  o f  the U nited S ta te s . The..-states__theniselves..reser7.ad
t he r ig h t  to  appo in t th e  m i l i t i a  o f f i c e r s ,  but th e  a u th o r i ty  ofL tra ln .T .
11ing^ the  m i l l t i a  was according  to. the  d is c ip l in e  p re sc rib e d  by Qopgress . 
The t o t a l  e f f e c t ,  re g a rd le ss  o f what W ilson argued in  th e  convention, 
deW itt in s i s te d ,  was c e r ta in ly  n o t to  g ive r e s p e c ta b i l i ty  to  th e  p ro ­
posed c e n tra l  government, n o r to  e s ta b l is h  m il i ta r y  f o r t i f i c a t io n s  on 
the  f r o n t ie r  in  view o f the  presence o f  fo re ig n  governments elsew here 
in  th e  North American c o n tin e n t. R ather, th e  upsho t o f  th e  p ro v is io n  
could  only be a f u r th e r  in su rance  f o r  the  su b tle  in te n tio n  o f c o n so li­
d a tio n ; the  fram ers o f th e  C o n s titu tio n  recognized  the  h i s to r ic a l  value
9Jonathan E l l i o t ,  The Debates in  the S everal S ta te  Conventions 
on th e  R a tif ic a tio n  o f the  F ederal C o n s titu tio n  v o ls . ,  1W 6- I 89I ;  
P h ila d e lp h ia , 1 8 7 6 IlT% 2l-2:2S.
^^James Madison, The Debates in  the  F edera l Convention Which 
Framed th e  C o n stitu tio n  o f  ^ e  IM ited S ta te s o f America, G a illa rd  Hunt 
and James Brown S c o tt ( e d s .y  (New York, 1920),
^^Borden, c i t . , pp. 7^-77«
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
h2
o f  a m i l i t i a  o f  f r e e  men in  p reserv ing  th e  freedom o f  a  f r e e  peop le .
C e rta in ly  th e  fram ers could n o t a ffo rd , deW itt contended, to  a llow  such
p o te n t ia l ly  "dangerous" power and a u th o r i ty  to  remain so le ly  in  th e
hands o f  the  s t a t e s .  But the  r e a l  s ig n if ic a n c e  o f  deW itt' s essay  comes
in  th e  f i n a l  paragraphs
I f  th e  people a re  n o t in  genera l d isposed  to  execute the powers 
o f  government, i t  i s  tim e to  su sp ec t th e re  i s  something wrong 
in  th a t  government; and . , , they  had b e t te r  have an o th er.
For, in  my humble op in ion , i t  i s  much too e a r ly  to  s e t  i t  down 
f o r  a f a c t ,  th a t  mankind cannot be governed bu t by f o r c e ,
The im p lica tio n  o f  deW itt*s s in g le  paragraph m ight w e ll summarize the 
essence of A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  opp o sitio n  to  th e  powers o f the  proposed 
fe d e ra l  governments should the  people o f  the U nited S ta te s  f a i l  o r r e ­
fu se  to  acknowledge the supremacy o f th e  fe d e ra l  government, as they  
m ight w ell do, th e re  may be some d r a s t ic  m isunderstanding o f the 
p eo p le ' s d e s ire s  o r needs in  the  fe d e ra l  government; the  people o f th e  
U nited .p l a t es a re  q u ite  capable o f _^pyeniing_ th  ems_^ye_s, ry
of..the  country. shpHftA, and th e  coercive
in  which t h e i r  ro le  i s  l im ite d .
Another p o in t o f  strong  A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  o p p o sitio n , to  which 
t h e i r  opponents were fo rced  again  and again  to  re tu rn , was the proper  
d is t in c t io n  o f power to  be drawn between th e  fe d e ra l  and s ta te  govern­
m ents. Although a res ta tem en t o f  th e  'A n tis '*  argument a g a in s t the  
co n so lid a tin g  n a tu re  o f  the C o n s titu tio n , i t  was an argument rep ea ted ly  
a s s e r te d . C e rta in ly , judging from the  number o f  times Wilson was 
fo rced  to  re tu rn  to  the  s u b je c t ,  i t  was an argument s tre s s e d  again  and 
again  by the 'A n tis ' in  the  Pennsylvania convention .
l^ ib ido
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In  the  course o f  h is  counter argum ents, W ilson re p e a te d ly  covered 
th e  same ground. Whereas, th e  A r t ic le s  o f C onfederation moved to a r r iv e  
a t  some p roper l im i t  o f  a u th o r i ty  between th e  n a tio n a l  and s ta te  gov­
ernm ents, th e  re la t io n s h ip  i t  e s ta b lis h e d  was f a r  too lo p sid ed  in  fa v o r 
o f the  l a t t e r ?
Whatever o b je c t o f  government i s  confined , in  i t s  o p e ra tio n , and 
e f f e c ts ,  w ith in  th e  bounds o f a p a r t i c u la r  s t a t e ,  should be con­
s id e re d  as belonging to  th e  government o f  t h a t  s t a te ;  w hatever 
o b je c t o f government ex tends, in  i t s  o p e ra tio n  o r e f f e c ts ,  beyond 
th e  bounds o f a p a r t i c u la r  s t a t e ,  should be considered  as belong­
ing to  the  government o f  th e  U nited S ta te s ,  But though th is  
p r in c ip le  be sound and s a t i s f a c to r y ,  i t s  a p p lic a tio n  to  p a r t ic u la r  
cases would be accompanied w ith  much d i f f i c u l ty ,  because, in  i t s  
a p p lic a tio n , room must be allow ed fo r  g re a t  d is c re tio n a ry  l a t i tu d e  
o f c o n s tru c tio n  o f  th e  p r i n c i p l e  A 3
L a te r  in  th e  same speech before  the  convention, Wilson a rr iv e d  a t  the
f ^ d ^ e n t a l  F e d e ra l is t  p o s itio n  on governments
[T]he powers o f th e  fe d e ra l  government and those o f the s ta te  
governments a re  drawn from sources equally  p u re . I f  a d iffe re n c e  
can be d iscovered  between them, i t  i s  in  fav o r o f the fe d e ra l 
government, because th a t  government is  founded on th e  re p re se n ta ­
t io n  o f  the  whole Union, whereas the  government of any p a r t ic u la r  
s t a te  i s  founded only on the  re p re se n ta tio n  o f  a p a r t ;  in co n s id e r­
ab le  when compared w ith th e  whole. I s  i t  no t more reasonable  to  
suppose th a t  the  counsels o f  the  whole w il l  embrace th e  in te r e s t  
of every p a r t ,  thgin th a t  the counsels of any p a r t  w il l  embrace 
the in te r e s t s  o f  th e  whole
The essence o f W ilson 's argument, and the  b asis  o f the  C o n s titu tio n , was 
th a t  a c e n tra l  government req u ired  genuine n a tio n a l  powers. I t  was the  
question  o f  the  e x te n t and n a tu re  o f  those powers in  the  C o n s titu tio n  
th a t  sep ara ted  the F e d e ra l is ts  and th e  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts ,
C ritic ism  and f e a r  o f th e  fe d e ra l  government expressed by Penn­
sy lv a n ia  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  was by no means l im ite d  to  the powers o f
^ % l l i o t .  D ebates, I I ,  k 2 h .  
^ ^ Ib id ,
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Congress a lo n e . W illiam  Penn, f o r  example, r e f le c te d  a t  some le n g th  on 
th e  proposed e x e c u tiv e 's  veto  power, one o f the  very  few men to  co n sid er 
th a t  a sp e c t o f th e  execu tive  branch o f the  fe d e ra l  government. I t  i s  
e s s e n t ia l ,  Penn argued, always to  d iv ide  th e  powers o f a f r e e  govern­
ments
The f i r s t  and most n a tu ra l  d iv is io n  o f the  powers o f  govern­
ment a re  in to  th e  l e g i s l a t i v e  and execu tive  branches. These 
two should n ever be su ffe re d  to  have th e  l e a s t  share  o f  each 
o th e r 's  j u r i s d ic t io n ,  o r to  in term eddle w ith  i t  in  any manner.
For idiichever o f  th e  two d iv id es  i t s  powers w ith the  o th e r , 
w i l l  c e r ta in ly  be subord ina te  to  i t ;  and i f  they  both have a 
sh a re  o f  each o th e r 's  a u th o r i ty ,  they  w i l l  be in  f a c t  but one 
body. T heir i n t e r e s t ,  a s  w e ll as t h e i r  powers w il l  be same, 
and they  w il l  combine a g a in s t  th e  peop le .
I t  i s ,  th e re fo re , a p o l i t i c a l  e rro r  o f th e  g re a te s t  magni­
tu d e , to  allow  th e  execu tive  power a n e g a tiv e , o r in  f a c t  any 
k ind  o f  c o n tro l over th e  proceedings o f the  l e g i s l a t u r e .^5
This ab so lu te  se p a ra tio n  o f l e g i s l a t iv e  and executive  has been th e  ru le ,
continued Penn, in  England s in c e  W illiam  I I I ,  and in  alm ost every s t a te
of America.
G incinnatus chose th e  proposed Senate as the  o b je c t o f b i t t e r  
rem arks. The s ix -y e a r  term s o f the S e n a te 's  members, i t s  powers o f 
impeachment, the n e c e s s ity  f o r  i t s  approval o f a l l  p r e s id e n t ia l  ap­
p o in te e s , the  union th a t  would l ik e ly  be e s ta b lish e d  between th a t  body 
and the  executive  v ia  th e  v ic e -p re s id e n t 's  p o s it io n  as the  p res id in g  
o f f i c e r ,  a l l  c o n s t i tu te d  se rio u s  breaches o f  accep ted  p r in c ip le s  o f 
repub lican  goyeipment. The r e s u l t ,  he in s i s te d ,  would undoubtedly be 
th e  estab lish m en t o f  an a r i s to c r a t i c  c lu b  "by which the  dem ocratic 
r ig h ts  o f th e  people w il l  be overwhelmed.
^^Borden, c i t . , p . 210.
^ ^ Ib id . , pp. 210-211.
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D espite  a l l  the e f f o r t s  o f th e  Pennsylvania A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts ,  
t h e i r  cause was a lo s in g  one, and th e i r  e f f o r ts  came to  no th ing  bu t 
delay  in  the  debates
I f  the  F e d e ra l is ts  in  Pennsylvania achieved r a t i f i c a t i o n  w ith  
l i t t l e  r e a l  o p p o sitio n , t h e i r  c o u n te rp a rts  in  ne ighboring  New York 
faced  a much d arker p ro sp e c t. For in  New York, th e  F e d e ra lis ts  were 
opposed by a w ell developed and w ell d is c ip lin e d  A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  o r ­
g a n iz a tio n . The o rg a n iz a tio n , c o o rd in a tio n , and d is c ip l in e  of the 
A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  fo rce s  o f the  Etapire s t a te  were equalled  only by the  
A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  o f V irg in ia , where r a t i f i c a t i o n  came only a f t e r  a  
most b i t t e r  s tru g g le  in s id e  and o u ts id e  th e  convention, and o f North 
C aro lina , lA ich re je c te d  th e  C o n stitu tio n  in  the f i r s t  r a t i fy in g  con­
v en tio n , and d id  n o t r a t i f y  u n t i l  1789.
The New York A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  d e leg a tio n  to  th e  r a t i fy in g  conven­
tio n  was a very  d is tin g u ish e d  and very  capable one. I t  included Gov­
ernor George C lin to n , around whose s ta te -w id e  p o l i t i c a l  p a rty  the 
A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  o rg an iz a tio n  was la rg e ly  based, h is  l ie u te n a n ts  Robert 
Yates and John Lansing, J r . ,  and Melancton Sm ith, w ithou t a doubt the  
most capable A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  d eb a te r and one o f the  very  few men on 
both s id e s  of the  C o n s titu tio n  s tru g g le  r e a l ly  d is in te r e s te d  in  the  
sjbrogglfiu The New York = A n tis » were g re a t ly  ^ded^^b^^^ PMbWR
th e  b e s t fu n c tio n in g  committee o f correspondents in  th e  United S ta te s .  
Newspaper support was a determ ining f a c to r  in  th e i r  ex tensive support 
th roughout the r u r a l ,  a g r ic u l tu r a l  a re a s . Most s ig n i f ic a n t  o f  a l l .
^ T h e  f in a l  v o te  on r a t i f i c a t i o n ,  taken  on December 12, 178?, 
gave approval to  the  C o n s titu tio n  by a vo te  o f  1̂ 6 f o r ,  23 a g a in s t 
r a t i f i c a t i o n .  R utland, 0£ . c i t . , pp . 135-159»
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however, was th e  e f f i c ie n t  n a tu re  o f the  s ta te  government.
The c o n te s t f o r  c o n tro l o f  th e  s t a t e 's  p o l i t i c a l  and governm ental
machinery had been fough t o u t, f o r  many y e a rs , between th e  C lin ton ians
and th e  A n ti-C lin to n ia n s . % e form er group, c o n s t i tu t in g  the  bulk o f
th e  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  in  the  convention , had c o n tro lle d  New York alm ost
com pletely s in ce  independence. The s t a t e 's  government, under C lin ton ,
18was an enormously popu lar and h ig h ly  su c ce ss fu l one, a t  l e a s t  to  those
in  the  ru ra l  a reas who c o n s titu te d  i t s  m ajor su p p o rt. The o p p o sitio n ,
le d  a t  the  time o f  the  r a t i f i c a t i o n  s tru g g le  by Gener a l  P h ilip  Schuyl e r
and h i s  son-in-law ^ Alexander Hamilton, g leaned both i t s  le a d e rs  and
i t s  c h ie f  support_from  the_lar& # m t^ ^ a r e a s  o f  the^ , p a r t ic u la r ly
19New York C ity  and th e  surrounding c o u n tie s . These l in e s  o f  p o l i t i c a l  
d iv is io n , popular su p p o rt, and le a d e rsh ip  w ith in  the s t a t e  were c a r r ie d  
down to  the  r a t i fy in g  convention, w ith  l i t t l e  r e a l  s ig n i f ic a n t  a l t e r a ­
t io n .
S pec ta to rs a t  the  convention, which began i t s  sessions on June 
17 , 1788, came in  the  ex p ec ta tio n  th a t  they  would see the g re a te s t  d is ­
p lay  o f o r a to r ic a l  t a l e n t ,  and the  most im portan t and w ide ly -respec ted  
group o f lead e rs  o f  both s id e s ,  ever assembled in  the  s t a t e 's  h is to ry .  
The promise o f much excitem ent was f u l f i l l e d  e a r ly .
The d isp lay  o f  i n te l l e c tu a l  t a l e n t  was n o t l im ite d  to  the  a c tu a l 
deba tes . Essays and pamphlets from both s id e s  were more w idely  read 
and d is t r ib u te d  than in  any o th e r  s t a t e .  The F e d e ra l is t  Papers o f
^^MacDonald, c i t . « g ives one exp lanation  fo r  C lin to n 's  popu­
l a r i t y  and success in  c o n tro llin g  the s t a t e 's  government.
^^Main, o£. c i t . ,  pp. iil-71<
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Alexander Ham ilton, John Ja y , and James Madison on the F e d e ra l is t  s id e
had no p e e rs ; th e  L e tte rs  o f  B ratus and th e  pamphlets and essays o f
M elancton Smith from A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  pens v ied  on ly  w ith  R ichard Henry
L ee 's  "The L e tte rs  o f  a F edera l Farm er," as the  most a n a ly tic a l  o f  Anti-
F e d e ra lis t  l i t e r a t u r e  to  appear.
In  th e  most g en era l o f term s, the  essence o f A n ti-F e d e ra lis t
o p p o sitio n  to  th e  C o n s titu tio n  in  New York was th a t  the  new central,
government would u l t im a te ly  prove d e s tru c tiv e  o f  the p o l i t i c a l  freedom
and in d iv id u a l l i b e r t i e s  enjoyed by M e ^ jja n s  everywhere. This was the
argument most o ften  advanced f o r  th e  re je c t io n  o f the  C o n s titu tio n .
But i t  i s  n o t a t  a l l  s u rp r is in g , considering  th e  p r iv ile g e d  p o l i t i c a l
p o s itio n  enjoyed by th e  C lin ton ians w ith in  th e  s t a t e ,  to  f in d  a g re a t
deal o f what must be c a lle d  s t a te s - r ig h ts  p o l i t i c s  creep ing  in to  both
debates and essays o f p a r t i c u la r  New York 'A n t i s ' . This d u a li ty  o f
20purpose i s  q u ite  ap p aren t, f o r  example, in  th e  L e tte rs  o f S idney.
More o f te n , however, one can on ly  surm ise th e  purpose f o r  opposition
to  th e  C o n s titu tio n , t h i s  being e s p e c ia lly  th e  case w ith  the L e tte rs
21o f Cato, the pen-name o f  George C lin to n , and th e  speeches during th e  
debates o f  C linton^^ and John Lansing, J r .^ ^  Indeed, th e  opening A n ti- 
F e d e ra l is t  speech in  th e  r a t i f y in g  convention, by Lansing, included 
th is  r a th e r  in d ic a t iv e  paragraphs
^®Paul L e ic e s te r  Ford, Essays on the  C o n s titu tio n  (Brooklyn, 
1892), pp. 297-313o
^^I b id . , pp. 2U5-278.
^ ^ E ll io t ,  D ebates, I I ,  359= 
^ ^ Ib id .,  p . 217.
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I t  has been observed, t h a t ,  as th e  people m ust, o f  n e c e s s i ty , 
d e le g a te  e s s e n t ia l  powers e i th e r  to  the  in d iv id u a l o r  general 
s o v e re ig n tie s , i t  i s  p e r f e c t ly  im m aterial where they  a re  lodged; 
b u t, as th e  s t a te  governments w i l l  always possess a b e t t e r  
re p re se n ta tio n  o f  th e  f e e lin g s  and in te r e s t s  o f th e  people a t  
l a r g e ,~ i t“l3  obvious th a t  those  powers can be d ep o sited  w ith  
much g re a te r  s e c u r i ty  w ith the  s t a t e  than w ith  the general
government o 2d
This a t t i tu d e  must be c o n tra s te d  w ith  th a t  expressed by Melancton Smith
in  h is  f i r s t  speech on the  convention f lo o rs
[Smith] was as s tro n g ly  im pressed w ith  the  n e c e ss ity  o f  a union 
as any one could be. He would seek i t  w ith  as much a rd o r . In  
th e  d iscu ss io n  o f t h i s  q u estio n  [the  n e c e s s i ty  o f a union re q u ir ­
ing a stro n g  c e n tra l  governm ent], he was d isposed to  make every 
concession , and indeed, to  s a c r i f ic e  every th ing  f o r  a union , 
except th e  l i b e r t i e s  o f  h is  co un try , than  which he could  n o t 
contem plate a g re a te r  m isfo rtu n e . But he hoped we were no t 
reduced to  th e  n e c e s s i ty  o f  s a c r i f ic in g ,  o r even endangering our 
l i b e r t i e s ,  to  p rese rv e  th e  Union. I f  th a t  was th e  case , th e  a l ­
te rn a tiv e  was d re a d fu l. But, he would n o t now say th a t  the 
adoption  o f th e  C o n s titu tio n  would endanger our l i b e r t i e s ,  be­
cause th a t  was the  p o in t to  be debated . . . .25
C h a ra c te r is tic  o f  h is  l a t e r  speeches in  a t t i tu d e  was S m ith 's lack  o f 
concern f o r  the  s t a te  governments p e r  s e . üa, dw elt p r im a rily  upon the  
need to  p reserve  those  l i b e r t i e s  and freedoms enjoyed by Americans.
This exam ination o f New York A nti-Federalism  w i l l  draw from A nti-Feder­
a l i s t s  o f both p o s i t io n s ,  and w il l  c o r re la te  th e  arguments o f both in to  
a coherent p ic tu re  o f  New York A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts ' fe a rs  o f  th e  proposed 
fe d e ra l government.
John L ansing, in  th e  speech p rev io u s ly  quoted, p re c is e ly  summed 
up the argument o f s t a te s - r ig h t s  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts s  " I f  th e  o p e ra tio n  
o f th e  genera l government w i l l  su b v ert those  o f  the  in d iv id u a l s t a te s ,
26
th e  i n t e r e s t  o f  th e  s t a te  o f f ic e r s  [w il l]  be a ffe c te d  in  some m easure," 
The two g re a te s t  spokesmen f o r  t h i s  p o s i t io n ,  and the  two who had th e
^^ Ib id . ^^ Ib id . . p . 223. . p . 220,
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most to  f e a r  from th e  o p e ra tio n  o f a  s tro n g  c e n tra l  government, were 
Governor George C lin ton  and Robert T a tes , member o f  th e  New York S ta te  
Supreme Court» Both were extrem ely vocal in  td ie ir a tta c k s  on the Con­
s t i t u t i o n ,  though C lin ton  took l i t t l e  r e a l  p a r t  in  th e  debates and
Yates none a t  a l l»  Both men w ere, however, a c t iv e  e s s a y is ts  on the
27C o n s titu tio n , and Y ates, under th e  pseudonym o f  Sidney, made l i t t l e  
e f f o r t  to  h ide th e  e x te n t o f  h is  f e e l in g s .
In  h is  L e t te r s ,  Sidney compared the  fe d e ra l  C o n s titu tio n  w ith  
th e  c o n s t i tu t io n  .of J h e  s W b  o f  lew„York» He dem onstrated how the  
powers o f % e sta ite  goyernmmt wpu%d b e . e i th e r  to  t a l l y  o r  p a r t ia l ly ^  
absorbed, and asked w hether th e  rem aining powers would be s u f f ic ie n t  to  
support th e  s t a te  governments » Though h is  L e t te r s  lacked th e  l i t e r a r y  
and in te l l e c tu a l  q u a li ty  o f  those  o f  Smith o r  B ru tus, Sidney achieved 
h is  d e s ire d  end q u ite  w e ll.
Sidney contended t h a t g
The powers v e s ted  in  th e  l e g i s la tu r e  o f t h i s  s t a te  [by the  New 
York s ta te  c o n s t i tu t io n ]  w i l l  be weakened, fo r  the  proposed 
government d e c la re s  th a t  " a l l  l e g i s l a t iv e  powers h e re in  g ran ted  
s h a l l  be v e s ted  in  a  congress o f th e  United S ta te s ,  which s h a l l  
c o n s is t  o f a  Senate and a house o f r e p re s e n ta t iv e s ,"  and i t  
f u r th e r  p re s c r ib e s , t h a t  " th is  c o n s t i tu t io n  and th e  laws o f  th e  
U nited S ta te s ,  which s h a l l  be made under the  a u th o r i ty  o f the  
U nited S ta te s ,  s h a l l  be th e  supreme law o f th e  lan d , and the  
judges in  every s t a te  s h a l l  be bound th ereb y , anything in  the 
c o n s t itu t io n  o r laws o f  any s ta te  to  th e  co n tra ry  n o tw ith stan d ­
in g . . . »"28
This o b jec tio n  was a fa m ilia r  one, though F e d e ra l is ts  everywhere con­
tended th a t  th e  powers o f  the  n a tio n a l  l e g i s la tu r e  were q u ite  r e s t r i c te d  
in  th e  scope o f t h e i r  o p e ra tio n s . But, i s  th i s  reaso n ab le , Sidney asked, 
and concluded*
^7pord, E ssays, p . 29$» ^^Ib id . , p . 301̂ .
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so
I t  appears to  me as im possible th a t  th ese  powers in  th e  s t a te  
c o n s t i tu t io n  and those  in  the g en era l government can e x is t  and 
o p e ra te  to g e th e r  . , « Can th e re  a t  th e  same time and p lace  be 
and o p e ra te  two supreme l e g i s l a tu r e s ,  e x ecu tiv es , and ju d ic ia ls ?  
W ill a “guaran tee  o f  a rep u b lican  form o f  government to  every 
s t a te  in  th e  union" be o f any a v a i l ,  o r  secure  th e  estab lish m en t 
and re te n tio n  o f s t a te  r ig h ts
In a l a t e r  L e t te r ,  Sidney answered h is  own questions
I t  appears t h a t  the  g en era l government, when com pletely organ­
ize d , w i l l  absorb a l l  those  powers of  fee  s ta te s  which the  
framer's o f  th e  M n â tT w tlœ T h âd  d ec la red  should be only ex er­
c ise d  by th e  re p re se n ta tiv e s  o f  th e  people o f  the  s ta te  . , . 
bu t [the s t a t e '  s ] o p e ra tio n s  to  ensure o r  c o n tr ib u te  to  any 
e s s e n t ia l  measures prom otive o f th e  happiness o f  th e  people 
may be t o t a l l y  p ro s tr a te d ,  j^ _ g en era ]L  g9%8rnm w t-aizoga± ing  
liol i t s e l f  ̂ th a^ rig h .l.o f .^ te r fp r i i^ g  S  the mos
o f in te rn a l  p o l ic y , and the  most t r i f l i n g  dom estic concerns o f
- - —       . . . . . . . . .  - . . . . . .  , - . - - ,  . . . .  . .
every s t a t e .  . .
Cato went f u r th e r  in to  th is  m a tte r , though h is  i n i t i a l  prem ise
o f the  co n so lid a tin g  n a tu re  o f th e  C o n stitu tio n  was th e  same. Was i t
p o s s ib le , he asked, to  expect a rep u b lican  form o f government to  e x is t
in  th e  United S ta te s ,  given i t s  d iv e rse  in te r e s t s ,  c u ltu re s ,  and needs?
R e fle c tin g  on M ontesquieu 's famous aphorism r e la t in g  th e  s iz e  o f  a
country  to  i t s  form o f  government, Cato continued?
W ill t h i s  co n so lid a ted  r epubl i c ,  i f  e s ta b lis h e d , in  i t s  e x e rc ise  
beget~sucH~conficl&ice and' c ^ p l l a n c e ,  among th e  c i t iz e n s  o f 
th e se  s t a te s ,  as to  dq.$ritho%t the  a id  o f  a s tand ing  army? . . .
9  — ,1 . 1-1 full Ib.w ^ o r inu.1.1 1.1 . f . . » .,..1
The m alcontents in  each s t a t e ,  who w il l  n o t be a few, nor the  
l e a s t  im portan t, w i l l  be e x c itin g  fa c t io n s  a g a in s t i t —the  f e a r  
o f a dismemberment o f some o f i t s  p a r t s ,  and the  n e c e s s i ty  to  
en fo rce  the  execu tion  o f  revenue laws [a co n tin u a l source o f 
apprehension] on th e  extrem es and in  the  o th e r  d i s t r i c t s  o f th e  
government, w i l l  in c id e n ta ll;^  and n e c e s s a r i ly  re q u ire  a permanent
fo rc e  to  be k ep t fo o t 
The e f f e c t  o f t h a t  stand ing  army would be d e trim en ta l to  th e  freedoms 
o f th e  people?
^ ^ Ib id ..  pp . 30li-30^o 30 ib ido , pp . 3I3-31U.
3 ^ Ib id ., p . 258.
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will n o t p o l i t i c a l  s e c u r i ty ,  and even th e  opinion o f  i t ,  be 
extinguished'? Can m ildness and m oderation e x is t  in  a govern­
ment where the  prim ary in c id e n t in  i t s  e x e rc ise  must be fo rce?
W ill n o t v io len ce  d estro y  confidence , and can e q u a lity  su b s is t  
where th e  e x te n t, p o lic y , and p ra c t ic e  o f  i t  w i l l  n a tu ra l ly  
le a d  to  make odious d is t in c t io n s  among c i t iz e n s ? 32
Cato fu r th e r  suggested  th a t  th e  sou thern  s t a t e s ,  whose c it iz e n s  were
u n fa m ilia r  w ith f r u g a l i ty  and in d iv id u a l e f f o r t  and achievem ent, and
whose economy was based on s la v e ry , would be le s s  ten ac io u s in  defense
33of t h e i r  freedoms and independence than  th e  n o rth e rn  s t a t e s ,  C ato 's  
appeal in  the l a t t e r  argument was to  th e  em otions, to o n e 's  p rid e  in  
being a "freedom -loving, hard-w orking, en e rg e tic  Yankee," C e rta in ly , 
the  argument had l i t t l e  b a s is  in  h is to ry ,  f o r  the South had shown i t ­
s e l f  as ded icated  to  the  cause o f  independence as had th e  North,
But t h i s  was c e r ta in ly  n o t th e  only  means by which th e  ex is ten ce
o f the  s ta te s  was th re a te n e d . To Sidney» the  d u a li ty  o f  p ro v is io n s in  
the  s t a t e 's  c o n s t i tu t io n  and th e  f e d e ra l  C o n s titu tio n  f o r  th e  re g u la tio n  
o f the  mode, tim e, and p lace  o f n a tio n a l  e le c t io n s , and the  f a c t  th a t  
th e  l a t t e r  a r t i c l e  o f government was considered  in  a l l  cases as the  
supreme law o f th e  lan d , v i r tu a l l y  made th e  s t a t e 's  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  p ro ­
v is io n s  on the  m a tte r  in e f f e c t iv e ,  i f  n o t indeed n u l l i f i e d .  The fe d e ra l  
C o n stitu tio n  could , in  a d d it io n , vo id  th e  s t a t e 's  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  p ro v i­
sion  th a t  no c i t iz e n  could be deprived  o f h is  v o te , o r the  p r iv ile g e s
3iiand r ig h ts  confirmed to  th a t  in d iv id u a l by h is  s t a te  c it iz e n s h ip .
A r tic le  17, s e c tio n  i;, o f  th e  fe d e ra l  C o n stitu tio n  guaranteed  
to  every s t a te  a repub lican  fonri o f government, T his, Sidney charged, 
was a guarantee in  name on ly , f o r g
Ib id , 33i b id , ,  pp. 2S8-2S9. 3l i b i d . , pp. 208, 311,
3% adlson , og, c l t ,» p . 636 ,
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I f  th e  Ito ited  S ta te s  guaran teed  " to  every s t a t e  in  the  union 
a  repub lican  form o f  government, " we may be allow ed the  form 
and n o t th e  substance , and th a t  i t  was so in tended  w i l l  appear 
from th e  changing o f th e  word c o n s t i tu t io n  to  th e  word form 
and th e  om ission o f  th e  words, and i t s  e x is tin g  law s .36
Moreover, Sidney continued?
And I  do not even think i t  uncharitable to  suppose that i t  was 
designedly done; but whether i t  was so or n o t, by leaving out 
these words the jurisprudence o f  each s ta te  i s  l e f t  to the 
mercy o f  the new government « , « [by] 1s t  a r t . ,  8th s e c . ,  1 s t  
clause o o o by the 9th clause o f  the same sectio n  . . .  by 
the I8th clause . . .T b y ]  the 3rd a irt., 1s t  sec . . . .  by sec .
2nd. . . .  by the 3d a r t . ,  3d s e c .37
The im p lica tio n  o f Sidney's  co n ten tio n  i s  obvious—th e C o n s t i tu t ion
*  m m e iæ m iM g æ a m o  . ....................... » , i . .  — ■ ■ ■
could n o t e i th e r  guaran tee  the  s ta te s  a republic#;^ government o r main- 
t a in  th e  fo rce  o f  th e i r  e x is tin g  law s, fo r  by doing so th e  fe d e ra l 
government could n o t assume the p o s it io n  o f supremacy w ith in  the 
country  i t s  fram ers so obviously  in tended . Omissions o f  t h i s  n a tu re  
were s u b tle  indeed, bu t they  were more than  s u f f ic ie n t  and more than 
apparen t f o r  Sidney to  ca tch  t h e i r  probable consequences.
Sidney a lso  p o in ted  ou t t h a t  under^ the  C o n s titu tio n  the s ta te s  
would lo se  command o f  % e ir  when drawn in to  the use o f the.
fe d e ra l  g o v e i^ ^ n t .  The s t a te  governo r's  power o f pardon, h is  execution  
o f s t a te  laws, h is  c o n tro l o f  appointm ent, and the  l ie u te n a n t  governo r's  
a u th o r i ty  to  assume th e  power o f h is  su p e r io r , would a l l  be " e i th e r  a l l  
enervated  or a n n ih ila te d ."
F in a lly , the  s t a te  c o n s t i tu t io n ,  u n lik e  i t s  fe d e ra l c o u n te rp a rt, 
f l a t l y  in su red  th e  s a n c t i ty  o f any and a l l  r e l ig io u s  p ra c t ic e s ,  except 
as they  were in c o n s is te n t  w ith th e  peace and s a fe ty  o f the  s t a t e .  The
3^Ford, E ssays, p . 309.
^^I b id . 38xb id . .  p . 310.
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f e d e ra l  C o n s titu tio n  made no such g u a ran tees , nor d id  i t  p ro h ib it  those 
in  the  m in is try  from sim ultaneously  occupying c iv i l  o r  m il i ta ry  p o s i­
t io n s  o S epara tion  o f church and s t a t e  was a p ro v is io n  inco rpo ra ted  
in to  v i r tu a l ly  every s t a te  c o n s t i tu t io n ,_ jn d . the  If^çlç o f  in s is te n c e  upon 
th is  in  th e  C o n s titu tio n  made F e d e ra l is ts  and A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  a lik e  
uneae jo
Cato and John Lansing were more sp e c if ic  and le s s  inflam m atory
in  th e i r  observations on th e  C o n s titu tio n  than S idney. The fo rm er's
L e t te r s ,  which la rg e ly  covered the  same ground as d id  the L e tte rs  o f
Sidney, and which were only m arg ina lly  su p e rio r in  q u a li ty  to those  o f
Sidney, d id  n o t so g re a t ly  r e f l e c t  p reoccupation  w ith s ta te  in te r e s ts
as d id  th e  L e tte rs  o f Sidney. L an sin g 's  speeches likew ise  a re  only
very  seldom concerned w ith  any s t a t e s - r i g h t s .  On read ing  the  speeches
o r  L e tte rs  o f th ese  men, however, one s u b s e t s  t h e i r  p o s itio n  was no t
e n t i r e ly  d is in te r e s te d . Yet Lansing very  ab ly  summarizes th e  problem
o f a sse ss in g  th ese  m en's p o s itio n s
I f  th e  o p e ra tio n  of the  g en e ra l government w i l l  subvert those 
o f  th e  in d iv id u a l s t a t e s ,  the  in te r e s t s  o f the  s ta te  o f f ic e rs  
may be a ffe c te d  in  some m easure, o therw ise  th e i r  emoluments 
w i l l  remain undim inished—t h e i r  consequences n o t so much im­
p a ire d  as n o t to  compensate men o f  in te r e s te d  p u rs u its  by the 
p ro sp ec t o f sh arin g  the  o f f ic e s  o f the  g en era l government.
Does th is  im putation  only  apply  to  th e  o f f ic e r s  o f  th is  s ta te ?
Are they more d isc e rn in g  in  d is tin g u ish in g  th e i r  in te r e s t s ,  o r  . 
a re  they  only  capable o f  being warped by apprehensions o f lo ss? ^
The problem is  a d i f f i c u l t  one f o r  a modem h is to r ia n  to  deal w ith
o b je c tiv e ly . Indeed, any com pletely o b je c tiv e  a n a ly s is  o f Cato and
Lansing could be on ly  concerned w ith  t h e i r  o b je c tio n s . Only by
39lb id . , p . 313o
^ ° E l l io t ,  D ebates. I I ,  220-221,
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in je c t in g  one’s su b je c tiv e  f e e lin g s  in to  th e  a n a ly s is  can one a r r iv e  a t  
any conclusions o f  th e  underly ing  m otives o f two such men.
This th e s is  i s  concerned more w ith  th e  observa tions on th e  Con­
s t i t u t i o n  o f  those  who saw in  i t  genuine th re a ts  to  the  l i b e r t i e s ,  
freedom s, and p r iv ile g e s  enjoyed by Americans» A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  l ^ e  
Melancton Smith and Brutus devotedly  b e liev ed  in  a d e c e n tra liz e d  gov­
ernment « Though they  re a l iz e d  th a t  th e  C onfederation was too weak to  
accom plish th e  needs o f  and meet th e  problems faced  by the young n a tio n , 
th ey  fe a re d  the  C o n s titu tio n  to  be too f a r  in  the  o th e r  extreme» T heir 
p o s it io n  in  the  con troversy  was a  moderate one—>îlth. .c e r ta in  amendments 
to  the  C o n s titu tio n  in su r ln  freedoms o f  th e  Americans, th e  C onsti­
tu t io n  would be accep tab le  to  them» But they  added a g re a t d ea l o f 
r e s p e c ta b i l i ty  and in te l l e c tu a l  q u a li ty  to  the  New York A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  
o rg a n iz a tio n , which o therw ise  would have been q u ite  drab» Smith, how­
ev er, and o th e r  moderates l ik e  him, proved to  be the  weak l in k  in  the 
o therw ise q u ite  s o l id  New York A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  o rgan ization»^^
^ U n til very  l a t e  in  th e  deb a tes . Smith remained firm  to  th e  
A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  PQslM.5a . 0f  no r a t i f i c a t i o n  w ithou t p r io r  amendments »
At th e  same tim e, however, he expressed p r iv a te  thoughts th a t  he would 
vo te  fo r  recommendatory amendments i f  s u b s ta n t ia l  enough» As th e  con­
ven tio n  continued , and as the  s p l i t  between the two s id es  in  th e  con­
tro v e rsy  widened. Smith came to  r e a l iz e  th a t  should New York re fu se  
r a t i f i c a t i o n  w ithout p r io r  amendment, th e  s ta te  would l ik e ly  be is o la te d  
in  th e  Union» Then to o . Smith was the  only  A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  d e leg a te  
from Duchess County, and he knew from New York’s re b e llio u s  s t a te  of 
mind th a t  th e  p o s s ib i l i ty  o f  secess io n  o f th e  c i ty  and th e  surrounding 
co u n ties  was rea l»  though perhaps u n lik e ly »  Smith decided a f t e r  much 
co n s id e ra tio n  th a t  i t  was b e t te r  to  v o te  f o r  r a t i f i c a t i o n  w ith, recOJir 
mandatory amendments than r i s k  a d iv is io n  o f  the  s t a te  by v o tin g  a g a in s t 
r a t i f icatiggup He d id  e x ac tly  t h a t ,  though he must have re a liz e d  th a t  
h is  a c tio n  would v i r tu a l ly  amount to  h is  p o l i t i c a l  death  in  the  s ta te »  
Robin Brooks, "Alexander Hamilton, Melancton Smith, and th e  R a ti f ic a tio n  
o f  the  C o n stitu tio n  in  New York," W illiam  and Mary Q u arte rly . (1962),
A lso, Linda Grant DePauw, The S e v e n th  P i l l a r s  New York and the F edera l 
C o n s titu tio n  ( I th a c a , 196671
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The proposed House o f R ep resen ta tiv es  p a r t i c u la r ly  concerned 
Stalltho The House alone was th e  source o f  th e  p e o p le ’s d i r e c t  rep resen ­
ta t io n  In  th e  fe d e ra l  government, and as such was considered  th e  source 
o f  much o f the  p eo p le ’s s e c u r i ty  In  government» The proposed House was 
o b jec tio n a b le  on th re e  p a r t i c u la r  counts »
Sm ith’s f i r s t  o b je c tio n  to  th e  House was th a t  I t s  ru le  o f  appor­
tionm ent was u n ju s t .  S ec tion  2, A r t ic le  I I  o f  the  CSonstltutlon^^ p ro ­
vided  th a t  a l l  w h ites and th r e e - f i f th s  o f the  s lav es In  each s t a te  
were th e  basis f o r  rep re se n ta tio n »  Ttils p ro v is io n  was th e  r e s u l t  o f  a 
North-South con^romlse between th e  d e leg a tes  In  the F edera l Convention, 
and Stailth c le a r ly  understood th a t ,  as such, I t  was a compromise which 
n one the less disp le a se d  h ^ »
He could n o t see any ru le  by which s lav es  were to  be Included
^ÊRr88@Rtytlon. The p r in c ip le  o f re p re se n ta tio n  
being th a t  every f r e e  agen t should be concerned In  governing 
h im self, i t  was absurd In  g iv ing  th a t  power to  a man who could 
n o t e x e rc ise  I t»  Slaves have no w i l l  o f  t h e i r  own» The very  
o p e ra tio n  o f I t  was to  g ive c e r ta in  p r iv ile g e s  to  those  people 
who were so wicked as to  keep slaves»^^
Secondly, the  C o n s titu tio n , by A r t ic le  I ,  se c tio n  2, f ix ed  the  
re p re se n ta tio n  a t  one re p re se n ta tiv e  p e r t h i r t y  thousand In h a b ita n ts  » ̂  
This was u n sa tis fac tp iy ^ t^ ^  f o r  w hile th e  maximum number o f
re p re se n ta tiv e s  was f ix e d , th e Gonst l t a t l g n d l d  no t f i x  a minimum 
number below which th e  House m ight be reduced» The House might con­
ce ivab ly  reduce th e  number o f  re p re se n ta tiv e s  b ^ p w ,th e  s lx ty - f lv o  
provided  f o r  by the  C o n stitu tio n  u n t i l  th e  census o f  1790» The only
^^Madlson, ^ »  c l t »» p» 627» 
^ % l l l o t ,  Debates» I I ,  226-227< 
^S îad lson , o£» c i t .» p» 627»
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s e c u r i ty  in  th e  p ro v is io n  f o r  the  number o f re p re se n ta tiv e s  was th e
in te g r i ty  o f th e  r u le r s ,  a  very  s le n d e r th read  o f p ro te c tio n  indeed.
The power to  determ ine th e  number o f re p re se n ta tiv e s  in  a repub lican
government being l e f t  to  the  d is c re t io n  o f th e  l e g i s l a to r s  was a poten-
li5t i a l  th r e a t  to  th e  peop le .
The th i r d  e rro r  in  th e  proposed House, and the o b je c tio n  most 
o f te n  rev e rted  to  by A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  throughout th e  coun try , was th a t  
the  re p re se n ta tio n  o f  th e  House vras inadequate f o r  the  s iz e  and popula­
t io n  o f  th e  country .
I t  was, [Smith] s a id , th e  fundam ental p r in c ip le  o f f r e e  govern­
ment, th a t  the people should make the  laws by which they were 
to  be governed. He who i s  c o n tro lle d  by an o th er is  a s lav e ; 
and th a t  government which is  d ire c te d  by th e  w il l  o f  any one, 
o r a few, o r  any number le s s  than i s  the  w il l  o f the  community, 
i s  a  government f o r  s la v e s , , . , The view point was, how was 
th e  w i l l  o f the community to  be expressed? I t  was no t p o ss ib le  
f o r  them to  come to g e th e r ; th e  m u ltitude  would be too g re a t;  in  
o rd e r , th e re fo re , to  provide a g a in s t th i s  inconvenience, the  
scheme o f re p re se n ta tio n  had been adopted, by which th e  people 
denoted o th e rs  to  rep re se n t them. In d iv id u a ls  e n te r in g  in tot  - ■ — ...............—'-J- - — -•
s o c ie ty  became one^body, and th a t  body ought to  be anim ated by 
one mind , , , we may approach a g re a t way toward p e rfe c tio n  by 
in c re a s in g  th e  re p re se n ta tio n ,^ ^
Given th e  n a tu ra l  u rge o f  men once in  power to  r e ta in  as much power as
p o ss ib le , i t  was n o t w ise to  expect th e  House to  en large i t s  numbers,
thereby  decreasing  th e  power each re p re s e n ta tiv e  possessed . The same
m otives would a lso  o p e ra te  upon the Senate and the ex ecu tiv e , to  whose
advantage i t  would be to  m ain ta in  a  sm all body o f re p re se n ta tiv e s . I t
was very  im portan t, th e re fo re , to  e s ta b l is h  from the o u tse t a s u i ta b le
number o f  r e p re s e n ta t iv e s , enforced  by a c o n s t i tu t io n a l ly -e s ta b l is h e d
J 7
minimum number o f r e p re s e n ta tiv e s .
^ P E llio t, Debates, I I ,  227.
^^I b id , , pp, 227- 228 , ^ “̂I b id , ,  pp, 228, 2l|2- 2ii3o
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Smith continued to  hammer a t  s e c tio n  2, A r tic le  I ;
There was an o th e r o b jec tio n  to  th e  c lauses i f  g re a t  a f f a i r s  o f 
government were t ru s te d  to  few men, they  would be more l ia b le  
to  corruptiono C orrup tion , he knew, was un fash ionab le  amongst 
u s ;  bu t he supposed th a t  Americans were l ik e  o th e r  men; and 
though they  had h i th e r to  d isp lay ed  g re a t v i r tu e ,  s t i l l  they 
were men; and th e re fo re  such s te p s  should be taken as to p re ­
ven t the  p o s s ib i l i ty  o f  c o rru p tio n .^ "
With t h i s  o bserva tion  and demand, Cato staunch ly  agreeds
I t  i s  a  very  im portan t o b jec tio n  to  th is  government, th a t  the  
re p re se n ta tio n  c o n s is ts  o f so few; too few to  r e s i s t  the  in f lu ­
ence o f  c o rru p tio n , and the  tem ptation  of tre a c h e ry , a g a in s t 
which a l l  governments ought to  tak e  p re c a u tio n s .
As a c o ro lla ry  to  h is  th i r d  o b se rv a tio n , Smith a s se r te d  th a t  a 
repub lican  government must depend, fo r  i t s  f a i t h f u l  execu tion , upon 
the  p e o p le 's  good op in ion  and confidence. The Confederation had been 
somewhat i n e f f i c i e n t ,  p re c is e ly  because i t  lacked  th i s  confidence. 
R epresen tatives should resem ble those  whom they  re p re se n t, and should 
possess a knowledge o f th e i r  circum stances and w ants. Such knowledge 
should comprehend p o l i t i c s  and commerce, as th a t  he ld  by men o f re f in e d  
education . But men o f  th e  'm iddling  class* were more competent to  
comprehend th e  concerns and preoccupation  o f the  common p e o p l e . T h e  
government proposed by the  C o n s titu tio n , Smith charged, would be com­
posed o f  men o f th e  h ig h er c la s s ,  s in ce  i t  was co nstruc ted  to  admit 
but a few to th e  e x e rc ise  o f  i t s  powers. The w ell-bo rn , w ith  su p e rio r  
re sp e c t from th e  common people , and w ith t h e i r  ta le n t  f o r  e a s i ly  formed 
p o l i t i c a l  a s so c ia tio n s , would tend  to  be chosen fo r  p u b lic  o f f ic e  be­
fo re  those  of the  m iddling c la s s .  The r e s u l t  m ight very w ell be. Smith
^^ib id . , pp. 228- 229.
^^Ford, E ssays, p . 268. 
^ ° E l l io t ,  D ebates. I I ,  22*5-21*6,
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concluded, a government o f l im ite d  p u b lic  exp ression j indeed a govern­
ment o f o pp ression . The e f f e c t  upon l i b e r ty  would be d isa s tro u s
The duty  o f  c i t iz e n s  a t  t h i s  c ru c ia l  tim e. Smith v igo rously  
argued, was to  frame a government f r ie n d ly  to  th e  l ib e r ty  and r ig h ts  
o f mankind.
We were now in  th a t  s tag e  o f s o c ie ty  in  which we could d e lib ­
e ra te  w ith freedom; how long i t  m ight con tinue , God only kneswl 
Twenty years hence, perhaps, th ese  m otives [of honesty  in  
government] m ight become u n fash io n ab le . We a lre ad y  have . . . 
in  some p a r ts  o f  th e  coun try , gentlemen r id ic u lin g  th a t  s p i r i t  
o f  p a tr io t is m , and love o f  l ib e r ty ,  which c a r r ie d  us through 
a l l  our d i f f i c u l t i e s  in  tim es o f  danger.52
Government must a lso  c u l t iv a te  a love o f l ib e r ty  among i t s  c i t i ­
zens. Should i t  become op p ressiv e , i t  would do so by degrees and would 
proceed to  the  s tep  by s te p  d e p riv a tio n  o f p o l i t i c a l  freedoms and p e r­
sonal l i b e r t i e s Cato he ld  s im ila r  b e lie f s  g
[ I ] t  may be remarked th a t  a w e ll-d ig es te d  democracy has th is  
advantage over a l l  liie  o th e rs , to  w it, th a t  i t  a ffo rd s  to many 
the opp o rtu n ity  to  be advanced to  th e  supreme command, and the  
honors they  thereby  enjoy f i l l  them w ith  a d e s ire  o f rendering  
them selves worthy o f  them; hence th is  d e s ire  becomes p a r t  o f 
t h e i r  education , i s  m atured in  manhood, and produces an a rden t 
a f fe c tio n  f o r  t h e i r  country  . . . th e  more complete [the rep re ­
s e n ta tiv e  branch] i s ,  the b e t te r  your in te r e s t s  w il l  be p reserv ed , 
and th e  g re a te r  th e  o p p o rtu n ity  you w il l  have to  p a r t ic ip a te  ^  
government, one o f  the  p r in c ip a l  s e c u r i t ie s  o f a f r e e  p eop le .5u
The d e leg a tes  to  the  New York r a t i f y in g  convention spen t a f u l l
week on the proposed House o f R e p re se n ta tiv e s . They a lso  spen t over a
week on th e  proposed Senate, the  re p o s ito ry  o f those whom Smith termed
the  n a tu ra l  a r is to c ra c y  o f th e  coun try .
^ I b i d . , pp. 216-217.
^^Ib id . , p . 229. ^^ Ib id . , p . 2U6 <
5^Ford, E ssays, pp. 268-269.
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G ilb e r t  L iv ingston , an A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  who seldom spoke on the
convention f lo o r ,  but who was n e v e r th e le s s  a capable o ra to r , opened the
debates on the  upper house o f th e  n a tio n a l  le g is la tu re o  His summary o f
A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  o b jec tio n s  to  th e  Senate was very  w ell developed?
F i r s t ,  [the S enate] would possess l e g i s l a t i v e  powers coextensive 
w ith those  o f th e  House o f R ep resen ta tiv es  except w ith re sp ec t 
to  o r ig in a tin g  revenue law s; which, however, they  would have 
power to  r e j e c t  o r  amend, as in  th e  case  o f  o th e r  b i l l s □ Sec­
ondly , they would have an im portance, even exceeding th a t  o f  th e  
r e p re se n ta tiv e  house, as th ey  would be composed o f  a sm aller 
number, and possess  more firm ness and system . T h ird ly , t h e i r  
consequence and d ig n ity  would s t i l l  f u r th e r  transcend  those  o f  
the  o th e r  branch, from th e i r  longer continuance in  o f f ic e .
These powers * . . rendered  the  Senate a dangerous body.^^
As Brutus so a c c u ra te ly  observed,^ the. 5 $ m te  was design ed to  
represen-^-^e^ a r is to c ra c y  o f  the. country  This was necessary  i f  the  
Senate were to  balance th e  House. But, the  Senate was a lso  designed 
as a k ind  o f bulwark o f  the s t a t e s ,  a  check on encroachments by the  
g enera l g o v e r n m e n t .G iv e n  th e  n a tu re , and the  r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s  o f 
the  S enate , John Lansing thought i t s  d ig n ity  and re sp e c t to  be g re a te r  
than th a t  o f  the  House.
L iv ingston  continued h is  o b se rv a tio n s on the Senate?
He went on, in  the  second p la c e , to  enumerate and anim advert 
on th e  powers w ith  which they  were c lo th ed  in  t h e i r  ju d ic ia l  
c ap a c ity , and in  t h e i r  c ap a c ity  o f  counsel to  the  P re s id e n t, 
and in  th e  forming o f  t r e a t i e s .  In  th e  l a s t  p la c e , i f  too 
much power could n o t be given to  t h i s  body, they  were made, 
he s a id , a co u n cil o f  appointm ent, by whom ambassadors and 
o th e r  o f f ic e r s  o f s t a t e  were to  be appo in ted . These a re  the  
powers . o o which a re  v e s te d  in  t h i s  sm all body o f tw en ty -s ix ; 
in  some e a se s , to  be ex erc ised  by a bare quorum, which i s  fo u r­
tee n ; a m a jo rity  o f which number, ag a in , i s  e ig h t . What a re  
th e  checks provided to  balance t h i s  g re a t  mass o f power?59
^ ^ B llio t ,  Debates^ I I ,  286
^6
Borden, o£. c i t . ,  p . l 8l .
5’̂ E l l io t ,  D ebates. I I ,  28? .
^ ^ I b id . .  p . 293. ^ ^ Ib ido , p . 28?.
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The Senate was 9 as B ratus observed, a mixed le g is la t lv e ° e x e c u tlv e -
ju d le ia l  bodyg
lo  They a re  one b ra n c h ^ ^ ^ h e  l^ g i^   ̂ and in  th is  
re sp e c t w il l  possess equal powerj ‘în  a l l  cases w ith  the  house 
o f re p re se n ta tiv e s?  fo r  I  consider the c lause  which gives the  
house of re p re se n ta tiv e s  th e  r ig h t  o f o r ig in a tin g  b i l l s  fo r  
r a is in g  revenue as m erely nom inal, see ing  the  Senate [has the  
power] to  propose o r  concur w ith  amendments,
2o They a re  a branch o f  th e  execu tive  in  th e  appointm ent o f 
ambassadors and pub lic  m in is te rs ,_ a n d  in  th e  appointm ent o f 
i n  o th e r  o f f ic e rsj, no t o therw ise  provided fo r?  whether th e  
forming o f  t r e a t i e s  g in  which they  a re  jo in ed  w ith  th e -P re s i­
d e n t, ap p e rta in s  to  the  l e g i s l a t iv e  o r  execu tive  p a r t  o f the  
government, o r  to  n e i th e r ,  i s  no t m a te r ia l ,
3o o f _ th e  ju d ic i a l ,  fo r  they  form the  c o u rt
This arrangem ent, to  B ru tus, was n o t s a t is f a c to r y :
I t  has been a long e s ta b lis h e d  maxim, th a t  th e  l e g i s l a t iv e ,  
ex ecu tiv e , and ju d ic ia l  departm ents in  the  government should 
be kep t d i s t in c t  , , , I  adm it th a t  t h i s  d is t in c t io n  cannot 
be p e r f e c t ly  p rese rv ed . In  a duly balanced government, i t  is  
perhaps a b so lu te ly  n ecessa ry  to  g ive the execu tive  q u a lif ie d  
l e g i s la t iv e  powers, and th e  le g i s la tu r e  o r  a  branch o f them 
ju d ic ia l  powers in  th e  l a s t  r e s o r t .  I t  may p o ss ib ly , a ls o , 
in  some sp e c ia l  cases be ad v isab le  to  a sso c ia te  th e  le g i s la tu r e ,  
o r  a branch o f  i t ,  w ith  the  ex ec u tiv e , in  th e  e x e rc ise  o f a c ts  
o f g re a t n a tio n a l  im portance. But s t i l l  th e  maxim i s  a good 
one, and a se p a ra tio n  o f th ese  powers should be sought as f a r  
as i s  p ra c t ic a b le ,  I  can sc a rc e ly  imagine th a t  any of the  
advocates o f th e  system  w i l l  p re ten d  th a t  i t  was necessary  to  
accumulate a l l  th ese  powers in  th e  s e n a te ,^ !
A r tic le  I ,  s e c tio n  3, o f th e  f e d e ra l  C o n stitu tio n ^^  provided th a t
th e  se n a to rs , two from each s t a t e ,  be appoin ted  by th e  s t a te  le g i s la to r s
fo r  a term of s ix  y e a rs . Of t h i s  B ratus sa id :
The apportionm ent o f  members o f the  Senate among the  s ta te s  i s  
no t according to  numbers, o r th e  im portance o f the s t a te s ,  but
i s  eq u a l. T his, on th e  p lan  o f a c o n so lid a ted  government is
^^Borden, o£, c i t , ,  pp , 182=183, 
^^I b id o
^^Madison, og, c l t , , p , 628 ,
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unequal and im proper; bu t i s  p roper on th e  system o f confeder­
a tio n  o o o I t  i s  indeed th e  only fe a tu re  o f  any importance 
In  th e  c o n s t i tu t io n  o f  a con federa ted  government o
The term fo r  which th e  sen a te  a re  to  be chosen i s ,  in  my 
judgment, too lo n g , and no p ro v is io n  being made fo r  a ro ta t io n  
w i l l ,  I  conceive, be o f  dangerous consequence.
I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  f i x  th e  p re c ise  p e rio d  fo r  which the  
Senate should be chosen . . . Some o f  th e  d u tie s  which a re  to  
be perform ed by the Senate , seem e v id e n tly  to  p o in t ou t the  
p ro p r ie ty  o f t h e i r  term o f  se rv ic e  being extended beyond the  
p e rio d  o f t h a t  o f  th e  assem bly . . . They a re  designed to  
re p re se n t th e  a r is to c ra c y  o f  the  coun try , i t  seems f i t  they 
should  possess more s t a b i l i t y ,  and so continue a lo n g er p eriod  
then  [s i c ] th a t  branch who re p re se n t the  democracy. The b u s i­
ness o f  making t r e a t i e s  and some o th e rs  which i t  w i l l  be p roper 
to  commit to  th e  S enate , re q u ire s  th a t  they  should have ex p eri­
ence, and th e re fo re  th a t  they  should remain some time in  o f f ic e  
to  acqu ire  i t . ° 3
Those A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts ,  l ik e  Brutus and Sm ith, who, w hile no t e n t i r e ly
s a t i s f i e d  w ith the  d i s t r ib u t io n  o f  power in  the  f e d e ra l  government,
acknowledged th e  n e c e s s i ty  o f  a Senate o f  lo n g er d u ra tio n  o f o f f ic e  and
of some power, n e v e rth e le ss  g re a t ly  fe a re d  the  len g th  o f  time f o r  which
the Senate would e x e rc ise  th e se  powers. Brutus continued:
But s t i l l  i t  i s  o f  equal im portance t h a t  they  should  n o t be so 
long in  o f f ic e  as to  be l ik e ly  to  fo rg e t  the  hand th a t  formed 
them, or be in se n s ib le  to  t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s . Men long in  o f f ic e  
a re  very a p t to  f e e l  them selves independent; to  form and pursue 
in te r e s ts  se p a ra te  from th o se  who appoin ted  them. And th is  i s  
more l ik e ly  to  be the case  w ith  the  se n a te , as they  w il l  f o r  
th e  most p a r t  o f  th e  tim e be absen t from the s ta te  they  re p re se n t, 
and a s so c ia te  w ith  such company as w il l  possess very  l i t t l e  f e e l ­
ings o f th e  m iddling c la s s  o f  peop le .
To th e se  o b se rv a tio n s , Smith added a few o f  h is  own?
I  concur . . . th a t  th e re  i s  a  n e c e s s i ty  fo r  g iv ing  th is  branch 
a  g re a te r  s t a b i l i t y  than  th e  House o f  R e p re se n ta tiv es . But, 
s i r ,  i t  does no t fo llow  from th is  p o s i t io n ,  th a t  the  senato rs 
ought to  hold  t h e i r  p laces  during  l i f e  . . .  As the c lause  now
^^Borden, c i t . .  p„ l 8l<
6 k Ib id .
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s ta n d s , th e re  i s  no doubt t h a t  th e  se n a to rs  w i l l  ho ld  t h e i r  
o f f ic e  p e rp e tu a lly , and in  t h i s  s i tu a t io n  they  must o f neces­
s i t y  lo se  t h e i r  dependence, and attachm ents to  the peop le . I t  
i s  c e r ta in ly  in c o n s is te n t  w ith  the  e s ta b lis h e d  p r in c ip le s  o f  
republican ism  th a t  th e  sen a te  should be a f ix e d  and unchange­
ab le  body o f  m en.°^
G ilb e r t  L iv ingston  a ls o  spoke on the m a tte r . A se n a to r , l ik e  
a l l  men, would have p erso n a l m a tte rs  to  a tte n d  to ,  and so might forego 
h is  o f f i c i a l  d u t ie s .  Furtherm ore, given th e  a r i s to c r a t i c  n a tu re  o f  the  
se n a to rs , the d u ra tio n  o f  o f f i c e ,  and t h e i r  d is tan c e  from the  p e o p le 's  
ob se rv a tio n , " fa c tio n s  a re  a p t  to  be f ormed i f  the  body becomes perman­
e n t. The sen a to rs  w il l  a s s o c ia te  only w ith  men o f t h e i r  own c la s s ,  and 
thus become s tra n g e rs  to  th e  c o n d itio n  o f  th e  common people .
Alexander Baralltgrij a F e d e ra lis t , o f  some no te  and consequence, 
thought , th a t  th e  fe d e ra l  government ought to  be v i r tu a l ly  independent. 
The s t a t e s ,  he acknowledged, were necessary  and fundam ental p a r ts  o f 
the  p o l i t i c a l  system o f  th e  co un try . But they  should be so p o s itio n e d  
w ith in  the  governmental o rg an iz a tio n  o f  th e  U nited S ta te s  as to  reduce 
th e i r  in flu en ce  upon the  c e n tra l  government. But, Lansing asked, were 
the C o n stitu tio n  to  be adopted unamended, and were the  fe d e ra l govern­
ment to  be e s ta b lis h e d  v i r tu a l l y  as Hamilton w ished, where was th e  
check upon i t  to  be lodged? C e r ta in ly , checks could n o t be found 
w ith in  the s ta te s ,  f o r  they  lacked  any e f f e c t iv e  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  powers 
o f th is  n a tu re  a g a in s t the c e n tr a l  government. Hamilton contended th a t  
the s t a te s  re ta in e d  th e i r  so v e re ig n ty , and th ereb y  c o n s titu te d  a de 
fa c to  check. But, Lansing asked , d id  they  in  f a c t  r e ta in  t h e i r  so v er­
e ign ty?  They could n o t m ain tain  arm ies; they  d id  n o t have the  u n lim ited
^ ^ E l l io t ,  D ebates. I I ,  309-310. 
^^I b id . , pp. 287- 288.
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powers o f  ta x a tio n  which c h a ra c te r iz e d  th e  c e n tra l  government. In  
r e a l i t y g th e  s t a te s  would soon be found u se le s s  and unnecessary . Upon 
th e  g radual bu t inexorab le  e ro s io n  o f  s t a t e  and lo c a l  governments, the 
r ig h ts  and l i b e r t i e s  o f th e  people would lik ew ise  erode, u n t i l  they 
became n o t c i t iz e n s  bu t su b je c ts  o f  th e  f e d e ra l  government.
Forced ro ta t io n  o f  th e  s e n a to rs , Snith  argued, would be a s te p  
in  th e  r ig h t  d ire c tio n  o f  an e f f e c t iv e  check a g a in s t the  c e n tra l  gov­
ernment. R o ta tion  would in su re  th e  senators*  continued understand ing  
of the p e o p le 's  needs and f e e l in g s .  I t  would p rev en t, o r  a t  l e a s t  
h in d e r, th e  beginning o f  p lo ts  a g a in s t the  l i b e r t i e s  and a u th o r ity  o f 
the s t a te  governments. F in a lly , ro ta t io n  would be the  b est means o f 
ex tin g u ish in g  f a c t io n s ,  which had so o f te n  p re v a ile d  in  repub lican  
governments. The hi s to r y  o f l e g i s l a t iv e  bodies in  repub lican  s t a te s .  
Smith p o in ted  o u t. showed th a t  p e rp e tu a l bodies tended to  e i th e r  com­
bine J n ^ 8ok^es__pf o r were to m  a p a r t  by,, pabal»^®
S im ila r reason ing  suggested  the  advantage o f  g ran ting  to  the  
s ta te  le g is la tu r e s  the  power o f  r e c a l l  over t h e i r  s e n a to rs . Smith 
argueds
That the  se n a to rs  a re  th e  re p re se n ta tiv e s  o f th e  s ta te  l e g i s ­
l a tu r e s ,  i t  i s  reasonab le  and p roper th a t  they  should  be under 
t h e i r  c o n tro l. When a s t a t e  sends an agent commissioned to  
tra n s a c t  any b u s in e ss , o r  perform  any s e ^ i c e ,  i t  c e r ta in ly  
ought to have the  power o f r e c a l l .
Smith continued by s t re s s in g  th a t  th e  r e c a l l  should n o t be ex erc ised  by 
th e  people a t  la r g e ,  f o r  th a t  would d e fe a t the purpose fo r  which the  
sen a te  was e s ta b lis h e d . He concludeds
67Ib id . ,  p . 308. I b id . ,  p . 311.
69 Ib id .
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Form th is  government as you p le a se , you must, a t a l l  events, 
lodge in  i t  very important powers, Biese powers must be in  
the hands o f  a few men, so s itu a ted  as to  procure a small 
degree o f  r e sp o n s ib ility . These circumstances ought to put 
us on our guard, and the inconvenience o f th is  necessary d e le ­
gation o f power should be corrected , by providing some su itab le
checks,70
Both Smith^^ and Lansing7^ feared that the s ta te  governments, 
e ith er  through lack  o f ju r isd ic tio n  or in s u ff ic ie n t  power to e f fe c t  
what areas o f  ju r isd ic tio n  were l e f t  them, would dwindle in  public  
resp ect. Eventually, they argued, the s ta te s  would be considered only  
as a u se le ss  and expensive burden upon the people. Though the two men's 
arguments c lo s e ly  p a ra lle led  each other, one note o f  in te r e s t  does ap­
pear in  the former's reasoning: " I  conceive th at the true in te r e s t  o f
every s ta te  i s  the in te r e s t  o f  the whole; and that i f  we should have a 
w ell-regu lated  government, the idea w i l l  p rev a il,
The F ed era list argument that as the w ell-regu lated  central gov­
ernment developed, so a lso  would the in te r e s ts  and w ell-being o f the 
s ta te s , was judged erroneous. The error la y , Snith contended, in  the 
premise o f the F ed era list argument:
We s h a ll ,  indeed, have a few lo c a l in te r e s ts  to pursue, under 
the new C onstitu tion , because i t  l im its  the claims o f  the s ta te s  
by so c lo se  a l in e ,  th at on th e ir  part there can be but l i t t l e  
dispute, and l i t t l e  worth disputing about. But, s i r ,  I  conceive 
that p a r tia l in te r e s ts  w i l l  grow continu ally  weaker, because 
there are not those fundamental d ifferen ces between the rea l 
in te r e sts  o f  the severa l s ta te s ,  which w i l l  long prevent th e ir  
coming together and becomii^ uniform, 74
I t  was a w idely repeated p ostu la te  o f  p o l i t ic s  in  the United 
States in  the la t e  eighteenth century, that the c lo ser  the people were 
to  th e ir  government, the more secure th e ir  r ig h ts . I t  was an argument
70lb id , 71ib id , ,  p , 313, 72 ib id , ,  p, 311-
7 3 lb id ., p , 31^0 7liib id ,
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w ith  Wiioh Smith was in  t o t a l  agreements
I  have fre q u e n tly  observed a  r e s t r a i n t  upon -üie s t a te  govern­
m ent, which CSongress never can be under, c o n s tru c t th a t  body 
as you p le a s e . I t  i s  a  t r u th  capable o f demon s t r a t io n ,  t h ^  
th e  n e a re r  th e  re p re se n ta tiv e  i s  to  h is  const"ituents '." 'tE i 
msre _ a t t ^ e ^ a R l4 a p ^ ^  In  th e  s t a te s ,  lEhe
e le c tio n s  a re  f re q u e n t, and th e  re p re se n ta tiv e s  numerousj 
they  t r a n s a c t  business in  th e  m idst o f  th e i r  c o n s titu e n ts , 
and every man must be c a lle d  upon to  account fo r  h is  conduct.
. . .  Ih  th i s  s t a t e ,  the  council o f  appointm ent a re  e le c te d
fo r  one y e a r . The proposed C o n s titu tio n  e s ta b lis h e s  a council 
o f  appointm ent ■Hho w i l l  be p e r p e t u a l . 73
Nor was i t  a ccu ra te  to  observe , as d id  Hamilton on occasion , th a t  fa c ­
tio n s  could no t e x is t  in  th e  Senate w ithout th e  knowledge o f the  s t a te
le g i s la tu r e s .  Indeed, th e  h is to ry  o f th e  C onfederation Congress proved 
76th e  o p p o site .
The d e leg a tes  to  the  r a t i f y in g  convention spen t over a week on
the S enate . The execu tive  and ju d ic ia l  branches o f  the  proposed fe d e ra l
government rece ived  on ly  passing  re fe re n c e . Indeed, Cato was the  only
New York “Anti* to  g ive  the execu tive  branch any a t te n t io n  a t  a l l .  In
h is  fo u r th  L e t te r ,  Cato observed th a t  th e  c o n s tru c tio n  o f  A rtic le  I I ,
77se c tio n  1 , o f  the  C o n s titu tio n  was vague and in e x p l ic i t  as to  the  mode 
o f e le c t io n  o f th e  P re s id e n t and V ice-P re s id en t fo llow ing  t h e i r  f i r s t  
fo u r-y e a r  term o f o f f i c e .  Indeed, th e re  was no in d ic a tio n  th a t  the  two 
o f f ic e s  would become vacan t upon the  e x p ira tio n  o f  t h e i r  t e r m s . Cato 
continued?
I t  i s  remarked by M ontesquieu, in  t r e a t in g  of re p u b lic s , th a t
"in a l l  m agistraces. the grealaiess o f the power must be contpen
the brevity  o f  the duration, andsa ted  fo r
"^^Ibid.. p . 315» 7^ Ib ld . ,  p . 312 .
^^Madison, o£. c i t . .  pp. 632-633.
^®Ford, E ssays, f p .  260-261.
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th an  a year would be dangerous,'* I t  i s ,  th e re fo re , obvious . . . 
to  account why g re a t power in  th e  hands o f  a m a g is tra te , and 
t h a t  power connected w ith  co n sid erab le  d u ra tion  may be dangerous 
to  th e  l i b e r t i e s  o f  a re p u b lic . The d ep o sit o f  v a s t  t r u s t s  in  
th e  hands o f  a s in g le  m a g is tra te , enables him in  t h e i r  ex erc ises  
to  c re a te  a numerous t r a i n  o f  dependents; t h i s  tem pts h is  ambi­
t io n ,  . . . and th e  d u ra tio n  of h is  o f f ic e  f o r  any considerab le  
tim e favors h is  view s, g ives him th e  means and tim e to  p e rfe c t  
and execute h is  desig n s, he th e re fo re  fan c ie s  th a t  he may be 
g re a t and g lo rio u s  by oppressing  h is  fe l lo w -c it iz e n s  and ra is in g  
h im self to  permanent grandeur on the  ru in s  o f  h is  co u n try .7^
Furtherm ore, Cato observed, the  P re s id e n t was w ithou t a c o n s t itu t io n a l
council fo r  advice during th e  recess o f  the  S ena te . He would most
finl ik e ly  come under the  in flu e n ce  o f f a v o r i te s .  F in a lly , th e  PTeatdent
might by no means be the  choice o f  the  p lu r a l i t y  of the people , fo r  he
need have only th e  g r e a te s t  number o f vo tes o f the  top f iv e  can d id a te s .
Yet, the  P re s id e n t was capable o f  e x e rc is in g  powers which l ik e ly  might
"tend e i th e r  to  th e  estab lish m en t o f an a rb i t r a r y  a r is to c ra c y  o r  mon- 
fila rchy ."  Cato concluded w ith an o b se rv a tio n  on th e  n a tu re  o f repub­
lic a n  governments
The s a fe ty  o f  the  people in  a re p u b lic  depends on th e  share  o r  
p ro p o rtio n  they have in  the  government; but experience ought to  
teach  you th a t  when a man i s  a t  th e  head o f  an e le c tiv e  govern­
m ent, in v es ted  w ith  g re a t powers, and in te re s te d  in  h is  r e -  
e le c tio n , in  what c i r c le  appointm ents w il l  be made; by which 
means an im perfec t a r is to c ra c y  bordering  on monarchy may be 
e s t a b l i s h e d . -
The ju d ic ia l  branch o f  th e  fe d e ra l  government would be v i r tu a l ly
independent o f a l l  o th e r  branches o f  th e  government, and o f  the peop le .
The C o n s titu tio n , by A r t ic le  I I I ,  se c tio n  1 ,^ ^  provided th a t  one supreme
c o u rt, and such in f e r io r  fe d e ra l  c o u rts  as thought necessary  would be
'^^I b id , .  p . 261. ^°I b id .
^^I b id . , p . 261. ^^I b id .
®3Madison, 0£ . c i t , , p . 63^ .
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e s ta b lis h e d . (Mce e s ta b lis h e d  and s ta f f e d ,  B ratus n o ted , the ju s t ic e s  
could be removed only by th e  in s tan c e  o f tre a so n , b r ib e ry , o r h igh  
crim es and misdemeanorsj o th e rw ise , t h e i r  tenu re  in  o f f ic e  was f o r  
l i f e .  Nor could  the  Supreme C o u rt 's  d ec is io n s  be reviewed by any o th e r  
ju d ic ia l  body; i t  was th e  supreme ju d ic ia l  o rg an iz a tio n  o f the  coun try ,
81iand i t s  word was f i n a l .
A r t ic le  in, s e c tio n  2 ,^^  o f  the  C o n s titu tio n  provided th a t  g
"The ju d ic ia l  power s h a l l  extend to  a l l  cases in  law and eq u ity  a r is in g
under th is  c o n s t i tu t io n ,  th e  laws o f  th e  United S ta te s ,  and t r e a t i e s  
made, o r which s h a l l  be made, under t h e i r  a u th o r i ty .  . . . "  The con­
s t ru c t io n  o f th is  p ro v is io n , Brutus argued in  two consecutive L e t te r s ,  
was n o t easy  to  d e f in e . F o r, on th e  one hand, the  fe d e ra l c o u rts  were 
au th o rized  to  determ ine any and a l l  questions th a t  might a r i s e  upon th e
meaning o f  th e  C o n s titu tio n  in  law , th a t  i s :
Tfeis"~article v e s ts  the  c o u rts  w ith a u th o r i ty  to  give the C onsti­
tu t io n  a le g a l  c o n s tru c tio n , o r to  exp la in  i t  according to  the 
ru le s  l a id  down f o r  c o n stru in g  a law . These ru le s  give a c e r ta in  
degree o f l a t i tu d e  o f  ex p lan a tio n  . . . The co u rts  a re  to  give 
such meaning to  th e  c o n s t i tu t io n  as compares b e s t w ith  the  common, 
and g e n e ra lly  received  acceptance o f  the  words in  which i t  i s  
expressed . . . Where words a re  dubious, th ey  w il l  be explained 
by the  c o n te x t.
On the other hand, the courts are empowered to decide questions 
arisin g  out o f equity: "By th is  they are empowered, to explain the
con stitu tion  according to the reasoning s p ir i t  o f  i t ,  without being 
confined to the words or l e t t e r s .
®^Borden, op.. c i t . ,  p . 227. 
^ ^ a d is o n , c i t . , p . 63^ . 
G^Borden, o£. c i t . .  p . 227.
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Becattse there was no superior ju d ic ia l body and because there  
could be no appeal from th e ir  d ec is io n s, these decision s w il l  have v ir ­
tu a lly  the force  o f law. Though Brutus nowhere e x p l ic i t ly  said  so , h is  
im plication  was th at the fed era l jud iciary , un like the le g is la t iv e  or 
executive branches, would in  e f fe c t  control the C onstitution . Far 
worse, however, was h is  b e l ie f  that the fed eral jud iciary  would operate 
to  e f fe c t  the subversion o f  the s ta te  governments. Every adjudication  
o f the Supreme Court on questions a r is in g  from and a ffec tin g  the nature 
and extent o f the general government would lik ew ise  a f fe c t  the lim its  
o f s ta te  ju r isd ic t io n . As the fed era l jud iciary  enlarged i t s  powers, 
to that extent would the sphere o f the l e t t e r ' s  powers be restricted.®®  
Brutus saw more than enough evidence in  the C onstitution to sug­
gest th at the powers o f the fed era l jud iciazy  would opgr^ e_strongly i n 
favor o f  the fed era l government. F ir s t ,  he charged, the Constitution  
i t s e l f  countenanced such construction; not only did i t  ju s t ify  the 
courts in  in c lin in g  to th is  mode of explanation, but the courts them­
se lves would be in terested  in  extending th e ir  powers. Moreover, every 
extension o f  the powers o f  the general le g is la tu r e  would lik ew ise  act 
as an extension o f  the power o f  the cou rts. F in a lly , he concluded, the 
courts had a precedent to plead and ju s t ify  the extension o f th e ir  
powers—the Court o f  Exchequer o f  Great B r ita in , With th is  precedent,
would i t  not be l ik e ly ,  Brutus asked, fo r  the federal courts lik ew ise
89to attempt to extend th e ir  own powers?
\  Them ost p o te n t ia lly  dangerous feature o f the proposed federal
A
ju d ic iary , Brutus argued, was % at th® te^ ic iary  could v ir tu a lly  mold
®®Ib id . , p . 228. ®9 lb id . .  pp. 228-230,
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the genera l government in to  w hatever shape i t  desired»  In rendering  
i t s  d e c is io n s , th e  c o u rt m ust, and would, a s s e r t  c e r ta in  p r in c ip le s  
which, from r e p e t i t io n ,  would become fixed» These p r in c ip le s ,  in  tu rn , 
would be adopted by th e  Congress, and would become th e  ru le  by which 
i t  would f i x  th e  e x te n t o f  i t s  own powers. Though th e  le g is la tu r e  
would n o t extend i t s  a u th o r i ty  beyond th a t  e s ta b lish e d  by the  c o u rts , 
i t  was most l ik e ly  th a t  i t  would approach those  l im its  as o f te n  as th e  
occasion p e rm itted . The purpose o f  the  fe d e ra l  government was s ta te d  
in  the  Preamble to  the  C o n s titu tio n . The c o u rt would understand  i t s  
ends to  be p re c is e ly  the  same and would give l a t i tu d e  to  every d e p a rt­
ment. Thus, fo r  example, from the f i r s t  object».Of govaiMimAnt daftlarod 
in  the  Preamble, "To form a more p e r f e c t  UnipPf” th e  co u rts  would give 
such c o n s tru c tio n  to  th a t  p ro v is io n  as would tend  to  d isparage the  
lo c a l and s t a te  governm ents. C lea rly , the  Union in tended and s ta te d  
was to  be a union no t o f the s t a t e s ,  but o f  th e  people , and to e s tab ­
l i s h  i t  would re q u ire  the  disparagem ent o f any in f e r io r  governments.^® 
I t  was im portan t, B rutus concluded in  ano ther essay , th a t  a 
check be e s ta b lish e d  upon any body given e x tra o rd in a ry  powers, in  o rder 
no t to  abuse those  powers. He d id  n o t in ten d  popu lar e le c tio n  o f  the  
.ju s tic es  o f the c o u r ts , f o r  t h a t  would e lim in a te  the  indepandance o f 
th o ae . men. Yet, in  o rd e r to  avoid  t o t a l  and complete independence, a 
fe a tu re  repugnant to  the  p r in c ip le s  o f f r e e  government, the  ju s t ic e s  
should be in  some manner c o n tro lle d . This he proposed as "some supreme.
 ̂ r    - ... k*- -•  ̂ v-«—' ' - . .
o v ^  whom i s  no powar. to  p m tfo l . W t the  .people them selves. This su-
91preme c o n tro llin g  power should be in  the  choice o f  the peop le . . . . "
90Ib id . . pp. 230- 233. ^^Ib id .o  p . 22$.
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The p a r ts  o f th e  C o n s titu tio n  irtiich were o f  g re a te s t  concern to  
A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  everywhere were those  se c tio n s  o f  the  C o n stitu tio n  
g ran tin g  the  f e d e ra l  government i t s  f i e ld s  o f  powers. The in te n t  o f 
the f e d e ra l  government was ex p re ss iv e ly  provided fo rs  . . i n  o rder 
to  form a more p e r fe c t  Union, e s ta b l is h  J u s t ic e ,  in su re  domestic Tran­
q u i l i t y ,  p rov ide fo r  the  common de fen se , promote th e  general w e llfa re .
. . To achieve th e se  broad ends C ongrus was ^
s iv e  range o f powers enuraerated-JjouJucticle I ,  se c tio n  8,^ ^  culm inating 
in  the  powers to  " , . . make a l l  laws which s h a l l  be necessary  and 
proper f o r  ca rry in g  in to  Execution . . . a l l  . . . powers v e sted  by 
th i s  C o n s titu tio n  in  th e  Government o f  the  U nited S ta te s , o r  in  any 
Department o r O ff ic e r  th e re o f ."  In  s h o r t ,  as A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  John 
W illiams argued, th e re  was no l im i t  to  tW  p o ss ib lq  nimber o f job jacta  
to  which the  power o f  the  fe d e ra l  gover nment , ° Nor were 
the  means by which th e se  ends were to  be a tta in e d  c le a r ly  s e t  f o r th .
I t  was a  c o n d itio n , acknowledged and e a rn e s tly  he ld  by A n ti-  
F e d e ra lis ts  everywhere, t h a t  th e  s ta te s  were necessary  f o r  the purposes 
and m a tte rs  o f l o c a l concern. I t  was a lso  contended th a t  th e  general 
government was necessa ry  fo r  those m atte rs  and purposes n a tio n a l in  
scope. But even th e  more m oderate ^A ntis, * exem plified  by Smith, a lso  
conceived th a t  th e  s t a t e  c o n s t i tu t io n s  ought to  be both th e  support and 
the  check upon th e  n a tio n a l  C o n s titu tio n , th e  s t a te  governments l ik e -  
wise being the support and check upon the  n a tio n a l  government. But th e
^% adlson , 0£ . c i t . . p . 62?,
^^ Ib ld . ,  pp. 630- 631.
^ ^ E llio t ,  D ebates. I I ,  33I .
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s ta te  governments and s t a te  c o n s t i tu t io n s ,  n o t t h e i r  n a tio n a l  coun ter­
p a r t s ,  should be th e  guardians o f  the  dom estic r ig h ts  and in te r e s t s .  
T herefo re , the  genera l government ought to  r e s t  upon th e  s t a te  govern- 
raents, no t only in  i t s  form bu t a lso  in  i t s  o p e ra tio n .
In  view o f  th is  r e la t io n s h ip ,  i t  i s  necessa ry  to e s ta b l is h  
p roperly  and im m ediately, Smith argued, th e  l in e  o f  ju r is d ic t io n  be­
tween the s t a te  and g en era l governments. Only by such an arrangement 
could th e  harmony between th ese  governments be m aintained , and in te r ­
fe rence  between the  two, and consequently  se rio u s  d if fe re n c e s , be 
96p reven ted . The power g ran ted  to  the fe d e ra l government by A r t ic le  ly 
se c tio n  8, th e  g re a te s t  source o f most se rio u s  d isp u te  was, to  Smith, 
the  most v i t a l  p r in c ip le  o f  th e  rep u b lican  government.
A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  o b jec tio n s  to  th e  p rov isions inco rpo ra ted  in  
se c tio n  8 were numerous. Most, however, were re la te d  in  one way o r 
ano ther to  the one c h ie f  p ro v is io n —the r i ght o f the  general government
John W illiams argued th a t  the  p ro v is io n s  comprehended in  the  terms
98ta x e s , d u tie s , im posts, and ex c ise s  were exceedingly  vague.^ Indeed,
v i r tu a l ly  every source o f  revenue could be in co rpo ra ted  in to  one or 
ano ther o f  those t e r m s . ’An t i s ’ l ik e  Smith conceded th a t  th e  p r in ­
c ip a l d i f f i c u l ty  fa c in g  th e  C onfederation  was an inadequate means of 
r a is in g  r e v e n u e . Y e t ,  though th is  f a c t  was unden iab le , the C onsti­
tu t io n  went too f a r  in  the  o p p o site  extrem e. For the  power o f ta x a tio n  
g ran ted  Congress was most comprehensive a n ^  given the  s ta te d  in te n t  of
^^ Ib id . pp. 323,  331. ^ ^ Ib id ..  p . 332. ^ '^Ibid.
^ ^ Ib id ..  p . 330. 9 > Ib id .. pp. 330, 372. ^Q ^Ibid .. p . 330.
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the  C o n s titu tio n  and the  n ecessa ry  and p roper c la u se , th e  most e f f i c ie n t  
power delegated„Jb9.-th.e_general  governm ent. I t  would probably extend, 
aga in , to  v i r tu a l ly  a l l  p o ss ib le  sources o f  revenue, excepting export 
d u tie s
S n ith  cogen tly  a r a iad , a t  one p o in t  e a r ly  in  th e  debates on the  
p ro v is io n s  o f s e c tio n  8, ^ t ^ U  w ^  a gen̂ ^̂ ^̂
fin d , u s a I ndeed,  n o t in fre q u e n tly , the
102demand i s  f a r  more» The case would in  a l l  p ro b a b il i ty  be the  same 
fo r  the  f e d e ra l  government. Subsequently , i t  was argued by Hamilton 
th a t  th e  genera l government ought to  possess a l l  th e  resources o f the
n Q-5
coun try . H am ilton 's argument r e s te d  on the p r in c ip le  th a t  th e  power
o f the n a tio n a l government ought to  be n a tio n a l  and g en e ra l, m d  i t s  
reso u rces , th e re fo re , lik ew ise  g e n e ra l. Lansing answered th a t  th e  gen-
. I III 1 1  I I III ^
e r a l  government was bu t p a r t  o f  a system , th e  whole o f  which should 
possess the  means o f  su p p o rt.
But the  s t a t e s ,  to o , would have f in a n c ia l  requirem ents to  meet 
îdiich req u ired  th e  lev y in g  o f taxes o r  d u tie s  o f  some k ind . In  view of 
the  s t a te  and general governments levy ing  tax es o r d u tie s  on the same 
person , and /o r the  same a r t i c l e s ,  i t  was l ik e ly  th a t  th e  two would in ­
te r f e r e  and be h o s t i le  to  one a n o th e r . In  t h i s  c o n te s t f o r  ju r is d ic t io n ,  
a r is in g  from claim  and i n te r e s t s ,  what chance would the  s ta te s  have? 
Considering the  su p e rio r  p o s i t io n  o f  th e  genera l government, and the  
f a c t  th a t  a l l  ju d ic ia l  d isp u te s  b e tween^the two would  be c a r r ie d  to  the  
fe d e ra l  c o u rts , r e l a t i v e ly  l i t t l e  was l e f t  to  th e  s t a t e s .  The powers 
g ran ted  th e  g ^ e r a l  government by th e  C o n s titu tio n  a re  m ostly  expressed ,
p . 332. ^Qglbid.o p . 333. lO ^ Ib id ., p . 372.
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no th ing  o f  Im portance i s  l e f t  to  construction ,^® ^ For th e  s t a te s ,  
q u ite  th e  opposite  i s  th e  c a se . Though th e  F e d e ra lis ts  argued r e - 
p e a ted ly  th a t  th e  s t a te s  had co n cu rren t ju r is d ic t io n  w ith the  genera l 
government o f  ta x a tio n , y e t ,  as W illiam s po in ted  o u t,
th e  C o n s titu tio n  nowhere s ta te d  such . The C o n s titu tio n  gran ted  the  
power o f ta x a tio n  to  Congress; i t  was s i l e n t  w ith  regard  to  the  same 
power o f th e  s t a t e s .  Such would on ly  be a t  b e s t a whim o f c o n s tru c tio n , 
and i t  was a m a tte r  o f  too  much u n c e r ta in ty  y e t  o f  too much importance 
to  be l e f t  to  mere c o n s t r u c t i o n , The r ig h t  o f  the  s t a te s ,  argued 
Smith, to  lev y  taxes, f o r  t h e i r  own su p p o rt, a  1 e g is l a t i v e , n o t a 
c o n s t i tu t io n a l  r i g h t .  I t  was dependent and c o n tro l la b le .  No such 
im portant m a tte r , he s a id ,  should be l e f t  to  th e  doubt o f c o n s tru c tio n . 
The ju r is d ic t io n  and power o f  th e  s ta te s  and genera l government should 
be so formed as to  ren d er the  business o f l e g i s la t io n  as sim ple and as 
p la in  as p o s s ib le . I t  could  n o t always be expected th a t  members o f 
th e  fe d e ra l  l e g is la tu r e  would be d isposed  to  make n ice  d is t in c t io n s  
w ith  re sp e c t to  th a t  ju r isd ic tio n ,^ ® ^
John W illiam s, in  ca rry in g  the a tta c k  to  h is  opponents on th e  
convention f lo o r ,  argued th a t  even supposing th e  s ta te s  to  have con­
c u rre n t ju r is d ic t io n  w ith  Congress f o r  tax in g  purposes, y e t  the laws 
o f the  l a t t e r  a re  considered  as th e  supreme law o f the  lan d . Conse­
quen tly , when i t s  tax es  a re  d is ru p te d  by th e  taxes o f the  s ta te s ,  those  
o f th e  Congress must and w i l l  c laim  p r io r i t y  fo r  c o lle c t io n . Indeed, 
he charged, the Congress may c o n s t i tu t io n a l ly  ab o lish  th e  s ta te  ta x e s , 
and monopolize a l l  revenue so u rc e s . The end r e s u l t  o f  such a c tio n  i f
^Q^ Ib id o, pp , 333-1, 37L. ^®^I b id „  p , 338, ^®^I b id , ,  p ,337 .
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
7li
i t  should  come to  th a t j  would be th e  o vertu rn ing  o f the s ta te  govern­
ments o For how could  th e  s t a t e  governments e x is t  when th e i r  revenue 
sources were a t  th e  w i l l  and p lea su re  o f Congress
Smith advanced ano ther argument o f  danger to  the  s t a t e  govern­
ments h y  the  f e d e ra l  tax in g  pow ers. Hamilton contended th a t  the 
s e c u r i ty  o f  the  s t a t e  governments would be d e riv ed  from the r e la t iv e ly  
g re a t number o f s t a te  represen tatives.^® ®  T h is , Smith s a id , would 
only a c t ,  however, to  f u r th e r  encourage the  abolishm ent o f  th e  s t a te s .  
For th e  peop le , see ing  th e i r  g re a t  expense o f t h e i r  support and com­
paring  th a t  w ith th e i r  sm all im portance, would hence be discouraged 
w ith  t h e i r  upkeep and so would be l ik e ly  to  drop them.^®^
A few o th e r  c r i t ic is m s  o f  th e  powers o f  the  proposed fe d e ra l  
government were o ffe re d  p rev ious to  th e  convention . Both Smith and 
Cato asked how was i t  p o ss ib le  to  expect the  fe d e ra l government to  lower 
taxes as i t s  proponents promised? Smith contended th a t  the  simple b asis  
fo r  th e  expensive deb t f e l t  in  th e  coun try  was th e  r e s u l t  o f a wrong
balance o f tra d e , and th a t  as long as th a t  balance o f  tra d e  remained,
110cash would continue to  leave  th e  country  and debts would mount.
CatOo tak in g  a more a la rm is t  approach, urged th a t  the new government^ 
must be more expensive because i t  m ust be b ig g e r. He went on to  say 
th a t  as most members o f th e  Senate and probably  o f the House would be 
lan d h o ld ers , they  would n o t tend  to  lev y  tax es on lan d . R ather, t h e i r  
aim would be d u tie s  and imposts on commerce. B ut, as p r ic e s  on fo re ig n
^® 7lb id .. p . 339. ^®®I b id .« pp . 251-252. ^® ^Ibid ., p . 378.
^^®Paul L e ic e s te r  Ford. Pamphlets on th e  C o n s titu tio n  o f  the  
U nited S ta te s  (Brooklyn, 1891), p . 107.
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made goods went np, th e  volume consumed would go down u n t i l  th a t  source 
o f  revenue d ried  up . The n ex t source o f revenue would be much more 
odious—p o l l  taxes and th e  l ik e ,^ ^ ^
The A n ti-F ed era l i s  t s  o f  New York made a v a l i a n t  t r y  in  t h e i r  
e f f o r t  to  secure  recommendatory amendments to  th e  C o n s titu tio n , Had 
■üiey been w ill in g  to  take  advantage of t h e i r  su p e rio r numbers and p ress
v ic to ry .  Mere v ic to ry  by i t s e l f  was n o t t h e i r  c h ie f  d e s ire ,  however; 
they  sought to  convince a t  l e a s t  a  few F e d e ra l is ts  th a t  t h e i r  f e a r  o f  
th e  C o n s titu tio n  and i t s  proposed system of government was based on a  
genuine b e l ie f  th a t  th e  p o l i t i c a l  freedom and in d iv id u a l l i b e r t i e s  o f 
the  people were in  danger. And, had Melancton Smith n o t ac ted  on th e  
s tre n g th  o f  h i s  co n v ic tio n s  and decided to  rev e rse  h is  p o s itio n  on 
recommendatory amendments, perhaps the  New York convention would no t 
have r a t i f i e d  th e  C o n s ti tu tio n , In  any case , th e  scene o f th is  th e s is ' 
i n te r e s t  w i l l  s h i f t  to  th e  sou thern  s ta te s  in  th e  fo llow ing  c h ap te r .
^^^Ford, E ssays, pp , 222-223.
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CHAPTER 17 
THE SOUTHERN STATES 
The r a t i f i c a t i o n  o f th e  C o n s titu tio n  by New York on Ju ly  26,
1788; p laced  th e  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  o f th e  U nited S ta te s  in  a despera te  
s i tu a t io n .  New York was th e  te n th  s t a te  to  r a t i f y  the new a r t i c l e  o f 
government, and was th e  second o f  th e  ‘big th r e e ' s ta te s  o f the  Union 
to  g ive i t s  app rova l. Though th e  Consti tu t io n  had f o r  a l l  in te n ts  and 
purposes en te red  in to  o p e ra tio n  w ith  i t s  acceptance by New Hampshire 
on June 21, 1788. w ith o u t th e  approval o f  New York and V irg in ia , th e  
new government would be hamstrung a t  th e  s t a r t .  New Y ork's approval 
o f the  C o n s titu tio n , th en , threw  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts ' hopes o f  securing  
amendments to  th e  C o n s titu tio n  upon th e  co n d itio n a l r a t i f i c a t i o n  by 
the  conventions o f  V irg in ia  and North C aro lin a .
Of th e  sou thern  s t a t e s ,  on ly  V irg in ia  and North C arolina r e -  
mained undecided on the  q u estio n  o f r a t i f i c a t i o n  by th e  summer o f I 788. 
Georgia had given i t s  unanimous approval to  the  C o n stitu tio n  e a r ly  in  
the w in te r o f I 787. The South C aro lina  r a t i fy in g  convention voted  11*0 
to  73 in  fav o r o f th e  C o n s titu tio n  in  January o f I 788, th e  F e d e ra lis ts  
a c tin g  (juite as they  wanted during  th e  d eb a tes | though the  A nti-Feder­
a l i s t  le a d e r o f  th e  s t a t e ,  Rawlins Lowndes, made a commendable e f f o r t ,  
the  outcome was never in  doubt. Maryland lik ew ise  gave i t s  approval 
to  th e  C o n s titu tio n  in  l a t e  A p ril, 1788.^ The hopes o f  the  A n ti-
^The r a t i f i c a t i o n  vo te  in  th e  Maryland convention came on A p ril 
26,  1788. The vo te  was 63 f o r  and 11 a g a in s t r a t i f i c a t i o n .
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F e d e ra l is ts 5 th en , and th e  a s p ira t io n s  o f  those  o f th e  South p a r t ic u ­
l a r l y ,  re s te d  upon th e  outcome o f  th e  conventions o f  V irg in ia  and North 
Carolinao
V irg in ia  scheduled i t s  convention during th e  f i r s t  week o f  June,
2
1788, and those  who planned to  a tte n d  th e  debates as sp e c ta to rs  came 
assu red  o f  a l iv e ly  show o f  fo re n s ic  t a l e n t .  North C aro lina , meanwhile, 
was choosing th e  d e le g a te s  f o r  i t s  convention, which opened in  Ju ly ,
1788o^ The c o n te s t  in  V irg in ia  prom ised to be c lo se . But the  'A n tis° 
o f North C aro lina  had th e  convention in  t h e i r  pocket, so com pletely d id  
W illie  Jones, th e  A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  le a d e r  o f the  s t a t e ,  c o n tro l th e  p o l­
i t i c s  o f  North C aro lin a . Jo n e s ' only  need in  th e  convention was to  
m ain tain  th e  u n i ty  o f h is  a s s o c ia te s  (ap p a ren tly  q u ite  e a s i ly  done), 
allow  h is  F e d e ra l is t  opponents to  t a lk  them selves h o a rse , and, when the  
time came f o r  a v o te , secure  an overwhelming vo te  o f no r a t i f i c a t i o n  
w ithout p r io r  amendments. His s tr a te g y  worked p e r f e c t ly ,  and on August 
1, Jones secured a v o te  o f  8ii ayes to  l8 ii nays on the questio n .
But a l l  th i s  i s  g e tt in g  ahead o f  the  s to ry .  And what i s  worse, 
i t  omits a  look a t  one o f  th e  most in te r e s t in g  o f  a l l  th e  s ta te s  o f the 
Union, South C aro lina , Though A nti-F edera lism  th e re  was never as strong  
as in  i t s  two more n o rth e rn  n e ighbo rs , and though th e  A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  
o b jec tio n s  were n o t as soundly based on reason  and lo g ic  as elsew here, 
y e t a few, a t  l e a s t ,  o f  th e  A n ti°F e d e ra lis t  o b jec tio n s  a re  o f cQ osidarr 
a b le in t e r e s t ,  p a r t i c u la r ly  because in  many ways they  c lo se ly  resemW ^  
l a t e r  South C aro lina  s t a te s - r ig h ts  argum ents,
^The V irg in ia  r a t i f y in g  convention began on June 2, 1788,
% he North C arolina r a t i f y in g  convention he ld  i t s  f i r s t  se ss io n  
on J u ly  21, 1788,
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The acknowledged A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  le a d e r  in  South narn ljna  vas 
Rawlins Lowndes o A p ro fe s s io n a l  p o l i t i c i a n ,  Lowndes had served during 
the  l a t e  c o lo n ia l and e a r ly  sta teh o o d  p e rio d s  in  l e g i s la t iv e  and ju d i­
c ia l  c a p a c itie s  » His s tro n g  s t a te s - r ig h t s  p o s it io n  appeared q u ite  
c le a r ly  in  h is  debates on th e  is su e s  o f  th e  s lav e  tra d e  and paper 
money, and h is  arguments on th ese  is su e s  mark him as unique among a l l  
th e  well-known sou thern  A n ti -F e d e ra lis ts , His speeches end o rs in g thA 
slav e  tra d e  as a  b e n e f ic ia l  good to  a l l  involved a re  o f p a r t ic u la r  
i n t e r e s t ,  f o r  he alone o f th e  sou thern  *A n tis ' took th is  p o s i t io n . He 
stands in  sharp c o n tra s t  to  th e  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  o f V irg in ia  in  p a r t i c ­
u la r ,  though a s im ila r  p o s i t io n  would subsequently  a r is e  as the  c h ie f  
defense o f  s la v e ry  among p re -C iv i l  War South C arolina p o l i t i c a l  f ig u re s . 
Lowndes f e l t  e s p e c ia l ly  concerned f o r  th e  p re se rv a tio n  o f South Caro- 
1 in a  ' 8_ in te r e s ts  in  the  Ifaion» I t  might be expected th a t  he would 
consequently  develop h is  o b jec tio n s  to  th e  proposed House o f  Represen­
t a t iv e s  to  g re a t le n g th . S u rp ris in g ly , though, l i t t l e  o pposition  to  
th e  House appe33red from Lowndes and h is  co lleag u es .
E arly  in  the  debates in  the  s t a t e  l e g i s la tu r e ,^  Lowndes rose  to
s p e a k s
He be lieved  th e  gentlem en th a t  went from th is  s t a te ,  to  rep re sen t 
us in  the  Convention, possessed  as much in te g r i ty ,  and stood as 
h igh in  p o in t  o f c h a ra c te r , as any gentlemen th a t  could have been 
se le c te d ; and he a ls o  be lieved  th a t  they  had done every th ing  in  
t h e i r  power to  p rocure  f o r  us a p ro p o rtio n a te  share in  th is  new
^Debates on th e  C o n s titu tio n  in  South C arolina began f i r s t ,  cu r­
io u s ly , in  th e  South C aro lina  L e g is la tu re , in  m id-January, 1706, Fol­
lowing th e  read ing  o f th e  C o n s titu tio n  on th e  f lo o r  o f the  L e g is la tu re , 
th a t  body reso lved  i t s e l f  in to  a committee o f  the whole and debated the  
C o n s titu tio n  f o r  some days. The South C aro lina  r a t i f y in g  convention 
i t s e l f  opened on May 12, 1788, w ith  th e  f i n a l  vo te  o f  1L9 to  73 in  
fa v o r  o f  r a t i f i c a t i o n  coming on May 23,
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government; b a t th e  very  l i t t l e  they  had gained proved what we 
may expect in  th e  f a tu r e —th a t  the in t e r e s t  o f th e  N orthern 
Sjtatfls ■ would ba...30^n radQminant^aa^^tQ-_dlves t  us o f any p re ten - 
s io n s  to  th e  t i t l e  o f  a  re p u b lic
What, th e n , w i l l  s k i l l  and c h a ra c te r  a v a i l  in  a  body where most o f the  
men were o f  opposing and d i f f e r e n t  in t e r e s t s ,  and where the  re p re se n ta ­
t iv e s  from th e  s t a te  were so few in  number? Only s ix  o f  th e  e a s te rn  
s ta te s  were req u ired  f o r  a  m a jo r ity  in  the House, and th ese  s ix  could 
v i r tu a l ly  enac t any l e g i s l a t i o n  th ey  wished, which, he added, in  a l l  
p ro b a b il i ty  would be opposed to  th e  in te r e s t s  o f South C aro lina. Where 
was any s e c u r i ty  f o r  th e  in te r e s t s  o f  South C arolina in  the  proposed 
system?^
To what b e n e f i t ,  he continued l a t e r ,  would re p re se n ta tiv e s  o f 
c h a ra c te r  be when th e  P re s id e n t could in te r f e r e  o r in flu en ce  the  e le c -
7
tio n s  o f those men? He posed ano ther questio n ; How were the e le c tio n s  
of the  re p re se n ta tiv e s  to  be c a r r ie d  o u t, s in ce  th e  C o n stitu tio n  was
so vague on th i s  m atte r?  Would i t  n o t be p o ss ib le  f o r  some d i s t r i c t s
8o f th e  s t a te  to  have no re p re se n ta tio n  in  Congress?
Nor was Lowndes s a t i s f i e d  w ith  th e  proposed S enate . He d id  no t 
consider th e  n e c e s s i ty  o f only  tw o -th ird s  o f  th e  members f o r  the passage 
o f l e g i s la t io n  as s a t i s f a c to r y  a check as th e  approval o f nine s ta te s  
o f any le g i s la t io n  in  th e  Confederagion Congress. A r t ic le  I ,  s e c tio n  7
9
o f the  C o n s titu tio n  provided  th a t  only a quorum o f  the  Senate need be
^Jonathan E l l i o t ,  The Debates in  the Several S ta te  Conventions on 
the  R a ti f ic a t io n  o f th e  F edera l C o n s titu tio n  v o l s . ,  187^-1891; P h ila -
^ Ib id . 7I b id . .  IV, 28?. ^I b id . .  IV, 286,
9james Madison, The Debates in  th e  F edera l Convention o f  I 878 
Which Framed the  C o n stitu tio n  o f th e  U nited S ta te s  o f  America. G a illa rd  
Hunt and James Brown S c o tt ( e d s .)  (New York, 1920), p , 629.
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p re se n t fo r  th e  enactm ent o f  any le g i s l a t iv e  b u s in ess . Of th a t  quorum, 
he contended, only ten  se n a to rs  c o n s titu te d  a m a jo rity  fo r  the  passage 
o f  any l e g i s l a t iv e  b u s in e ss . What p ro p r ie ty  was t h i s ,  he asked, to  
v e s t  so few men w ith  such ex ten siv e  powers
But Lowndes reserv ed  h is  s tro n g e s t o b jec tio n s  fo r  the powers o f 
the c e n t r a l  government. Opposed to  independence, by h is  own adm ission, 
u n t i l  th e  day o f  reckoning, he lik ew ise  remained opposed to  th e  G onsti- 
tutioRc Only when th a t  new a r t i c l e  o f government was approved o f  by 
h is  c o n s titu e n ts  would he work in  support o f i t .  U n til then , as he 
rep ea ted ly  s tr e s s e d , he would remain in  o p p o sitio n .
^ t i c l e  71 , c lau se  2, o f  th e  C o n stitu tio n ^^  provided th a t  the 
C o n s titu tio n , th e  laws made in  pursuance o f i t ,  and a l l  t r e a t i e s  made 
under th e  a u th o r i ty  o f the  United S ta te s  were considered  as the  supreme 
law o f th e  lan d , and to  which a l l  judges were bound by law to  support. 
The e x te n t o f th e  powers gran ted  to  the  c e n tra l  government by th a t  
c lause  a lo n e , he charged, were thus g re a te r  than the  powers g ran ted  to  
any o f h i s to r y 's  most a r b i t r a r y  k in g s .
12
Lowndes was e s p e c ia lly  angered a t  A r t ic le  V o f the  C o n stitu tio n ,
p ro h ib it ing of  the  im porta tion  o f Negro s lav es a f t e r  l808s
[Wjhat cause was th e re  f o r  jea lo u sy  o f our im porting negroes?
Why confine us to  twenty y e a rs , o r  r a th e r  why l im i t  us a t  a l l ?
For h is  p a r t ,  thought % is  t % ^  c o % l d _ j u s t i f i e d  on the 
p r in c ip le s  o f  r e l ig io n ,  h u m ^ i ^ ,  ^ d  ju s t ic e  ; f o r  c e r ta in ly  
to  t r a n s la te  a  human being from a bad country  to  a  b e t te r ,  was 
f u l f i l l i n g  every  p a r t  o f those  p r in c ip le s .  But they  d p .n !t.lik e  
our s lav es because th ey  have none them selves and th e re fo re  want
^ ^ E ll io t ,  D ebates. 17, 310. 
^^Madison, o^. c i t . . p . 637.
^ ^ Ib id . . p . 636.
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to  exclude us from th i s  g re a t  advantage » Why should th e  Southern 
S ta te s  a llow  o f  t h i s ,  w ithou t th e  consent o f n ine  s ta te s ?  . . . 
we had a law p ro h ib it in g  th e  im porta tion  o f negroes fo r  th re e  
y e a rs , a  law he g re a t ly  approved o f; but th e re  was no reason 
o ffe re d  why th e  Southern S ta te s  m ight n o t f in d  i t  necessary  to  
a l t e r  t h e i r  conduct, and open th e i r  p o r ts .  W ithout negroes, th is  
s t a te  would degenera te  i n to  one o f th e  most contem ptible in  the  
Union; and he c i te d  an expression  ’tÊ k ç^ ïe ïtT P 'ro m ^en e^  'PincKney 
on a form er d eb a te , th a t  w h ils t  th e re  remained one acre  o f  swamp­
lan d  in  South C aro lina , he should r a i s e  h is  vo ice  in  r e s t r i c t in g  
th e  im porta tion  o f  n eg ro es. Even in  g ran ting  th e  im portation  fo r  
twenty y e a rs , care  had been taken  to  make us pay f o r  th is  in d u l­
gence, each negro being l i a b l e ,  on im p o rta tio n , to  pay a duty no t 
exceeding te n  d o l la r s ;  and in  a d d itio n  to  t h i s ,  they were l ia b le  
to  a c a p i ta t io n  ta x .
Negroes were our w ealth , our only n a tu ra l  resou rce ; y e t behold 
how our k ind  f r ie n d s  in  th e  n o rth  were determ ined soon to  t i e  up 
our hands, and d ra in  us o f what we have .^3
Where, he asked th e  members o f  th e  l e g i s la tu r e ,  was th e  o ften-m arvelled
a t  N orth-South compromise in  th e  C o n stitu tio n ?  The South agreed
Neg o  s la v e  tra d e  mig h t, continue f o r  twenty.jc&axsu- and then  be abo lished ;
^8_Nor t h ,  in  tu rn , agreed th a t  a ^ l v @_j]er_.ca]it_imDO&t_would be p.aid„Qii_
imported poofk. Where was the  compromise in  th i s  s in c e :
The E aste rn  S ta te s  drew t h e i r  means o f su b s is ten c e , in  a g rea t 
m easure, from t h e i r  sh ipp ing ; and, on th a t  head, they  had been 
p a r t ic u la r ly  c a re fu l no t to  a llow  any burdens; they  were no t to  
pay tonnage o r  d u t ie s ;  no, n o t even th e  form o f c le a r in g  o u t: 
a l l  p o r ts  were f r e e  and open to  themi Why th en , c a l l  th is  a 
re c ip ro c a l b a rg a in , which took a l l  from one p a r ty , to  bestow i t  
on th e  o ther?^^
In  rep ly  to  an in te r je c t io n  by P ie rc e  B u tle r  th a t  the n o rth e rn  s ta te s  
agreed to  a f iv e  per cen t impo&t, Lowndes continued^—'llhis.^_ m u st^  
f a l l  on thA r-nnmimflr. They a re  to  be the  c a r r ie r s ;  and, we being the  
consumers, th e re fo re  a l l  expenses would f a l l  on u s ."^ ^
This was only  one d isadvan tage  p laced  upon the southern s ta te s  
by th e  commerce powers g ran ted  to  Congress by the  C o n stitu tio n , Lowndes
l^ E l l i o t ,  D ebates. IV. 272-273» 
^^ Ib id . . p . 273. ^ ^ Ib id .
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s tre ssed »  By th e  C o n s titu tio n , Congress "was to  re g u la te  commerce ad 
in fin itu m ; and thus c a l le d  upon us to  pledge ou rse lves and p o s te r i ty  
fo re v e r , in  support o f  t h e i r  m e a s u r e s . F u r t h e r m o r e ,  Lowndes con­
tin u ed  in  a  l a t e r  speech:
[The C o n s titu tio n ]  threw  in to  t h e i r  [the e a s te rn  s ta te s ]  hands 
th e  ca rry in g  t r a d e ,  and pu t i t  in  t h e i r  power to  la y  us under 
payment o f  w hatever f re ig h ta g e  they  thought proper to  impose.
I t  was t h e i r  in t e r e s t  to  do so , and no person could doubt but 
they  would promote i t  by every means in  t h e i r  power. [Lowndes] 
wished our d e leg a te s  had been s u f f ic ie n t ly  a t te n t iv e  to  th is  
p o in t in  th e  Convention—had been more a t te n t iv e  to  t h i s  o b je c t, 
and taken  ca re  to  have i t  expressed  in  th i s  C o n s titu tio n , th a t  
a l l  our p o r ts  were open to  a l l  n a tio n s ; in s te a d  o f p u ttin g  us 
in  th e  power o f  a s e t  o f men who may f r i t t e r  away the value o f 
our produce to  a  l i t t l e  o r n o th ing , by compelling payment o f 
e x o rb ita n t f re ig h ta g e .^ ?
He s tre s s e d  a lso  th a t  th e jjea s te rn  s ta te s  were making l i t t l e  a ttem pt to
meet the  needs o f  the  so u thern  s ta te s  f o r  sh ip s : " I t  was, indeed, a
genera l way o f ta lk in g , th a t  the  E aste rn  S ta te s  had a g re a t number o f
seamen, a v a s t  number o f sh ip s ; bu t where were they? Why did they  no t
18come here  now, when sh ip s  a re  g re a t ly  wanted?"
Lowndes a lso  s tro n g ly  o b jec ted  to  the ta x a tio n  powers o f the
fe d e ra l  government » The s t a t e s ,  he contended, had given up the  power
o f s e l f - ta x a t io n ,  which even th e  B r i t i s h  government had no t taken  from
the c o l o n i e s A n d ,  to  f u r th e r  add to  th e  o b jec tio n ab le  na tu re  o f  the
C o n s titu tio n  in  t h i s  reg a rd , i t  was l ik e ly  th a t  taxes would in crease
20
under th e  demand o f  the  "pompous government" e s ta b lish e d  by th e  Con­
s t i t u t i o n .  A d d itio n a lly , Lowndes charged, th e  C o n stitu tio n  proposed to  
take  from the s t a te s  id ie lr r ig h t  to  pay t h e i r  own d e le g a te s . The same
l ^ I b id . . pp. 273-27li. ^'^I b id . ,  pp . 288-289.
^Q lbid. .  p . 289. ^^ Ib id . ^^ Ib id . .  p . 310.
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is s u e , he p o in ted  o u t to  th e  o th e r  l e g i s l a to r s ,  had been ra ise d  in  
c o lo n ia l  M assachusetts when i t  was proposed th a t  th e  judges be pa id  
ou t o f impost revenues r a th e r  than  by th e  l e g i s l a t u r e 's  a p p ro p ria tio n s . 
Everyone, he s a id ,  remembered th e  o u tc ry  throughout the  co lon ies when 
th a t  p roposal was advanced. Thus, the  C o n s titu tio n , l ik e  the  a c t  o f
the  B r i t i s h  P a rliam en t, s tru c k  d i r e c t ly  a t  th e  independence o f the
21s t a te s .
Moreover, South C aro lina  had met i t s  own lo c a l  expenses from
s ta te  imposed impost d u t ie s .  But "now th a t  th is  was given away, and
thrown in to  a genera l fund , fo r  th e  use  o f a l l  s t a te s  in d isc rim in a te ly ,
we should be ob liged  to  augment our taxes to  c a rry  on our lo c a l govern-
PPment, no tw ithstand ing  we were to  pay a p o l l  ta x  fo r  our negroes."
Lowndes had s tro n g  o b jec tio n s  a lso  .to  th e  re s tr ic tio n .p la p .e d
upon s ta te - is s u e d  paper monies by the  C o n stitu tio n s
Paper money, to o , was an o th e r a r t i c l e  o f  r e s t r a i n t ,  and a popu­
l a r  p o in t w ith  many; bu t what e v ils  had we ever experienced by 
issu in g  a l i t t l e  paper money to  r e l ie v e  ou rse lves from any 
exigency th a t  p ressed  us?  We had now a c ir c u la t in g  medium 
which everybody took . We used fo rm erly  to  is su e  paper b i l l s  
every y e a r, and r e c a l l  them every f iv e  w ith g re a t convenience 
and advantage. Had n o t paper money c a rr ie d  us trium phantly  
th ro u g h j^ e . w ar,' e x tr ic a te d  us from d i f f i c u l t i e s  g en e ra lly  
supposed to  be in su m o u n tab le , and f u l ly  e s ta b lish e d  us in  our 
independence? and now every th ing  i s  so changed th a t  an e n ti r e  
s to p  must be p u t to  any more paper em ission, however g re a t our 
d is t r e s s  may be.^^
Lowndes a lso  co n te s ted  th e  n a w  proposed by A rtic la_J[p s e c t io n .8 
o f  th e  C o n s titu tio n .^ ^  Because the  navy would be s ta f fe d , b u i l t ,  sup­
p l ie d ,  and run by men o f n o rth e rn  b i r th  and h e r i ta g e , i t  w o u ld ^
^^Ib id .o p . 289. ^^ Ib id . ^% b id . ,  pp . 289-290.
^% ad ison , o£. c i t . .  p . 231.
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or̂  more opportamij g i f o r  Nor th , to. _%s§vm. a jpositto.il .of^^snporioxity
J:L?f&s..oW,o%Sji he charged, why n o rthern  
F e d e ra l is ts so..yeiy o f te n  83q)p3ioâiâJàl9Jlsgâ„o;f^,af^ navy, s in ce  
i t  would be in  e f f e c t  t h e i r  navy» The e f f e c t  th e  estab lishm ent o f th a t  
navy would have upon th e  f i s c a l  co n d itio n  o f  toe  country  should be 
obvious to  a l l ,  he added.
Lowndes and those  of h is  co lleagues in  th e  le g is la tu r e  and con­
v en tio n  who spoke p resen ted  o th e r  o b je c tio n s  to  the  C o n s titu tio n .
These o th e r  o b jec tio n s  were rep ea ted ly  s tre s se d  elsew here—fe a r  o f the  
P re s id e n t’s ex ten siv e  powers, to e_ iack  o f s u f f ic ie n t  checks upon the  
e x erc ise  o f th o se  powers, and the  vagueness o f th e  method o f e le c tio n  
o f th e  P re s id e n t, among o th e r s .  The re p e t it iv e n e s s  o f  these  o b jec tio n s 
does no t make i t  worth our w hile  to  examine them h e re , and we s h a l l  no t 
spend fu r th e r  tim e exp lo ring  them.
The re a l  s ig n if ic a n c e , th en , o f  Lowndes’ p o s it io n  l i e s  in  h is  
e a r ly  s t a te s - r ig h ts  a t t i tu d e s  on government. His p o l i t i c a l  p o s it io n
throughout the  l a t e  c o lo n ia l and e a r ly  n a tio n a l  periods was cu rio u s .
For, as we have p rev io u s ly  s a id ,  he opposed the  movement towards inde­
pendence u n t i l  th e  break between th e  co lon ies and the  Mother Country 
was i r r e p a ra b le ,  a f t e r  which h is  support o f toe  United S ta te s  was s o l id  
and a c t iv e . His su p p o rt o f the  C onfederation  was lik ew ise  unequivocal 
and staunch u n t i l ,  ag a in , th e  d ie  was c a s t  and the  C o n stitu tio n  accepted 
by h is  s t a t e .  In  s h o r t ,  Lowndes* p o l i t i c a l  philosophy c o n tra s ts  c u r i ­
ously  w ith  th a t  o f George C lin ton , who from the s t a r t  was vocal in  sup­
p o r t  o f  independence, and th e  C onfederation , bu t vriio made th e  t r a n s i t io n
S^ E llio t, Debates. 17, 309-310,
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to  th e  C Jonstitution smoothly^ easily j, andj in  terras o f p o l i t i c a l  l i f e ,  
advantageously . C lin ton  was th e  p ro fe s s io n a l p o l i t i c i a n  who, as b e f i ts  
the  pragm atic p o l i t i c i a n ,  nsed  every tu rn  o f events o f h is  co u n try 's  
p o l i t i c a l  development to  enhance h is  own p o l i t i c a l  p o s it io n  w ith in  h is
26
a re a . In  t h i s  re s p e c t, C lin ton  resem bled more c lo se ly  c e r ta in  o th er
27
n o rth e rn  p o l i t i c i a n s ,  men l ik e  Robert Y ates, who made the t r a n s i t io n
of every change o f  government e a s i ly  and su c c e ss fu lly . But Lowndes
l ik e  P a tr ic k  Henry, o f V irg in ia , more c lo se ly  resem bled l a t e r  sou thern  
p o l i t ic ia n s  o f th e  , s t a j ) f _ ^ , M ^ C ^  For
Lowndes, l ik e  Henry, stood  in  o p p o sitio n  to  the  C o n stitu tio n  n o t be- ——- 'IT— r r r r  i M i H L L J iM i i r  I i  ........ ... ii-ii-r-r~ iT T -rrrfi....
cause o f  th e  th r e a t  i t  p re sen ted  to  h is  own p o l i t i c a l  ca ree r w ith in  h is  
s t a te ,  bu t r a th e r  because of the  th r e a t  i t  p resen ted  to h is  s t a t e “s
 ̂ wr f - r N - r M-rrmmw.f iNg n raM m     Mm 1 H aw
p o s i t io n  w ith in  the  framework of th e  c e n tra l  government. Lowndes* 
p o s i t io n  was more genuinely  s t a t e s - r i g h t s ,  as th a t  term  has come to  be
III « i n > i i u i i  i iiw  M i n i M i i n i w i W ^ i  I I  I I  iiM W  I I I I I  n  f   f r A « T n r m r - i i - m ' m f —
understood in  American p o l i t i c a l  th in k in g , than  th a t  o f C lin ton, who
M l i i i r m n r - m i i .  m i - . , . . ' .
assumed more o f the  p o s i t io n  o f  the  se lf-a g g ran d iz in g  p o l i t i c ia n .
The r a t i f y in g  convention f o r  th e  S ta te  o f V irg in ia  opened i t s  
f i r s t  business se s s io n  on th e  morning o f June 2.. 1788. Thus, w ith in  a 
p e rio d  o f two weeks, June 2 to  June 16, th e  two most in f lu e n t ia l  s ta te s  
in  th e  Union, V irg in ia  and New York, convened th e i r  re sp ec tiv e  r a t i fy in g
^G eorge  C lin ton  continued  as Governor o f New York u n t i l  179i+, 
and, a f t e r  spending f iv e  years in  p r iv a te  l i f e ,  was re e le c te d  Governor 
in  1800. In l80ii and aga in  in  I 8O8, he was e le c te d  V ice-P residen t of 
the  U nited S ta te s .  See E rn es t W illiam  Spaulding, His Excellency George 
C lin to n . C r i t i c  o f th e  C o n s titu tio n  (New York, 1938).
^^Robert Yates was appoin ted  to  the  p o s it io n  o f Chief J u s tic e  
o f the  New York Supreme Court in  1789= Robert A llen  R utland, The Or­
d ea l o f  th e  C o n s titu tio n s The A n ti f e d e ra l is ts  and th e  R a ti f ic a tio n  
S trugg le  o f 1787-1788 (Norman.
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conventions» R e jec tio n  o f the  C o n stitu tio n  by e i th e r  o f the two s ta te s  
would p lace  iJie new a r t i c l e  o f  government, even i f  i t  should be r a t i ­
f ie d  by th e  necessary  n ine s ta te s  needed f o r  i t s  o p e ra tio n  w ith in  the 
co un try , v i r tu a l l y  w ithou t a le g  to  s tan d  on. Both F e d e ra lis ts  and 
A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  a l ik e  in  th e  two s ta te s  re a liz e d  the  s ig n if ic an c e  o f 
t h e i r  p a r t i c u la r  s t a t e 's  d e c is io n , and none spared any e f f o r t  to  suc­
ceed, The F e d e ra l is ts  e s p e c ia l ly  in  th e  two s ta te s  re a liz e d  th e  need 
f o r  a l l - o u t  in d iv id u a l e f f o r t ,  fo r  they  were in  a m ino rity  in  both 
s t a t e s .
But though th e  V irg in ia  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  re a liz e d  the  l ik e lih o o d  
o f t h e i r  su p e rio r  number in  th e  convention, they  were by no means com­
p la c e n t. Indeed, V irg in ia  A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  e s s a y is ts  were among the  
e a r l i e r ,  most a c t iv e ,  and most so p h is tic a te d  in  t h e i r  reason ing , o f any 
in  the  coun try , George Mason, fo r  example, s e n t h is  o b jec tio n s to  the  
C o n s titu tio n  to  George Washington in  the form o f  a te r s e  essay on Octo­
ber 7, 1787 , L ikew ise, V i ^ g j ^ i a o f  the  c a l ib e r  o f James 
Madison and EA m A . PeM l.eW , f a n d  extrem ely capable opposi­
t io n  during th e  debates from such 'A n tis ' a s Jl onj ama,  
V irg in ia , th en , had perhaps the f i n e s t  A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  personages o f 
any s ta te  in  th e  Union, and the  essays o f th e se , and the debates in  the
j  I j M i i u j u »  in jimi w i I III m  I n  1
r a t i fy in g  convention a re  extrem ely in te r e s t in g .
I t  i s  n o t in ac cu ra te  to  say  th a t  V irg in ia  probably had more 
t r u ly  d is in te re s te d  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  as c i t iz e n s  than  d id  any o th e r  
s ta te  in  the  Union, Men such as George Mason and Richard Henry Lee, 
as rep u b lican s in  the  e ig h tee n th  cen tu ry  sense , were n a tu ra lly  concerned 
w ith  th e  ex ten t to  which the  common people would be rep resen ted  in  the 
fe d e ra l  government, and the degree to  which they  would e x is t  as the
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a u th o r i ty  behind the  government. They were, consequently , g re a tly  con­
cerned w ith  the s tre n g th  o f  th e  proposed House o f R ep resen ta tiv es , as 
th e  House o f Congress re p re se n tin g  the  peop le . The s tro n g e s t arguments 
p resen ted  a g a in s t the  House came in  th e  L e tte r s  o f  a F edera l Farmer by 
Richard Henry Lee.
The g re a t o b je c t o f a f r e e  people in  forming th e i r  government,
Lee contended, was to  c re a te  confidence in  and e s ta b l is h  re sp e c t fo r  
the  laws o f th a t  government. That confidence and re sp ec t would r e s u l t  
in  popu lar suppo rt o f  th e  government w ithout the need o f m il i ta iy  
coercion . C oercion, i f  a p p lied  in te r n a l ly  o ften  enough, would only  
d estro y  the  confidence o f th e  people in  t h e i r  government, destroy  the  
s p i r i t  o f the  peop le , and u l t im a te ly  b ring  d e s tru c tio n  upon th a t  peop le ’s 
f r e e  government.
Only w ith in  the  re p re s e n ta tiv e  branch o f  the  government, Lee 
con tinued , was i t  p o s s ib le  to  c o l le c t  the  confidence o f the  people , and 
in  i t  to  f in d  alm ost e n t i r e ly  the fo rce  o f p e rsu as io n . In  forming the  
branch, then , i t  was necessary  to  in co rp o ra te  se v e ra l d i s t in c t  q u a l i t ie s  
in  i t :
I t  must possess the  a b i l i t y  to  d isc e rn  the s i tu a t io n  o f the  
people and o f p u b lic  a f f a i r s ,  a d isp o s it io n  to  sympathize w ith 
th e  peop le , and a cap a c ity  and in c l in a t io n  to  make laws congen­
i a l  to  t h e i r  c ircum stances and co n d itio n : i t  must a ffo rd  s e c u r ity  
a g a in s t in te re s te d  com binations, co rru p tio n , and in flu en ce ; i t  
must possess th e  confidence and have the  v o lu n ta iy  support of
the  p eop le .29
And what o f  th e  proposed House o f R epresen ta tives?  On i t  Lee was 
q u ite  e x p l ic i t .  That body, as proposed, was to  c o n s is t  o f s ix ty - f iv e
^®Richard Henry Lee, ^  A d d itio n a l Number o f L e tte rs  from the 
Federa l Farmer to  the  Republican (Chicago, 1962), pp. ^6-^7.
2 9 ib id .
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members, o r  about one re p re s e n ta tiv e  fo r  every f i f t y  thousand in h ab i­
ta n t^ .  This nambflr miprht^ and Lee s tr e s s e d  the  p ro v is io n  "m ight", be 
in c reased  to  one re p re se n ta tiv e  f o r  every t h i r t y  thousand in h a b ita n ts . 
I t  was no t conce ivab le , he charged, to  expect th a t  s ix ty - f iv e  rep resen ­
t a t iv e s  could c o l le c t  the  i n te r e s t s ,  f e e l in g s ,  and opinions o f the 
th re e  o r fo u r m illio n s  o f in h a b ita n ts  o f the  coun try . This was espec­
i a l l y  t r u e ,  he s a id , and Mason agreed most h e a r t i l y , i n  m atte rs  o f 
in te rn a l  t a x a t i o n , L e e  continued:
A sm all re p re se n ta tio n  can never be w ell informed as to  the  
circum stances o f  th e  peop le , th e  members o f i t  must be too f a r  
removed from the p eo p le , in  g e n e ra l, to  sympathize w ith them, 
and too few to  communicate w ith  them: a re p re se n ta tio n  must be 
extrem ely im perfec t where the  re p re se n ta tiv e s  a re  no t circum­
stanced  to  make th e  p roper communications to  th e i r  c o n s titu e n ts , 
and where the  c o n s titu e n ts  in  tu rn  cannot, w ith  to le ra b le  con­
ven ience , make known th e i r  w ants, c ircum stances, and op in ions, 
to  t h e i r  r e p re s e n ta tiv e s :  where th e re  i s  bu t one re p re se n ta tiv e  
to  30,000 o r  1:0,000 in h a b ita n ts , i t  appears to  me, th a t  he can 
mix w ith  a  few re sp e c ta b le  c h a ra c te rs  among h is  c o n s titu e n ts , 
even double the  f e d e ra l  re p re se n ta tio n , and then  t h ^ e  must be 
a  very  g re a t d is ta n c e  between th e  re p re se n ta tiv e s  and 
in  g en era l r e p r e s e n te d .^
The p o p u la tio n  o f  th e  U nited S ta te s ,  Lee went to  g rea t leng th s 
to  ex p la in , c o n s is te d  o f  se v e ra l d i s t in c t  c la sse s  o f p eop le . There a re , 
f i r s t ,  the th re e  k inds o f a r is to c ra c y  (a  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  one, which he 
sa id  d id  no t e x is t  in  th e  U nited S ta te s  ; th e  a r i s to c r a t i c  fa c tio n  was 
the  second, c o n s t i tu te d  o f  men o f w ealth  who combined to  make th e i r  
o b je c t t h e i r  own p r iv a te  in te r e s t s  o r aggrandizem ent; and th i r d ly , the 
n a tu ra l  a r is to c ra c y , th e  c la s s  t r a d i t io n a l ly  the  lead ing  c la ss  in
3 ° E ll io t ,  D ebates. I l l ,  262-261:.
31paul L e ic e s te r  Ford, Essays on th e  Con s t i tu t io n  (Brooklyn,
1891) ,  p . 29$.
3^Lee. o£. c i t . ,  pp. 62-63«
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c o lo n ia l governm ent), th e  l a r g e s t  nundaer o f  c i t iz e n s  who formed what
Lee c a l le d  th e  " n a tu ra l democracy," and f i n a l ly ,  those o f  th e  lower 
33c la s s e s .  Each o f  the  se p a ra te  c la s se s  has i t s  own p a r t ic u la r  i n te r ­
e s t s ,  and each i s  n a tu ra l ly  concerned w ith  th e  g re a te s t  degree o f  ad­
vantage i t  can ach ieve . The need, th en , o f  re p re se n ta tiv e  government 
i s  to  "u n ite  and balance t h e i r  in t e r e s t s ,  f e e l in g s ,  view s, in  th e  
le g i s la tu r e ;  we may no t on ly  so u n ite  and balance th ese  as to  p revent 
a change in  the government by th e  g radual e x a l ta t io n  o f one p a r t  to  the  
dep ression  o f o t h e r e . I n  view o f  th e  sm all number o f re p re se n ta tiv e s , 
however, and th e  g re a t  d is ta n c e s  se p a ra tin g  th e  re p re se n ta tiv e s  from 
th e i r  c o n s t i tu e n ts ,  i t  i s  l ik e ly  th a t  a r a th e r  p e c u lia r  re p re se n ta tiv e  
House w i l l  be th e  consequence. Lee exp la ined :
I  w i l l  co n sid er the  d e sc r ip tio n s  o f  men commonly p resen ted  to  th e  
people as cand ida tes f o r  th e  o f f ic e s  o f re p re se n ta tiv e s—we may 
rank -üiera in  th re e  c la s s e s :  1 . The men who form the  n a tu ra l
a r is to c ra c y :  . . .  2 . Popular demagogues: th ese  men a lso  a re
o f te n  p o l i t i c a l l y  e le v a te d , so as to  be seen by the  people through 
the e x te n t o f la rg e  d i s t r i c t s ;  they  o f te n  have some a b i l i ty ,  w ith­
o u t p r in c ip le ,  and r i s e  in to  n o tic e  by th e i r  no ise  and a r t s .  3«
The s u b s ta n t ia l  and re sp e c ta b le  p a r t  o f  th e  democracy, they a re  a 
numerous and v a lu ab le  s e t  o f men, who d isc e rn  and judge w e ll, but 
being g e n e ra lly  s i l e n t  in  p u b lic  assem blies a re  o f te n  overlooked: 
they  a re  th e  most s u b s ta n t ia l  and b e s t  informed men in  th e  se v e ra l 
towns, who o c c a s io n a lly  f i l l  the  m iddle grades o f  o f f ic e , &c. who 
ho ld  n o t a  sp le n d id , bu t a  re sp ec tab le  rank in  p r iv a te  concerns: 
th ese  men a re  e x te n s iv e ly  d if fu se d  through a l l  th e  co u n tie s , 
towns, and sm all d i s t r i c t s  in  th e  un ion ; even th ey , and th e i r  
immediate connec tions, a re  ra is e d  above the  m a jo rity  o f th e  
peop le , and as re p re s e n ta tiv e s  a re  only brought to  a le v e l  w ith  
th e  more numerous p a r t  o f  the  community, the m iddle o rd e rs , and 
a degree n e a re r  th e  mass o f th e  people . . .  The tru e  idea  i s ,  
so to  open and en large  th e  re p re se n ta tio n  as to  l e t  in  a due 
p ro p o rtio n  o f  th e  th i r d  c la s s  w ith  those  o f th e  f i r s t .  Now, my 
op in ion  i s ,  t h a t  th e  re p re se n ta tio n  proposed i s  so sm all as th a t  
o rd in a r i ly  v e ry  few o r  none of them can be e le c te d ; and, th e re ­
fo r e ,  . . .  th e  government must possess th e  sou l o f a r is to c ra c y , 
o r  something w orse, th e  s p i r i t  o f  popu lar le a d e r s .35
^ ^ Ib id ..  pp . 60-61, 3 liib ido , p . 62. ^ % i d . .  pp. 72-73
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Lee was extrem ely s k e p t ic a l  o f th e  n a tu re  o f th e  proposed Houses
On the whole, i t  appears to  me to  be alm ost s e lf -e v id e n t 
p o s i t io n ,  th a t  when we c a l l  on t h i r t y  o r  fo u r ty  thousand 
in h a b ita n ts  to  u n i te  in  g iv ing  th e i r  v o tes  fo r  one man, i t  
w i l l  be u n ifo rm a lly  im p rac ticab le  f o r  them to  u n ite  in  any 
man, except those  few who have become eminent f o r  t h e i r  
c i v i l  o r  m il i ta ry  rank , o r t h e i r  popular le g a l  a b i l i t i e s s
W r ac^ioab l^
become conspicuous enough to  a t t r a c t  th e  n o tic e  o f  so many 
lÿLafttars and have t h e i r  e u f f r ^ ? ^ ) » —
The re p re s e n ta tiv e  House o f Congress must guard a g a in s t combin­
a tio n s  o f  i n t e r e s t s ,  a c c id e n ta l  o r  o th erw ise . The chances fo r  such
com binations a re  in c reased  as th e  number o f re p re se n ta tiv e s  a re  de- 
37creased,-^ ' I t  i s  a  c o n s id e ra tio n  of much m e rit, Lee in s is te d ,  to  
explore the  c o n s tan t l i a b i l i t y  o f  a sm all re p re se n ta tiv e  body to  f a l l  
prey  to  p r iv a te  com binations, to  " fa c tio n s  o f the  few. " The p o s s i­
b i l i t y  o f p r iv a te  ju n ta s , th e  in fluœ ice  which accompanies the p ro spec t 
o f appo in tive  o f f ic e s ,  th e  c o n tro l o f th e  re p re se n ta tiv e s  by the  
R e s id e n t  or th e  Senate were a l l  very  r e a l  and dahgexom ^.m §§,ifeilltles 
in  the  proposed House, and any and a l l  were l ik e ly  to  adverse ly  a f f e c t  
the  confidence o f the  people in  t h e i r  government
I t  had been s a id  many tim es, Lee Pointed o u t, th a t  the  people 
wiJJL... ale& t-goad«#m , .the
degrees mo%:m.ari8tQjcratlG_than j;hh,iC .P O h sti^  Nor was th e  con­
te n tio n  th a t  th e  F edera l Convention in  i t s  wisdom had found the id e a l 
medium number o f re p re se n ta tiv e s  v a l id ,  Lee a s se r te d , fo r  "the  Conven­
t io n  was d iv ided  on t h i s  p o in t o f numbers»" Indeed, i t  was n o t u n t i l  
September 17, 1787, t h a t  the  maximum r a t io  o f one re p re se n ta tiv e  p e r
36 ib id . .  p . 71. 37Ib id » , pp . $9-60. 38ib id . ,  p . 63 .
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every t h i r t y  thousand in h a b ita n ts  was s e t t l e d  upon, and then only a f t e r  
George Wash in g to n , making a  r a r e ly  expressed p r iv a te  opinion befo re  the 
Convention, agreed th a t  the  in creased  number o f  re p re se n ta tiv e s  would
30
e l im inate  one of  th e  s tro n g e s t  o b jec tio n s  to  the  C o n s titu tio n . The 
p r in c ip a l  o b jec tio n s  made a g a in s t  in c re as in g  the  re p re se n ta tio n , Lee 
s a id ,  were the  expense o f  the  in creased  re p re se n ta tio n  and th e  d i f f i ­
c u lty  in  g e tt in g  members to  a tte n d . But the  f i r s t  ought not be consid­
e red , and th e  second, i f  founded a t  a l l ,  was a g a in s t any fe d e ra l form 
iiO
o f government.
Lee s tro n g ly  o b jec ted  a lso  to  th e  lack  o f inducements upon the  
re p re se n ta tiv e s  to  a t te n d  th e  se ss io n s  o f Congress. Not only was an 
inadequate re p re se n ta tiv e  branch proposed, but what e ls e  but a sense of 
duty  would encourage th e  re p re se n ta tiv e s  to  a tten d ?  The lack  o f induce­
ments o f  th i s  n a tu re  had been made in  th e  A r t ic le s ,  and he hoped the 
same m istake would no t be repea ted  in  th e  C o n stitu tio n ,^ ^
F e d e ra l is ts  throughout th e  coun try  rep ea ted ly  s tre s se d  th a t  the 
re p re se n ta tiv e s  must re tu rn  home, th a t  th e  burdens they  might impose 
upon t h e i r  c o n s titu e n ts  would lik ew ise  be imposed upon them selves a t  
home, and th a t  th e re fo re  they  would n a tu ra l ly  be in c lin e d  to  make m ild 
law s, to  support l i b e r ty ,  and ease as w ell as p o ss ib le  the  burdens o f 
the  peo p le . B ut, Lee in s i s te d ,  i f  a  man w il l  gain  more by measures 
oppressive  to  o th e rs  th an  he w i l l  lo se  by them, he w il l  be in c lin ed  
towards t h e i r  adop tion . Though th a t  man in c rease  th e  p u b lic  burdens.
^^Madison, 0£ . c i t . , pp. ^ 8 1 - ^ 8 2 .  
^®Lee, 0£ . c i t . « p . 76.
^ ^ Ib id ..  p . 70.
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he w i l l  in  a l l  p ro b a b i l i ty  a lso  be in c re a s in g  h is  own. Such a man would 
a lso  ten d  to  secu re  an in c reased  sa la ry  and o th e r  b e n e f its  a t  th e  same 
tim e th a t  he worked a g a in s t th e  p u b lic . He would secure  an advantage 
over th e  p u b lic , however much he m ight be a ffe c te d  by p u b lic  law s.
Under th e  C o n s titu tio n , th e  s ta te s  would have the  power to  choose 
n inety -one members o f Congress. Of th i s  number, which was the  same 
number o f re p re s e n ta tiv e s  in  the  C onfederation Congress, only tw o-th ird s 
would be brought in to  th e  s p o t l ig h t  o f pu b lic  exam ination by re e le c tio n  
in  a te n -y e a r  p e rio d , as was th e  case w ith  Üie Confederation Congress. 
But under th e  C o n s titu tio n , th e re  would be f iv e  and probably te n  times 
the  number of app o in tiv e  o f f  ic e ? , open f o r  ex-members o f Congress as 
under th e  A r t ic le s .  The e f f e c t  o f th i s  la rg e r  number o f such appoin tive  
o f f ic e s  would be to  prov ide th ese  ex-congressmen w ith  enough lu c ra tiv e  
o f f ic e s  so th a t  th ey  would never have to  re tu rn  to  p r iv a te  l i f e .  More­
over, n o t only  would such o f f ic e s  be a v a ila b le  to  ex-congressmen, they 
would a lso  be opened f o r  t h e i r  f r ie n d s  and fam ily . 
e x is t  in  th e  g o y e m > ^  th en , she i3 L^o_ma^,,,9j _ ^  
would f e e l  them selves candM atea.,fW -Æh8^.offica&, co rru p tio n  asid e?
This q uestion  posed by Lee was a cha lleng ing  one, one th a t  no F e d e ra l is t  
ever attem pted to  answer.
The C o n s titu tio n  au th o rized  th e  Congress o f the  United S ta te s  to  
levy  taxes a t  p le a su re  fo r  th e  g en era l w e lfa re , Lee exp la ined . Should 
th a t  Congress
m is-judge o f the  g en era l w e lfa re , and la y  unnecessary oppressive 
ta x e s , the  c o n s t i tu t io n  w i l l  p rov ide . . .  no remedy fo r  the 
people o r s t a t e s —th e  people must bear them, o r have recou rse .
^^Madison, 0£ . c i t . .  p . 636 .
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n o t any c o n s t i tu t io n a l  checks o r  rem edies, bu t to  th a t  r e s i s t ­
ance which i s  the  l a s t  r e s o r t ,  and founded in  se lf-defense#
I t  i s  w ell s t ip u la te d ,  th a t  a l l  d u t ie s ,  im posts, and excises 
s h a l l  be equal and th a t  d i r e c t  taxes sha l l  be apportioned on the
mences a dangerous power in  m atte rs  o f ta x a tio n , lodged w ithout 
any regard  to  th e  balance o f in te r e s ts  o f  the d i f f e r e n t  o rders 
o f  men, and w ithou t apy regard  to  th e  in te rn a l  p o lic y  o f the  
s ta te s  . . . no th ing  to  p reven t a system o f tax
laws being made, unduly to  ease some d e sc r ip tio n s  o f men and 
burden o th e rs ;  though such a system may be u n ju s t and in ju d i­
c io u s , though we may com plain, the answer w i l l  be, congress 
have th e  power de legated  by th e  peop le , and probably , congress 
has done what i t  thought b e s t .^ ^
In  th e  fo llow ing  L e t te r ,  Lee continued  h is  exam ination o f  Congress's
power o f  ta x a tio n :
To p a l la te  f o r  the  sm allness o f the  re p re se n ta tio n , i t  is  
observed, th a t  th e  s ta te  governments in  which th e  people a re  
f u l l y  re p re se n te d , n e c e s sa r ily  form a p a r t  o f the  system . . .
tru e  they  may, but 
a im less and.JielDlea&. perhaps, w ith  th e  p r iv ile g e  o f making a 
n o ise  when h u r t—th is  i s  no more than  in d iv id u a ls  may do. Does 
th e  c o n s t i tu t io n  p rovide a s in g le  check f o r  a s in g le  measure, 
by which th e  s t a t e  governments can c o n s t i tu t io n a l ly  and regu­
l a r l y  check th e  a r b i t r a r y  measures o f  co i^ ress?  Congress may 
r a i s e  im m ediately . . . tw enty m illio n s  o f  d o lla rs  in  tax e s , 
b u ild  a navy, model th e  m i l i t i a ,  &c. and a l l  t h i s  c o n s titu ­
t io n a l ly .  Congress may arm on every p o in t,  and th e  s ta te  
governments can do no more than an in d iv id u a l, by p e t i t io n  to  
Congress, suggest t h e i r  measures a re  alarm ing and n o t r i g h t . ^
Elsewhere in  h is  L e t te r s ,  Lee made a number of in te re s t in g  observations
on the  proposed House. The branches of the  le g is la tu r e  were e s s e n t ia l
p a r ts  o f the  fundam ental compact, presumably between the  people and
th e i r  government, and ought to  be f ix e d  by th e  people . But by A r tic le
I ,  s e c tio n  U, o f  th e  C o n s titu tio n ,^ ^  th e  House might a l t e r  i t s e l f  by
^ ^ e e ,  ogi. c i t . , p . 79. 
^ I b i d . . p . 82.
^^Madison, o£. c i t . ,  p . 629.
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m odifying the  e le c tio n s  o f  i t s  own members, hy re g u la tin g  the  e le c tio n s  
so as to  secu re  th e  choice o f any p a r t i c u la r  d e sc r ip tio n  o f men. I t  
m ight make an e n t i r e  s t a t e  one d i s t r i c t ;  th e  r e s u l t  m ight very  w ell be 
th a t  the  people who l iv e d  in  th e  more concen tra ted  urban areas could 
u n i te  and p lac e  in  th e  House th e  e n t i r e  number of re p re se n ta tiv e s  appor­
tio n ed  to  th e  s t a t e ,  Why, Lee asked, leave  th e  door open to  improper 
re g u la tio n s?  Why no t in co rp o ra te  d i r e c t ly  in to  th e  C o n stitu tio n  p ro v i-  
3ions fo r  th e  d iv is io n  o f  each s t a te  in to  p roper d i s t r i c t s  and f o r  the 
confin ing  o f th e  e le c to rs  in  each d i s t r i c t  to  th e  choice o f some men
R e la tiv e ly  l i t t l e  tim e was sp en t on th e  House by th e  'A n tis ' 
during th e  course o f th e  debates in  the  V irg in ia  r a t i fy in g  convention. 
For th e  most p a r t ,  tho se  o b jec tio n s  "üiat were voiced  were the same th a t  
we have seen rep e a te d ly  s tr e s s e d , i . e . ,  th a t  th e  re p re se n ta tiv e s  were 
to o few to  secure  adequate knowledge o f th e  p e o p le 's  needs, a b i l i t i e s ,  
and c o n d itio n s , th a t  because o f  th e  sm all re p re se n ta tio n  co rru p tio n  was 
l ik e ly , and th a t  th e  House would soon become an a r i s to c r a t i c  c lu b . But 
th e re  were a few in te r e s t in g  observa tions made on the  House, and i t  
would be worthwhile to  examine th e s e .
The proponents o f th e  new p lan  o f  government contend, W illiam 
Grayson sa id , t h a t  th e  dem ocratic branch o f the  Congress, because i t  is  
e le c te d  by the  p eo p le , i s  a  panacea fo r  many o f the  d e fec ts  o f  the  Con­
s t i t u t i o n ,  But what s e c u r i ty  i s  th e re  in  a re p re se n ta tio n  th a t  i s  too 
sm a ll, he asked? H isto ry  showed th a t  th e  le s s  th e  re p re se n ta tio n , the  
g re a te r  th e  opening o f  c o rru p tio n . C onsider, he asked, some f i f ^ e n
^^Ford, E ssays,-~CT>, 29^-296.
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hundred re p re se n ta tiv e s  a re  considered  only adequate to  handle the  
amount o f bugims& resp o n sib le  f o r  in  th e  sta^fca le g is la tu re s ^  And y e t 
much more ex tensive  powers, over th e  e n ti r e  country  as a conso lida ted  
un ion , a re  Jio,Jbfl.,,hfmdlfld ■ bg. a t o t a l  o f  n inety -one  re p re se n ta tiv e s  and 
se n a to rs . Tiftiether i t  was l ik e ly  th a t  these  n inety-one men in  the  United 
S ta te s  Congress were equal in  t h e i r  knowledge and a b i l i t i e s  o f the  f a c ts  
o f th e  coun try  to  th e  f i f t e e n  hundred, he made no sp e cu la tio n . His 
g re a te s t  o b je c tio n , he s a id , was th a t  the  Congress as proposed would 
be unequal and o p p ress iv e . Such e ff ic a c y  as i t  would dem onstrate, and 
th is  g e ts  to  th e  h e a r t  o f Grayson’s o p p o sitio n  to  the  House, would come 
from th e  presence o f  fa c tio n s  o f one p a r t  o f the Union ag a in s t an o th e r. 
For th e  powers and ju r i s d ic t io n  o f th e  government might be c a lle d  in to  
a c tio n  by a  com bination of only  seven s t a t e s .  There a re , he s tre s s e d , 
g re a t d if fe re n c e s  o f  circum stances among the  s t a te s ,  and i t  is  only 
reasonable  th a t  those  s ta te s  o f s im ila r  in te r e s ts  would combine a g a in s t 
o th e rs . The e f f e c t  upon th e  country  would be ru inous.
At a  l a t e r  da te  in  th e  deb a tes , P a tr ic k  Henry rose  to  make a few 
remarks on th e  House. During th e  course o f h is  speech, he brought up 
th e  argument made by a F e d e ra l is t  opponent th a t  th e  House would a c t  to  
curb any t r e a t i e s  th a t  m ight adverse ly  a f f e c t  the  American r ig h t  of 
n av ig a tio n  on th e  M is s is s ip p i . But where, Henry asked, was th is  power 
o f th e  House to  be found in  th e  C onstitu tio n ?  I t  could  n o t, fo r  the  
House had no such power. A most u n fo rtu n a te  om ission o f power, indeed, 
Henry complained.
At a s t i l l  l a t e r  p o in t in  the d eb a tes , James Monroe brought up
^ M l i o t ,  D ebates. I l l ,
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a unique and th o u g h tfu l o b se rv a tio n  on the  House. What, he asked, was 
the  purpose o f the  c lau se  in  the  C o n s titu tio n , c lause  U. se c tio n  5» 
A r t ic le I ,  id iich p ro h ib i ts  e i th e r  House from r is in g  fo r  more than  th re e  
days w ithou t th e  consent o f  the  o th e r?  Was i t  p ro p er, he asked, th a t
  .......     f --------.  .. ..  r r' 7 J
th e  House should thus be dependent upon the Senate, and as such might
unduly in c re a se  th e  in flu e n ce  o f iiie  Upper House on th e  Lower?^®
In  view o f  i t s  im portance, and the  e x te n t o f i t s  powers w ith in
the framework o f  th e  proposed fe d e ra l  government, th e  Senate received
su rp r is in g ly  l i t t l e  a t te n t io n  from A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  w r ite rs  o f  V irg in ia .
R ichard Henry Lee, f o r  example, devoted only  a  very  few pages in  h is
L e tte rs  From a  F edera l Farmer to  th e  Senate, f a r  le s s  than  he d id  to
th e  House o f R e p re se n ta tiv e s . His an a ly s is  o f the Senate i s  o f such
e x c e lle n t q u a li ty  i t  i s  worthwhile to  quote ex ten siv e ly  from him:
The sen a te  i s  an assembly o f 26 members, two from each s ta te ,  
though th e  se n a to rs  a re  apportioned  on th e  fe d e ra l  p lan , they 
w i l l  v o te  in d iv id u a lly ; th ey  rep re se n t th e  s t a t e s ,  as bodies 
p o l i t i c ,  sovereign  to  c e r ta in  purposes; the s t a te s ,  being 
sovereign  and independent, a l l  a re  considered  equal, each o th er 
w ith  the  o th e r  in  th e  se n a te . In  th is  we a re  governed so le ly  
by th e  id e a l  e q u a l i t ie s  o f so v e re ig n tie s ;  the  fe d e ra l and s ta te  
governments form ing one whole, and the s t a te  governments an 
e s s e n t ia l  p a r t  . . .  I  f e e l  more d isposed . . .  to  acquiesce in  
making them th e  b a s is  o f  th e  se n a te , and thereby  to  make i t  the  
in te r e s t  and duty o f  th e  se n a to rs  to  p reserv e  d i s t in c t ,  and to  
p e rp e tu a te  th e  re sp e c tiv e  so v e re ig n tie s  they  re p re se n t. . . .
The se n a te , as a  l e g i s l a t i v e  branch, i s  no t la rg e , but as an 
execu tive  branch q u ite  too numerous. I t  i s  no t to  be presumed 
th a t  we can form a genuine s e n a to r ia l  branch in  the  United 
S ta te s ,  a  r e a l  re p re s e n ta tio n  o f  th e  a r is to c ra c y  and balance in  
th e  l e g i s l a tu r e ,  any more than  we can form a genuine rep re se n ta ­
t io n  o f th e  p eo p le . Could we se p a ra te  the a r i s to c r a t i c a l  and 
dffljiocratical in t e r e s t s ;  compose th e  senate  o f  th e  form er, and 
th e  house o f assem bly o f  th e  l a t t e r ,  they  a re  too unequal . . . 
to  form a b a lance . Form them on pure p r in c ip le s ,  and leave each 
to  be supported by i t s  r e a l  weight and connections, th e  senate  
would be f e e b le ,  and the  house p o w erfu l:— I  say , on pure
^Q lb id .. p . 367.
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p r in c ip le s j  because I  make a  d is t in c t io n  between a senate  th a t  
d e riv es  i t s  w eight and in flu en ce  from a pure source, i t s  numbers 
and wisdom, i t s  e x ten siv e  p ro p erty , i t s  ex tensive  and permanent 
connections? and a  sen a te  composed o f  u n s ta b le  connections, th a t  
d e riv es  i t s  w eight and in flu en ce  from a c o rru p t and p e rn ic io u s 
source • . . I  wish the  proposed sen a te  may n o t p a rtak e  too much 
o f  the  l a t t e r  d e s c r ip t io n .^9
By i t s  v e iy  n a tu re  as th e  re p re se n ta tiv e  body o f  th e  a r i s to c r a t i c
elem ents o f  th e  p o p u la tio n  the  Senate had an in h e re n t d e fe c t fo r  the
p roper n a tu re  o f  re p re s e n ta tiv e  government in  th e  U nited S ta te s .
To produce a  balance and checks, the  c o n s t i tu t io n  proposes two 
branches in  th g ^ ^ ^ is la tu r e  ? but they  a re  so formed, th a t  the 
members o f  both must g e n e ra lly  be th e  same k ind  o f men—men 
w ith  s im ila r  in te r e s t s  and view s—men o f th e  same grade in  
so c ie ty . Senators and re p re se n ta tiv e s  thus circum stanced . . .  
must be governed g e n e ra lly  by the  same m otives and view s, and 
th e re fo re  pursue th e  same system o f  p o l i t ic s ?  . . . th e re  w ill  
n o t be found in  them any o f  those  genuine balances and checks, 
among th e  r e a l  in t e r e s t s ,  and e f f o r t s  o f the  same c la sse s  of 
men in  the  community we aim at.^®
Lee had o th e r  o b je c tio n s  to  th e  Senate as i t  was o igan ized . The 
s e n a to rs , he contended, s a t  f o r  f a r  too long? h is to ry  showed th a t  men 
w ith  long terms o f o f f ic e  tended to  develop ca llo u s  h a b its ,  and cease 
to  f e e l  t h e i r  dependence upon and knowledge of t h e i r  c o n s titu e n ts .
T his, he p re d ic te d , would be e s p e c ia lly  t ru e  in  a body over which th e re  
e x is te d  no r e c a l l . The power o f  r e c a l l  was, he s a id , considered an 
e s s e n t ia l  a sp ec t o f  th e  Congress undeg-J M  JjlM gleg.. o f  CoM M grationj 
and th e re  was no rea so n , and c e r ta in ly  no s e c u r i ty , in  no t in co rp o ra t­
ing s im ila r  p ro v is io n s  in  th e  C o n s titu tio n . The sena to rs rep resen ted  
so v e re ig n tie s  which ought n e c e s s a r ily  r e ta in  th e  power of r e c a l l  over 
t h e i r  ag en ts , f o r  i t  was th e  n a tu re  o f a l l  de legated  power th a t  con­
s t i tu e n t s  should r e t a in  th e  r ig h t  to  judge o f the  conduct o f t h e i r
^^Lee, o£. c i t . .  pp. 89- 90 . 
^^ Ib id .g p . 90 .
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re p re s e n ta t iv e s . The c o n s t i tu e n ts ' approval o r d isapproval o f t h e i r  
r e p re s e n ta t iv e 's  conduct im plied  the  r ig h t  to  continue o r co n tro l th e  
r e p re s e n ta t iv e 's  p o s i t io n .  Indeed, he in s i s te d ,  the  n e ce ss ity  o f r e c a l l  
i s  g re a te r  fo r .  t he„^Qate.„thgüi_fûr-.t^^^ f o r  th e  l a t t e r  would be
more f re q u e n tly  e le c te d  and, th e re fo re , more l ik e ly  to  be sc ru tin iz e d  
c a re fu l ly  by th e  p u b lic . The power o f r e c a l l  over th e  senato rs would 
have th e  e f f e c t  o f  p reven ting  th e  form ation  o f any p o ss ib le  in te re s te d  
f a c t io n s ,  as w e ll as se rv ing  to  keep up the w atchfulness o f the  senato rs 
and th e i r  a t te n t io n  to  t h e i r  p o s i t io n 's  r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s .^ ^
With th e  power o f r e c a l l  should a lso  come th e  p r in c ip le  o f ro ta ­
t io n  in  o f f ic e ,  Lee in s i s te d .  I t  was a p r in c ip le  found in  the  A r t ic le s ,  
and most o f te n  in  th e  s t a t e  l e g i s l a tu r e s .  In  a government co n sis tin g  
o f but a  few members, e le c te d  fo r  long p e rio d s , and f a r  removed from 
th e  o b se rv a tio n s o f  the  peo p le , as proposed by the  C o n s titu tio n , members 
a re  seldom changed, and government becomes f i l l e d  w ith men who c o n s ti­
tu te  a r e l a t iv e ly  f ix e d  body, who a re  o f te n  in a t te n t iv e  to  the pub lic  
good, a re  c a l lo u s ,  s e l f i s h ,  and prone to  co rru p tio n . The p r in c ip le  o f 
ro ta t io n  would rev e rse  a l l  such c h a ra c te r i& tlc a , and would have the  
a d d itio n a l e f f e c t  o f d is t r ib u t in g  more w idely throughout the  community 
knowledge o f th a t  community's government. R o tation  would serve to  
re tu rn  a  re p re se n ta tiv e  to  h is  c o n s t i tu e n ts ,  and to  r e in s ta te  him in
th e  i n t e r e s t s ,  f e e l in g s ,  and views o f  h is  c o n s titu e n ts , and thereby
92
confirm  him in  th e  e s s e n t ia l  q u a li f ic a tio n s  o f a l e g i s l a to r .
By A rtic le  I I ,  s e c tio n  2, th e  C onstitu tion^^  req u ired  th a t  two-
^ ^ Ib id . . pp. 92-91. ^^ Ib id .
^^Madison, op. c i t . « p . 63U«
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th i r d s  o f the  Senate confirm  p re s id e n t ia l  appointm ents f o r  fe d e ra l 
o f f i c e s .  In  L ee 's  e s tim a tio n  th is  was an improper power to  lodge in  
th e  Senate. The honor and emoluments o f  p u b lic  o f f ic e s  are  the  o b jec ts  
in  a l l  communities o f which am bitious men never lo se  s ig h t .  Honest 
men, those  who a re  in d u s tr io u s  and m odest, a re  more than  conten t to  
look a f t e r  th e i r  own p r iv a te  a f f a i r s ;  i t  i s  the  men o f  in tr ig u e  who
H    '  1 ,1 IHIIHINIW IT I I f  ............... I MHIimi HI 1 lltg lil f  I ,  "S •  •> ■N.'-.'
seek a f t e r  th e  o f f ic e s  o f pub lij5, ,^ n c e m . The o f f ic e s  necessary  fo r  
a n a tio n a l  system o f government as proposed by the  C o n stitu tio n  w il l  
be many, and those  men w ith the  power o f d isp o sa l o f those o ff ic e s  
w il l  have a ve ry  la rg e  in flu en ce  in  th e  government. The senato rs and 
re p re se n ta tiv e s  w i l l  n a tu ra l ly  consider them selves p o ss ib le  re c ip ie n ts  
o f app o in tiv e  o f f ic e s  which become vacant every y e a r. But every p re ­
c au tio n  must be tak en  to  ensure th a t  the  l e g is la to r s  do not become mere 
o f f ic e  men. This would be e ffe c te d , among o th e r  changes, by giv ing  
them as sm all a  share  in  th e  d isp o sa l o f those o f f ic e s  as p o ss ib le .
Furtherm ore, Lee con tinued , in  d iscussing  A rtic le  I I ,  se c tio n  2, 
th e  Senate has a major p a r t  in  try in g  fe d e ra l o f f ic e r s  fo r  m isconduct.
In  c re a tin g  o f f ic e s ,  i t  i s  too numerous fo r  a council o f appointm ent, 
o r  to  f e e l  any g re a t r e s p o n s ib i l i ty .  Added to  th is  must be th e  f a c t  
th a t  the  Senate has a n ecessa ry  share  in  the  concluding o f t r e a t i e s .
The e f f e c t  o f a l l  th ese  powers m ight very  l ik e ly  be th a t  t he Senate 
w i l l  no t only d ic ta te  to  th e  P re s id e n t, but w il l  manage t he House as 
w e ll, thereby  u p se ttin g  what balance o f government the C o n stitu tio n  
e s ta b l is h e s . A d d itio n a lly , the  Senate is  the  body to  t r y  impeachments 
o f fe d e ra l  o f f i c e r s ,  and must th e re fo re  be as d is in te re s te d  as p o ss ib le ,
51t-Lee, 0£ , c i t . ,  pp. 98, I l l - I l l ; .
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For a l l  th ese  reaso n s , Lee concluded, th e  Senate i s  a  p o te n t ia l ly  dan­
gerous body in  which to  lodge even a  share  in  the  power o f appointment 
o f fe d e ra l  o f f ic e r s
Elsewhere in  h is  L e t te r s ,  Lee made o th e r , r a th e r  random observa­
t io n s  on the  Senate t h a t  a re  worth examining fo r  a moment. A r t ic le  I ,  
s e c tio n  U, o f the  C o n s titu tio n ,^ ^  regard ing  the  e le c tio n s  o f fe d e ra l 
l e g i s l a to r s ,  empowered the  genera l l e g is la tu r e  to  re g u la te  the e le c tio n s  
o f s e n a to rs , "except as to  th e  p laces o f choosing se n a to rs ."  There i s ,  
th e re fo re , Lee argued, bu t l i t t l e  more s e c u r i ty  in  the  e le c tio n  o f  the  
sen a to rs  than  th e re  i s  f o r  th e  re p re se n ta tiv e s .
The Senate a ls o  came under A n ti-F e d e ra lis t a tta c k  during the 
course o f the  deb a tes , though the c r i t ic ism s  made were s im ila r  to  L ee 's  
in  h is  L e t te r s .  A few o th e r  observations were made here and th e re , 
however, th a t  a re  worth some time examining.
A g re a t d ea l o f  d isc u ss io n  during the  ea rly  days o f  the debates 
was given to  the American r ig h t  o f n av ig a tio n  o f  the  M iss iss ip p i R iver, 
As expected , V irg in ian s f e l t  v e ry  s tro n g ly  about the con tinua tion  of 
th a t  r ig h t .  But W illiam  Grayson po in ted  ou t th a t  the  senato rs o f only 
f iv e  s ta te s  and th e  P re s id e n t were n ecessa iy  f o r J ^ a t  r ig h t  to  be g i ^ n  
up. For, w ith tw o -th ird s  o f  th e  Senate p re se n t a quorum would be fo u r­
teen  se n a to rs , o f  which t m  would c o n s t i tu te  a m a jo r ity . What, then , 
he asked, i s  th e  s e c u r i ty  in  such a system , where sen a to rs  o f only f iv e  
s ta te s  and the P re s id e n t may conclude a t r e a ty  which a f fe c ts  v i r tu a l ly  
o n e -h a lf  o f the  s t a te s  o f  th e  Union?^^
^^Ibid.. pp. 115-116. 
^% adison , 0£ . c i t . , p . 62? . 
^^Ford, E ssays, p . 297.
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L a te r  in  th e  d e b a te s , Grayson ro se  to  o b je c t to  the S en a te 's  
power o f  concurrence and approval o f amendments to  money b i l l s ;  "He 
looked upon the  power o f  proposing amendments to  be equal, in  p r in c ip le ,  
to  th a t  o f  o r ig in a tin g , and th a t  they  w ere, in  f a c t  the  same . . . th is  
was, in  h is  o p in ion , a  d ep artu re  from th a t  g re a t p r in c ip le  which r e ­
q u ired  th a t  th e  immediate re p re se n ta tiv e s  o f the  people only should 
in te r f e r e  w ith  money b i l l s .
L ike Grayson, P a tr ic k  Henry fe a re d  the p o s s ib i l i ty ,  and e f fe c ts  
upon V irg in ia , o f  a c o llu s io n  between th e  Senate and the P re s id e n t.
The C o n s titu tio n  g re a t ly  dim inished th e  s e c u r i ty  a g a in s t c o llu s io n
S9which was p a r t  o f the  A r t ic le s .  Nor d id  Henry, l ik e  Lee, approve o f 
th e  lac k  o f  r e c a l l  over th e  se n a to rs , and he fea red  the w orst e f fe c t  o f 
th a t  lack,^®
The V irg in ia  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  made few c r i t ic ism s  o r expressed 
l i t t l e  f e a r  o f th e  proposed E xecutive. Richard Henry Lee, fo r  example,
61
devoted p a r ts  o f  only  twO L e tte r s  to  the  Presidency and V ice-Presidency. 
George Mason devoted some tim e to  h is  observations on the  Chief Execu­
t iv e ,  but as h is  e n t i r e  'o b je c t io n s ' occupied only fo u r pages, those 
o b se rv a tio n s , to o , were n e c e s s a r ily  summarized. L ikew ise, l i t t l e  time 
was spen t during  th e  debates on the  o f f ic e  o f the  P re s id e n t, and th a t  
which was s a id  was done so fo r  th e  most p a r t  only in  passin g . S t i l l ,  
i t  would be worthwhile to  tak e  some n o tic e  o f the  observations made.
The lack  o f a c o n s t i tu t io n a l  council f o r  the  P r e s id e n t  was, fo r  
George Mason, most o b je c tio n a b le :
^ % l i o t .  D ebates. I l l ,  351.
^^I b id . , pp. 375-376. ^^I b id . , pp. 353-355.
^^Lee, 0£ . c i t ; . pp. 118-119; a ls o . Ford, E ssays, p . 310,
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The P re s id e n t o f  the  U nited S ta te s  has no c o n s t i tu t io n a l  council 
(a  th in g  unknown in  any sa fe  and re g u la r  government) he w ill  
th e re fo re  be unsupported  by p roper in form ation  and adv ice; and 
w i l l  g e n e ra lly  be d ire c te d  by m inions and f a v o r i te s —o r he w il l  
become a to o l o f th e  Senate—o r  a council o f s t a te  w i l l  grow out 
o f  th e  p r in c ip a l  o f f ic e r s  o f  the  g re a t departm ents—the w orst 
and most dangerous in g re d ie n ts  f o r  such a c o u n c il, in  a f re e  
coun try ; fo r  they  may be induced to  jo in  in  any dangerous o r 
oppressive  m easures, to  s h e l te r  them selves, and p reven t an in ­
q u iry  in to  t h e i r  own m isconduct in  o f f ic e  . . . From th is  f a t a l  
d e fe c t o f  a c o n s t i tu t io n a l  c o u n c il, has a r is e n  the improper power 
o f th e  Senate , in  th e  appointm ent o f the  p u b lic  o f f ic e r s ,  and the  
alarm ing dependence and connexion between th a t  branch o f the  
l e g i s l a tu r e  and th e  supreme ex ecu tiv e . Hence, a ls o , sprung th a t  
unnecessary  ,o f f ic e r^ th e .l ie e -P E g s M  who, fo r  want o f o th e r '
employment, i s  made P re s id en t o f  the Senate; thereby dangerously 
blending th e  execu tive  and le g i s l a t iv e  powers; besides a lso  g iv­
ing to  some one o f th e  s ta te s  an u n ju s t and unnecessary p re ­
eminence over th e  o th e r ,
Mason o b jec te d  a lso  to  th e  power o f pardon gran ted  to  the P re s i­
d en t. The power o f  pardon m ight " sometimes be exerc ised  to  screen  from 
punishment those  idiom he may have s e c re t ly  in s t ig a te d  to  commit the 
crim e, and thereby  p rev en t a d iscovery  o f h is  own g u i l t .
Lee, as we have s a id ,  devoted space in  only two L e tte rs  to  the 
o f f ic e  and powers o f  th e  P re s id e n t. Like Mason, he ob jM ted  to ,  and 
fe a re d , the  connection  between the  Senate and the P re s id en t as an un­
necessary  mixing o f  l e g i s l a t i v e  and executive powers.
Though he approved on th e  whole o f  th e  method o f se le c tio n  of 
the  P re s id e n t, he d id  f e a r  t h a t  the  sm allness of the  number o f e le c to rs  
would in c rease  th e  p o s s ib i l i ty  o f co rru p tio n  o f  th o se e le c ;tors between 
the d a te  o f  t h e i r  s e le c tio n  and th e  date  o f  vo te  fo r  th e  P re s id e n t. He 
disapproved, f u r th e r ,  o f  th e  id ea  o f the r e - e l i g i b i l i t y  o f the P re s id en t.
62paul L e ic e s te r  Ford , Pamphlets on 1 ^  C o n stitu tio n  (Brooklyn, 
1891), p . 330.
^ ^ ib id o. pp . 330-331"
^^Fbrd, E ssays, p . 298.
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The o b je c t  In  rep u b lican  gOY-amment. he argued, was to  guard agains t  
p e rp e tu a tin g  any p o s i t io n  o f power. The executive  must remain in  o f f ic e  
long enough to  g ive h is  o f f ic e  s t a b i l i t y ,  but n o t long enough to  e s tab ­
l i s h  h im se lf . The p o s s ib i l i ty  o f  r e e le c tio n , he argued, might le a d  to  
in tr ig u e  fo r  r e e le c t io n .  The am bitious man would spare  nothing to  se ­
cure r e e le c t io n .  By re e le c t io n ,  the  man in  o f f ic e  would lo se  h is  
in te r e s t  in  h is  o f f ic e  and -ttie government beyond aggrandizem ent,^^
Obseirvations on th e  P re s id e n t 's  o f f ic e  made during the course o f 
th e  debates were m ostly  r e p e t i t io u s  o f  those we have examined b efo re , 
George Mason, fo r  example, expressed h is  fea rs  the  P residency might 
become a p e rp e tu a lly -o ccu p ied  p o s i t io n , th a t  t he Senate and P resid en t 
m ight a c t  to  support one ano ther a g a in s t the  peop le , and th a t  the P res­
id e n t ' sp o w e r o f  pardon and c o n tro l over the  m i l i t i a  were undesirab le  
and p o te n t ia l ly  dangerous powers.
James Monroe^^ and W illiam Grayson^® both covered o ld  ground in  
th e i r  c r i t ic is m s  o f the  P re s id e n t 's  and V ic e -P re s id e n t's  o f f ic e s .  Nei­
th e r  man was a t  a l l  s a t i s f i e d  w ith the broad e x ten t o f the P re s id e n t 's  
powers and th e  la c k  o f s e c u r i ty  p laced  on th ese  powers, and they fea red  
the  w orst should an am bitious man come to  occupy the o f f ic e .
S u rp ris in g ly  enough, in  view o f  the  r a th e r  l im ite d  a t te n t io n  
given the  execu tive  branch o f th e  government, the  proposed ju d ic ia l  
branch drew co n sid erab le  c r i t ic is m  from the V irg in ia  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts . 
Lee, in  p a r t i c u la r ,  devoted much a t te n t io n  to  th e  proposed ju d ic ia ry , 
and h is  exam ination i s  c e r ta in ly  worth th e  space req u ired  to  review  i t .
^^Lee, ogi. c i t . , pp . 123-126.
^ ^ E ll io t ,  D ebates. I l l ,  I 83.
"̂̂ I b id , .  pp. U88-lt96. ^ ^ I b id . , pp. h 9 0 -h 9 2 .
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Lee had no o b je c tio n  to  th e  b asic  arrangem ent o f  the  fe d e ra l 
ju d ic ia ry —one supreme c o u rt  and a s e r ie s  o f in f e r io r  c o u r t s . I n d e e d ,  
i t  was necessa ry  f o r  th e  fu n c tio n s  o f  the  ju d ic ia ry  to  be c a r r ie d  out 
sm oothly. But he did not approve o f  th e  ju d ic ia l  departm en t's  powers 
to  handle q u estio n s  a r i s in g  from the  in te rn a l  laws o f th e  sev e ra l s t a te s ,  
though he conceded the n e c e s s ity  o f th e  departm ent's  power o f deciding 
f i n a l ly  on th e  law o f  th e  Union. A ^ ic le  I I I j ^ .^eetlon  2, o f the  C onsti­
tu t io n ,  a c tio n s  between c i t iz e n s  o f a p a r t ic u la r  s t a te  and fo re ig n e rs , 
between c i t iz e n s  o f d i f f e r e n t  s t a t e s ,  by s ta te  governments ag a in s t 
fo re ig n e rs ,  and by s t a t e  governments a g a in s t c i t iz e n s  o f o th e r  s ta te s  
were to  be h ;n ^ ^ p p w ] % @ n tlz _ k L J a a & ^ ^  ^
ef f e c t  o f  th a t  p ro v is io n , in  L ee 's  e s tim a tio n , would be to  open new 
ju r is d ic t io n s  ^ d  new scenes o f  le g a l  a c tio n s , to  which c i t iz e n s  and 
fo re ig n e rs  a l ik e  must be drawn, perhaps hundreds o f m ile s . Such p ro ­
cesses would involve th e  s t a t e s ,  and many defendan ts, to  ac tio n s not in
70contem plation when th e  c o n tra c t  was made. Furtherm ore, though tAe
fe d e ra l  c o u rts  m ight be so organized as to  ease the  ob tain ing  o f le g a l
71a c tio n , the  C o n s titu tio n  d id  not secure  th a t  b e n e f i t .  In  a d d itio n , 
he questioned  th e  wisdom o f  making a s t a te  answerable to  the s u i t s  o f 
a fo re ig n e r  o r c i t i z e n  o f some o th e r  s t a t e .  By any o r a l l  o f  these  
a c tio n s , s t a te  governments m ight be humbled to  a degree to  vrtiich they 
were no t su b je c t under th e  A r t ic le s .
Though Lee adm itted  th e  n e c e s s ity  o f securing  the independence 
o f the fe d e ra l  ju d ic ia ry ,  he questioned  the  wisdom o f m ain tain ing  the
^% ad ison , o£. c i t . ,  p . 63^. 
^^Ford, E ssays, p . 309,
^^I b id . . pp . 306- 307.
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judge’s s a la r ie s  under permanent and stand ing  law s. For to  e s ta b l is h  
the  s a la r ie s  o f  th e  judges as permanent would be to  ignore  th e  p o s s i­
b i l i t y  o f  change in  th e  co u n try ’s economic co n d itio n . Furtherm ore, he 
considered  i t  l i k e l y  th a t  the judges and th e i r  f r ie n d s  would consp ire  
to  in c re a se  th e  s a la r ie s  o f the  judges, as the  C o n s titu tio n  provided 
th a t  t h e i r  s a la r ie s  could be ra is e d  bu t no t lowered except by consent 
of a l l  th e  branches o f  th e  le g is la tu r e .^ ^
A r t ic le  I I I ,  s e c tio n  2, o f th e  fe d e ra l C o n stitu tio n  provid ing  
th a t  " th e  ju d ic ia l  power s h a l l  extend to  a l l  cases in  law and equ ity  
a r is in g  under th e  c o n s t i tu t io n ,  the  laws o f  the  U nited S ta te s , . . . "  
confused Lee. He asked:
What i s  h e re  meant by equ ity?  id iat i s  eq u ity  in  a case a r is in g  
under th e  c o n s titu t io n ?  p o ss ib ly  th e  c lause  might have the  same 
meaning, were the  words " in  law and equity" om itted . Cases in  
law must d i f f e r  w idely  from cases in  law and eq u ity . At f i r s t  
view , by th u s jo in in g  th e  word e q u ity  w ith th e  word law, i f  we 
mean any th ing , we seem to  mean to  give th e  judge a d isc re tio n a ry  
power. . . . Perhaps th e  c lause  would have the  same meaning 
were th e  words " th is  c o n s titu tio n "  om itted; th e re  i s  in  i t  e i th e r  
a  c a re le s s  complex m isuse o f words, in  them selves o f  ex tensive 
s ig n i f ic a t io n ,  o r  th e re  i s  some meaning no t e a s i ly  to  be compre­
hended, Suppose a  case a r is in g  under th is  c o n s titu t io n —suppose 
th e  q u estio n  ju d ic ia l ly  moved, w hether, by th e  c o n s titu t io n , 
congress can suppress a  s t a te  ta x  l a id  on p o l l s ,  lands , o r as an 
excise  d u ty , which may be supposed to  in te r f e r e  w ith  a fe d e ra l 
ta x . By th e  l e t t e r  o f  th e  c o n s t i tu t io n , congress w il l  appear 
to  have no power to  do i t ;  but then  the  judges may decide the  
question  on p r in c ip le s  o f  eq u ity  as w ell as law . Now, om itting  
th e  words " in  law and e q u ity ,"  they  may decide according to  the 
s p i r i t  and tru e  meaning o f th e  c o n s t i tu t io n , as c o lle c te d  from 
what must have been the  in te n tio n s  o f the people when they made 
i t .7 3
R eflec tin g  on t h i s  p ro v is io n  in  an e a r l i e r  L e t te r ,  Lee contended, " I t  
i s  a  very  dangerous th in g  to  v e s t  in  th e  same judge power to  decide on
^^Lee, 22 . c i t . .  pp . 135-136. 
73 lb ld . .  p . l l i l .
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th e  law , and a lso  g en e ra l powers in  eq u ity ; f o r  i f  th e  law r e s t r a in  him, 
he i s  on ly  to  s te p  in to  h is  shoes o f  e q u ity , and g ive  what judgment h is  
reason  o r  op in ion  may d ic t a t e .  R irtherm ore, Lee continued, th is  
p ro v is io n  ignores th e  p r in c ip le  o f th e  se p a ra tio n  o f powers o f  law and 
e q u ity  e s ta b lis h e d  in  the  B r i t i s h  ju d ic ia l  system . The importance o f 
th i s  p receden t cannot be too s tro n g ly  s tre s s e d , fo r  the  ^ e r i c a n s ,  
being o f p r in c ip a l ly  Ehglish h e r i ta g e , considered th e  English system of 
government th e  f i n e s t  in  the  w orld^ barring^ o f course, i^ ere  own gov- 
em m ental o rg a n iz a tio n . A reading  o f  the  debates in  th e  se v e ra l s ta te  
conventions w i l l  dem onstrate th e  a f fe c t io n  the  Americans had f o r ,  and 
th e  re sp e c t o f  th e  B r i t i s h  p o l i t i c a l  and goveimmental system.
Lee doubted w hether th e  C o n stitu tio n  e s ta b lish e d  in  unequivocal 
term s, ju ry  t r i a l  in  c i v i l  c a se s . Jury  t r i a l  in  common law cases, Lee 
contended, was w ell e s ta b lis h e d , and was in  f a c t  the fundamental law o f 
the  U nited S ta te s .  The ju r ie s  were empowered to  give a  genera l v e rd ic t  
and to  decide as to  law and to  f a c t ,  in  common law procedures. T r ia l  
by ju ry  was, p o l i t i c a l l y  considered , th e  most important  fe a tu re  in  the  
ju d ic ia l  departm ent o f  a f r e e  coun try , and ought to  be given up only in
tdie very  l a s t  r e s o r t .  Where, in  c iv i l  law p ro cesses , the  ju ry  t r i a l  
was unknown, th e  consequence was th a t  a  few judges and dependent o f f i ­
cers possessed  a l l  th e  power in  th e  ju d ic ia l  departm ent. Furtherm ore, 
by the  common law o f  England and th e  U nited S ta te s ,  th e re  was no appeal 
from the v e rd ic t  o f th e  ju ry  as to  th e  f a c t s .  The C o n stitu tio n , how­
ever, Lee contended, proposed to  e s ta b l is h  th e  very  opposite  p r in c ip le
^^Ford, E ssays, p .  308.
"^^E llio t, D ebates. I l l ,  262 f f  j a lso  Debates I I ,  228,
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o f t h i s ;  an appeal w i l l  l i e  in  a l l  a p p e lla te  cases from the  v e rd ic t  o f 
th e  ju ry , even as to  f a c t s ,  to  th e  ju s t ic e s  o f th e  Supreme C ourt. The 
e f f e c t  would be to  e s ta b l is h  c iv i l  law procedures by th is  p ro v is io n , 
f o r  i f  th e  ju r is d ic t io n  o f th e  ju ry  i s  n o t f i n a l ,  as to  f a c t  e sp e c ia lly , 
t h a t  body i s  o f  l i t t l e  o r  no im portance.
George Mason had much d i f f e r e n t  c r i t ic is m s  to  make o f the fe d e ra l  
ju d iciairy . I t  was, he complained to  George Washington, so constructed  
and extended as to  absorb and d estro y  th e  ju d ic ia r ie s  o f the  sev era l 
sta te rs . I t  would, as a consequence, render th e  laws as ted io u s , i n t r i ­
c a te ,  expensive, and as u n a tta in a b le  as i t  was fo r  a g re a t p a r t  o f the  
popu la tion  o f  Ehgland.^^ The in f e r io r  c o u rts  o f the  fe d e ra l government 
were, he complained to  th e  d e le g a tes  a t  the  convention, as numerous as 
Congress m ight th in k  p ro p e r . There i s  no l im ita t io n  whatsoever w ith 
re sp e c t to  th e  n a tu re  o r  ju r is d ic t io n  o f those  c o u rts  contained in  
A rtic le  I I I ,  se c tio n  2, Mason charged during th e  debates. R ather, i t  
was th e re  d ec la red  th a t  " the  ju d ic ia l  power s h a l l  extend to  a l l  cases 
in  law and eq u ity  a r is in g  under t h i s  C o n s titu tio n ."  What o b je c ts , he 
asked, w i l l  th i s  p ro v is io n  no t extend to?  They w il l  judge how f a r  
th e i r  laws may o p e ra te , they  w i l l  modify t h e i r  own c o u rts , and th e re  
w i l l  be no s ta te  law th a t  can co u n te rac t them. Thus, th e  d isc rim in a­
t i on between th e  ju d i c i a l  power o f .i t ie  fe d e m l court_3y5t@m_ahd ,t^ a t  of
78
th e ^ s ta tes ' cou r t  system s e x is tM . in  p n ly . Continuing on th is
theme, Mason sa id :
^ ^ e e ,  o£. c i t . ,  pp . 137-lLl« 
77pord, Pam phlets, p . 330. 
^ ^ E ll io t ,  D ebates. I l l ,  521-522.
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To what d is g ra c e fu l  and dangerous len g th s  does th e  p r in c ip le  o f 
t h i s  goi For i f  your s t a te  ju d ic ia r ie s  a re  no t to  be tru s te d  
w ith  th e  a d m in is tra tio n  o f  common ju s t i c e ,  and d ec is io n  o f d is ­
p u te s  re sp ec tin g  p ro p e rty  between man and man, much le s s  ought 
th e  s t a te  governments to  be t ru s te d  w ith th e  power o f  l e g is la t io n .  
The p r in c ip le  i t s e l f  goes to  the  d e s tru c tio n  o f th e  le g is la t io n  
o f the  s t a t e s ,  whether o r  no t i t  was i n t e n d e d , 79
Concluding th i s  m a tte r . Mason made a candid and ra lh e r  in d ic a tiv e  s t a t e ­
ments "As to  my own op in ion , I  most r e l ig io u s ly  and co nsc ien tiously  
b e liev e  th a t  i t  was in tended , though I  am no t a b so lu te ly  certain."® ®  
George Mason was, from a l l  in d ic a tio n s , a w ell educated, and 
w idely read  man, e s p e c ia l ly  on m a tte rs  o f p o l i t i c a l  Iheory . From the 
s t a r t  o f  the  F edera l Convention, he n o ticed  the  w idely p rev a len t d e s ire  
among those  supporting  th e  need fo r  a strong  c e n tra l  government fo r  a 
red u c tio n  in  th e  im portance and p o l i t i c a l  p o s it io n  w ith in  th e  framework 
o f th e  c e n tr a l  government, w hatever i t  was to  be, o f  the  se v e ra l s t a te s .  
In  a  l e t t e r  to  h is  son, George Mason, J r . ,  he sa id :
The most p re v a le n t id ea  in  th e  p r in c ip a l  S ta te s  [p resen t in  
P h ilad e lp h ia  a t  th a t  tim e, May 20, 178?] seems to  be to ta l  
a l t e r a t io n  o f  th e  p re s e n t  fe d e ra l system , and s u b s ti tu t in g  
a g re a t n a tio n a l  co u n cil o r  parliam en t , . . w ith  f u l l  l e g i s ­
l a t iv e  powers upon a l l  the  su b je c ts  o f the Union, and an 
ex ecu tiv e , and to  make the  se v e ra l S ta te  le g is la tu r e s  subor­
d in a te  to  the  n a tio n a l  . . .  I t  is  easy to  fo resee  th a t  th e re  
w i l l  be much d i f f i c u l t y  in  o rgan iz ing  a government upon th is  
g re a t s c a le ,  and a t  th e  same time reserv in g  to  the  S ta te  
le g is la tu r e s  a s u f f i c i e n t  p o r tio n  o f  power fo r  promoting and 
securing  th e  p ro s p e r ity  and happiness o f t h e i r  resp ec tiv e  
c i t i z e n s .81
The reasoning behind M ason's f e a r  o f the  e f fe c ts  of th e  proposed fe d e ra l 
government was, o f course , th a t  the  s t a te  governments, being c lo s e r  to 
the  peop le , were th e re fo re  more s e n s i t iv e  to  the  p e o p le 's  needs ^ d
7 9 lb id . . p . $ 2 2 . ®®Ibid.
®^Kate Mason Rowland, T j^  L ife  and Correspondence of George 
Mason (New York, 196U), p . 101.
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and could  be more c lo se ly  watched than could the fe d e ra l 
government lo c a te d  in  some d i s ta n t  c i ty .
L a te r ,  Mason observed th a t  the  a p p e lla te  ju r is d ic t io n  o f  th e  
Supreme Court would embrace every o b je c t o f m aritim e, chancery, and 
common law co n tro v ersy . Mason d id  no t question  th e  ju r is d ic t io n  over 
th e  f i r s t  two f i e l d s ,  bu t why n o t, he asked, d isc rim in a te  as to  mat­
te r s  o f  f a c t  w ith  re sp e c t to  common-law co n tro v ersies?  James Madison, 
he s a id , p rev io u s ly  agreed th a t  i t  was dangerous, but expressed hope 
th a t  reg u la tio n s  would be made to  s u i t  the  convenience o f the people.
But he was no t s a t i s f i e d  w ith  the p ro sp ec t o f mere hope, fo r  hope was
82not s u f f i c i e n t  s e c u r i ty .
Nor d id  Mason co n sid er th e  p ro v is io n s o f  the C o n stitu tio n  regard­
ing common-law t r i a l s  and t r i a l s  in  co u rts  o f equ ity  and adm iralty  su f­
f i c i e n t ly  explanatory.® ^ In  appeals on the  l a t t e r  two, the depositions 
a re  committed to  re c o rd , and th e re fo re  on appeal the whole f a c ts  go to  
the  a p p e lla te  c o u r t .  The eq u ity  o f the  whole case i s  considered , and 
no new evidence i s  r e q u is i t e .  But in  common-law c ases , evidence i s  
given v iv a  voce, and upon appeal new w itnesses may be in troduced . This 
in  i t s e l f  would c e r ta in ly  be an inconvenience. Moreover, c e r ta in  Fed­
e r a l i s t s  had s a id  t h a t  th e re  would be no occasion to  c a rry  up the 
evidence by v iv a  voce testim ony , because Congress may order i t  committed 
to  w ritin g  and tra n sm itte d  in  th a t  manner. Yet on the  o th e r  hand, i t  
must be as eq u a lly  tru e  th a t  Congress m ight no t so a c t .  Furtherm ore, 
Congress m ight e s ta b l is h  i t s  own reg u la tio n s  as to  how appeals in
8 2 E llio t,  D ebates, I I I ,  52^. 
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m atte rs  o f  revenue and excise  co n tro v e rs ie s  be brought to  su p erio r 
c o u r ts , and th e re  would be no th ing  to  say what t h e i r  reg u la tio n s  might 
b . .%
Like Lee, Mason questioned  whether s t a te  cou rts  could no t be 
t ru s te d  to  handle cases between c i t iz e n s  o f d i f f e r e n t  s ta te s .  And, 
again  l ik e  Lee, he questioned  th e  wisdom o f humbling the s ta te  govern­
ments by b ring ing  them as p a r t ie s  in  cases concerning c i t iz e n s  o f 
d i f f e r e n t  s ta te s  befo re  fe d e ra l  c o u r ts .  The l a t t e r  power was e n t i r e ly  
unnecessary , he argued, and, moreover, what was to  be done i f  a judg­
ment were ob ta ined  a g a in s t a s ta te  government?®^
George M a s o n , P a t r i c k  H e n r y , a n d  James M o n r o e , a l l  con- 
tended th a t  t he c p e x is te n t ju r is d ic t io n  between the fe d e ra l and s ta te  
cou rts  would u l t im a te ly  lead  to  c o n f l ic t  between th e  two court systeifis. 
The r e s u l t  o f  such a c o n f l ic t  wou ld  be, they contended, the f in a l  des- 
tru c t io n  o f one system  or the  o th e r , though as Mason in s is te d ,  the 
l ik e lih o o d  was th a t  Congress would come to  the a id  o f the  former 
a g a in s t the la t te r .® ^  Moreover, and f a r  worse to  co n sid er, such a 
s i tu a t io n  would tend  to  oppress and g re a tly  inconvenience the people . 
On th is  l a t t e r  p o in t ,  ag a in , a l l  th re e  men were in  agreement.
W illiam G rayson 's g re a t  o b je c tio n  to  the fe d e ra l  ju d ic ia ry  was 
th a t  i t  would in te r f e r e  w ith th e  s t a te  ju d ic i a r i e s . There was no t 
superin tend ing  power to  m ain ta in  o rd e r between th e  two contending 
ju r is d ic t io n s ,  so th a t  rec u rren c e , he fe a re d , could only be had to  the
8* iE llio t, D ebates, I I I ,  $2$-S26.
® Îb id . .  pp. 526-527. Q̂ jb id . ,  p . 581.
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sword. Those s t a te  c o u rts  were, Grayson argued, the  b est check the  
people o f  th e  s ta te s  and th e  s t a te  governments them selves had. They 
secured  th e  l a t t e r  a g a in s t  encroachments on t h e i r  p r iv i le g e s ; they were, 
in  s h o r t ,  th e  p r in c ip a l  defense o f  the s t a t e s .  How improper i t  would 
be to  dep rive  the  s t a te s  o f t h e i r  only source o f p o l i t i c a l  defense.^®
With Mason, Grayson considered  the powers of the  Supreme Court 
over chancery, a d m ira lty , common p le a s , exchequer, and c rim ina l j u r i s ­
d ic t io n  cases too  ex tensive  f o r  a  s in g le  body. The ex ten t of i t s  
ju r i s d ic t io n  was n o t expressed in  a d e f in i te  manner. I t  was so vaguely 
and in d e f in i te ly  expressed th a t  th e  la t i tu d e s  o f power could not be 
a sc e r ta in e d . Grayson o b jec ted  a lso  to  th e  lack  o f re c ip ro c ity  in  cases 
between s ta te s  and fo re ig n  governments. In  h is  unique argument he con­
tended th a t  though a s ta te  government might be sued by a fo re ig n  gov­
ernment w ithou t i t s  consen t, th e  rev e rse  would no t be p o ss ib le . The 
e f f e c t ,  he im p lied , would be to  give g re a te r  fav o ritism  to  fo re ig n  
governments th an  to  th e  s ta te  governments, and to  him the idea was 
m onstrous.
John M arshall, Grayson argued, sa id  th a t  t r i a l  by ju ry  i s  p re ­
served in  th e  C o n s titu tio n  by im p lica tio n . The ju r is d ic t io n  o f the 
Supreme C ourt, and by im p lica tio n  the in fe r io r  fe d e ra l c o u rts , i s  to  be 
reg u la ted  by Congress, which i t  was sa id  would be ample s e c u r ity . I t  
i s  t ru e ,  argued Grayson, th a t  Congress may indeed make these  re g u la tio n s , 
but on th e  o th e r  hand, i t  i s  j u s t  as tru e  th a t  they might n o t. This 
ap p lied  a lso  to  the  t r i a l  by ju ry , which is  given up to  the d isc re tio n  
o f Congress. I t  w i l l  no t be a v io la t io n  o f  the C onstitu tion  should
9^ Ib id . . p . 563. ^^I b id . . pp. $66-^67 .
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th a t  body decide to  tak e  the  r ig h t  away, fo r  i t  i s  the re g u la tin g  body. 
I t  was p o s s ib le  f o r  Congress to  re g u la te  i t  p ro p e rly , but i t  i s  none­
th e le s s  a t  t h e i r  mere d is c re t io n  to  do so o r n o t,^ ^
The C o n s titu tio n  proposed th e  estab lishm en t, contended Lee, o f 
a new sp ec ie s  o f E xecutive, a  sm all Senate, and a very  sm all House o f 
R ep re se n ta tiv e s . The s e a t  o f th a t  government would be up to  sev e ra l 
hundred m iles from a g re a t many of i t s  s u b je c ts , r e q u ir i i^  a g re a t many 
o f f ic e r s  i f  i t  i s  to  opera te  upon th e se . Though i t  provided fo r  the  
concurren t ju r is d ic t io n  and coextensive o p e ra tio n  o f the  s ta te  govern­
m ents, y e t  th e  g en era l government would possess a l l  the e s s e n t ia l  powers ;
93the  s t a te s  would be mere shadows. Lee was n o t, in  s h o r t ,  p leased  a t  
th e  ex ten siv e  n a tu re  o f  the powers o f the  general government, and sev­
e ra l  o f  h i s  L e tte r s  he devoted ex c lu siv e ly  to  an examination of those 
powers.
Lee was p a r t i c u la r ly  u p se t over the  p ro spec t o f empowering the 
fe d e ra l  government to  la y  and c o l le c t  in te rn a l  and ex te rn a l tax e s , to  
form the m i l i t i a ,  to  make bankruptcy law s, and to  decide on appeal 
questions a r is in g  on th e  in te rn a l  laws o f the  sev era l s t a te s .  These, 
he s a id , in  e f f e c t  comprehend a l l  the  e s s e n t ia l  powers in  the country , 
and those l e f t  to  th e  s ta te s  would be o f  l i t t l e  r e a l  im portance.
He conceded th a t  many of the  e s s e n t ia l  powers given the n a tio n a l 
government were no t ex c lu siv e , and reasoned th a t  the general government 
might have s u f f ic ie n t  prudence to  fo reb e a r th e  ex erc ise  o f those powers 
which m ight a lso  be ex erc ised  by th e  s t a te s .  But a t  the  same tim e.
9 2 lb id ..  p . 568.
93pord, Essays, p . 292.
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th e se  powers were open fo r  Imprudent men in  the  n a tio n a l government to  
e x e rc ise  i f  they  would. And i f  so e x e rc ised , they must adversely  a f f e c t  
th e  in te rn a l  a f f a i r s  o f th e  s t a t e . I n  view o f p rospects  o f th is  
n a tu re , h is  f e a r s  a re  th e re fo re  q u ite  understandab le .
The power to  la y  and c o l le c t  ta x e s , he argued, was in  i t s e l f  o f 
g re a t im portance:
By means o f  ta x e s , th e  government may command the  whole o r  any 
p a r t  o f  th e  s u b je c t 's  p ro p e rty . Taxes may be o f va rious k indsj 
bu t th e re  i s  a s tro n g  d is t in c t io n  between ex te rn a l and in te rn a l  
ta x e s .  E x ternal taxes a re  import d u t ie s ,  which a re  la id  on 
im ported goods ; . . . though u ltim a te ly  p a id  by the  consumer j 
a  few o f f ic e r s  can c o l le c t  them, and they  can be c a rr ie d  no 
h ig h er than  th e  tra d e  w i l l  bear . . , th a t  in  th e  very  na tu re  
o f  commerce, bounds a re  s e t  to  them. But in te rn a l  tax e s , as 
p o l l  and land  ta x e s , e x c ise s , d u tie s  on a l l  w r it te n  instrum ents,
&c. may f i x  them selves on every person and species o f p roperty  
in  th e  community J they  may be c a r r ie d  to  any le n g th s , and in  
p ro p o rtio n  as they  a re  extended, numerous o f f ic e rs  must be em­
ployed to  a s se s s  them, and to  enforce the c o lle c tio n  o f them.
• . . In te rn a l  ta x a tio n  in  th is  country  i s  more im portant, as 
th e  country  i s  so very  ex tensive  . . .  to  lay  and c o lle c t  taxes 
in  t h i s  ex ten siv e  coun try , must req u ire  a g re a t number o f con­
g re s s io n a l o rd in an ces , imm ediately opera ting  upon the  body o f 
th e  people; th e se  must c o n tin u a lly  in te r f e r e  w ith  the  s ta te  law s, 
thereby  produce d iso rd e r  and general d is s a t is f a c t io n ,  t i l l  the  
one system o f laws o r th e  o th e r , o p e ra tin g  on the same su b je c ts , 
s h a l l  be a b o lish e d .95
As the s ta te  governments have concurren t powers w ith th e  general govern­
ment, and given th e  same o b je c ts  to  be tax ed , iJie o b jec tio n  th a t  th e  
general government m ight suspend a s ta te  ta x  as a necessary  measure fo r  
the c o lle c t io n  o f th e  f e d e ra l  ta x  was no t w ithout foundation , Lee con­
tin u e d . Was i t ,  he asked, "w ise, p ruden t, o r  s a fe , to  v e s t  the  powers 
of lay in g  and c o l le c t in g  in te rn a l  taxes in  the general government, w hile 
im perfïic tly  o rgan ized  and inadequate; and to  t r u s t  to  amending the  Con­
s t i t u t i o n  a f t e r  r a t i f i c a t i o n ,  and making i t  adequate to  th is  p u rp o se ."9^
9U ibld . . pp . 292-293, 95i b id . ,  pp. 301- 302. ^^ Ib id . ,  p . 30U.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
I l l
This power to  la y  and c o l le c t  taxes was fu r th e r  o b jec tio n a b le ,
in  L e e 's  e s tim a tio n , because o f  o th e r  a sso c ia te d  general powers.
By th e  c o n s t i tu t io n  i t  i s  proposed th a t  the  congress s h a l l  have 
th e  power " to  r a is e  and support arm ies, but no ap p ro p ria tio n  o f 
money to  t h a t  use  s h a l l  be fo r  a lo nger term than  two years; 
to  prov ide and m ain ta in  a navy, to  provide f o r  c a l l in g  fo r th  
th e  m i l i t i a  to  execute th e  laws o f the  union . . . reserv ing  
to  th e  s t a te s  the  r ig h t  to  appoin t th e  o f f ic e r s ,  and to  t r a in  
th e  m i l i t i a  according to  th e  d is c ip l in e  p re sc rib ed  by congress 
. . . "  When an array s h a l l  be once ra is e d  fo r  a number o f  y e a rs , 
i t  i s  not probable  th a t  we w il l  f in d  much d i f f ic u l ty  in  g e ttin g  
congress to  pass laws fo r  applying monies to  i t s  support. 97
Lee d id  n o t, he made c le a r ,  o b je c t to  the  power o f  ra is in g  and m ain tain ­
ing arm ies. His o b je c tio n  was cen tered  on the f a c t  th a t  such power 
would be given to  a very  few men w ith  so very  few checks on i t s  exer­
c is e .
The people m ust, he in s is te d ,  have a check upon the  powers to  
la y  and c o l le c t  t ^ e ? ,  9Pd the power to  r a i s e  a m ie s . For laws to  
c a rry  th e se  powers in to  e f f e c t  must be made o f te n , and un less the people 
have a  check upon th ese  powers, e i th e r  through th e  s ta te  le g is la tu re s  
o r by th e  few n a tio n a l  re p re se n ta tiv e s  in  Congress, they may very grad­
u a l ly  bu t inexorab ly  lo se  t h e i r  proper negative  upon these  m atters
98u n t i l  they  a re  l o s t  fo rever.'^
The s t a te  governm ents, by the  C o n stitu tio n , have ac tu a l in fluence  
over the  m i l i t i a  only in  th e  appointm ent o f o f f ic e r s .  Otherwise, the 
s ta te s  must t r a i n  the  m i l i t i a  according to  such forms and by such ru les  
and re so lu tio n s  as p re sc r ib e d  by Congress, which botty has, a ls o , the 
power to  c a l l  o u t the  m i l i t i a s  to  execute the laws o f the fe d e ra l gov­
ernm ent. This l a t t e r  power, Lee complained, was in  e f f e c t  to give few
97 98
Ib id . .  pp . 301- 305.  I b id . .  p . 305.
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men in  th e  coraraonity g re a t advantage over o th e rs , and to  commit the 
many to  th e  mercy o r  prudence o f  th e  very  few .^^
Fears o f  th e  d is c re tio n a ry  powers g ran ted  Congress in  the  mat­
t e r s  o f  in te r n a l  ta x a tio n  and standing  armies and c o n tro l o f th e  m i l i t i a  
were the  most o f te n  expressed fe a rs  during th e  d eb a tes . P a tr ic k  Henry, 
George Mason, and W illiam  Grayson a l l  expressed apprehensions on those 
m a tte rs . Henry, f o r  example, contended th a t  Congress' powers on in te r ­
n a l tax es  and th e  armed fo rc e s  o f the  country were delegated  w ithout 
adequate, and c e r ta in ly  no t s a t is f a c to ry  checks. I t  i s  s a id  by c e r ta in  
F e d e ra l is ts ,  he added, th a t  the  means must be commensurate to  th e  ends. 
This would a p p aren tly  mean th a t  an in f in itu d e  in  the  government must 
req u ire  an in f in i tu d e  o f  means to  c a rry  i t  on. But consider the pro ­
p r ie ty ,  th e  s a fe ty  o f  such a  government. In  such a government, the  
se rv a n ts , th e  governing, become g re a te r  than those fo r  whom they e x is t  
a t  a l l .  That same argum ent, he continued, has been the means by vrtiich 
despotism s have been e s ta b lis h e d  elsew here in  th e  w orld. Furthermore, 
the  c o n tro l o f th e  m i l i t i a  by th e  Congress might very  w ell become the
instrum ent o f o p p ress io n . The s ta te s  re ta in e d  c o n tro l o f t h e i r  m il i -
100
t i a s  only by im p lic a tio n , a most u n s a tis fa c to ry  p ro v is io n .
George Mason lik ew ise  co n tested  Congress' power over the m i l i t i a .  
His o b jec tio n  was th a t  too  much power was given to  Congress, and th a t  
i f  th e  s ta te s  were competent to  use  th e  m i l i t i a  to  suppress in su rrec ­
t io n s ,  Congress ought n o t have a coex tensive power. There was the  f e a r  
in  h is  mind, m oreover, th a t  th e  Congress m ight i n f l i c t  severe punishments
99ib id . .  p . 306.
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on th e  m i l i t i a  as a  necessary  incubus to  the  power o f o rganizing  and 
d is c ip l in in g  them, thereby  inducing th a t  body to  wish i t s  a b o li t io n , 
and which would a ffo rd  a p re te n se  fo r  th e  estab lishm en t o f a standing  
army. An a d d it io n a l  change sometime in  th e  fu tu re  m ight be made in  the  
o rg a n iz a tio n  o f  th e  m i l i t i a ,  be sa id  in  a l a t e r  speech, namely th a t  the  
m i l i t i a  th en  be c o n s t itu te d  only o f the  lower and middle c la sse s  o f  men, 
a l l  c la s s e s  o f men a t  p re s e n t , he s a id , being found in  i t .  I f  th a t  
should happen, given th e  inadequate and more a r i s to c r a t i c  re p re se n ta tio n  
o f th e  Congress, he foresaw  th e  lo s s  o f a l l  fe e lin g  fo r  the  lower c la s ­
ses by th a t  body. I t  m ight, then , d isc rim in a te  in  favo r o f people in
i t s  own c la s s ,  and exempt from duty a l l  th e  o f f ic e rs  and low est c re a -
101tu re s  o f  th e  n a tio n a l  government.
W illiam  Grayson agreed s u b s ta n t ia l ly  w ith these  obsenrations o f 
Hemy and Mason, adding th a t  Congress m ight m ain tain  a w ell aimed m il i ­
t i a  in  one a rea  o f th e  country  w hile n eg lec tin g  th a t  o f  ano ther. More­
over, he commented, th e re  was no assu rance , given th e i r  numerical 
advantage in  th e  Congress, th a t  the no rthern  s ta te s  might not push 
through b i l l s  fo r  th e  estab lishm en t and m ain tain ing  o f a  navy, the
e f f e c t  o f which would be to  f u r th e r  i t s  own economy a t  th e  expense o f
102th a t  o f  the sou thern  s t a t e s .
A r tic le  VI o f  th e  C o n s titu tio n  provided th a t  the C o n stitu tio n ,
the laws o f th e  U nited S ta te s ,  and a l l  t r e a t i e s  made under the a u th o r ity
103
o f the  United S ta te s  were to  be considered  the  supreme law of the land .
^ ^ ^ I b i d . t  p p .  Ü 0 2 , f i l ^ - l t l 6 ,  L 2 S -L 2 6 . 
^ ° ^ I b i d . ,  p p .  I i l 7- l i l 9,  L 2 9 -L 3 0 . 
^^^Madison, c i t . , p . 630.
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A ll judges y s t a t e  and f e d e ra l ,  were bound by th e  C o n stitu tio n  to  support 
t h a t  C o n s titu tio n , those  law s, and those  t r e a t i e s ,  s t a te  laws to  th e  
c o n tra ry  n o tw ith s tan d in g . The e f f e c t  o f  th is  a r t i c l e  would be, Lee 
in s i s te d ,  to  sweep away a l l  those customs, r ig h ts ,  law s, and c o n s titu ­
t io n s  h e re to fo re  e s ta b lis h e d , where th ese  l a t t e r  were incom patible w ith 
th e  C o n s titu tio n , laws o r t r e a t i e s .
Though Lee d id  n o t contend th a t  th e  n a tio n a l laws should be 
su p e r io r  to  s t a te  and d i s t r i c t  law s, he d id  i n s i s t  th a t  those laws 
ought to  y ie ld  to  u n a lie n a b le  o r  fundamental r ig h ts .  These n a tio n a l 
laws shou ld  extend to  only  a  few n a tio n a l concerns. But as the C onsti­
tu t io n  s to o d , th e se  laws would extend to  in te rn a l  and ex te rn a l o b je c ts , 
and to  those  o b je c ts  to  which a l l  o th e rs  a re  subord ina te . I t  i s  impos­
s ib le ,  he s t r e s s e d ,  to  have much conception o f  the  ex ten t o f those 
powers, o r  th e  e x te n t and number o f those laws which should be consid­
ered n ecessa ry  and p roper to  c a rry  these  powers in to  execution . In  
s h o r t ,  w hether Congress w i l l  re sp e c t those p r in c ip le s  o f the  people of
the  U nited S ta te s  by which they  have so long l iv e d  w il l  be merely up
10^to  th e  prudence o f  t h a t  body.
Like so many o f  th e  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  elsewhere in  the country , 
lao k  ̂  o f j ^ t s ^ i c L t ^ ^  "There
a re ,"  he s a id ,  " c e r ta in  r ig h ts  which we have always he ld  sacred  in  the 
United S ta te s , and recognized  in  a l l  our c o n s t itu t io n s , and which, by 
th e  adoption o f  th e  new c o n s t i tu t io n  in  i t s  p resen t form, w il l  be l e f t  
u n s e c u r e d . A m o n g  th e s e , he in s i s te d ,  were th e  t r i a l  by ju ry  in  the
^®^Ford, E ssays, p p . 311-312.
^°^I b id . .  p p . 312-313. ^Q^Ib id . .  p . 310.
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J u d ic ia l  depaz*1aaent and th e  c o lle c t io n  o f th e  people by the  rep re se n ta ­
t iv e s  In  th e  l e g i s l a t iv e  branch. But by th e  C o n stitu tio n  th e re  Is  
no th ing  sa id  in  th ese  m a tte rs , nor Is  th e re  anything to  prevent Con­
g ress  from making a law to  suppress the freedom o f  th e  p ress  by lay in g
107a  ta x  on p r in t in g .  He d id  no t understand  the reasoning between h is
opponents ' p o s i t io n  th a t  a  b i l l  o f  r ig h ts  was unnecessary because a l l
powers n o t g ran ted  to  th e  f e d e ra l  government were reserv ed . R ather,
th e  C o n s titu tio n  I s  f u l l  o f  many undefined  powers. To make d e c la ra to ry
a r t i c l e s  In  a  governmental Instrum ent unnecessary , the  na tu re  o f the
reserv ed  r ig h ts  and th e  e x te n t o f  th e  powers delegated  must be d efin ed .
Omittance o f those  r ig h ts  he ld  d ear by Americans everywhere Im plies
th a t  th ey  were n o t considered  Im portant. And, fu rtherm ore, general
108
powers g ran ted  c a rry  w ith  them In c id e n ta l powers.
Why th e  A n ti-F edera l 1 s t fo rce s  In  the  V irg in ia  convention lo s t  
the  s tru g g le  f o r  no r a t i f i c a t i o n  w ithout amendments, given th e i r  numer­
ic a l  m a jo rity  throughout th e  course o f the  deba tes , must be the  conse­
quence o f the  few undecided d e leg a tes  In  th e  convention. Both sides 
r e a liz e d  th e i r  hopes re s te d  w ith  th ese  few men, and both made long and 
vigorous p lays f o r  t h e i r  su p p o rt. E ven tually , however, Gtoveraqr Edmund 
Randolph's d e c is io n  to  Jo in  th e  p ro -C o n stitu tio n  fo rce s  In  the conven-. _ F— ----   - —----- •
t lo n ,  and.jbhfl„^ews o f South C a ro lin a 's  r a t i f i c a t io n  made_Jsim d iffe re p c e , 
and gave a  p sy ch o lo g ica l u rge to  Jo in  the  tren d  o f support o f the  Con­
s t i t u t i o n . T h e  r a t i f i c a t i o n  o f  th e  C o n stitu tio n  by V irg in ia  on June
^Q '^Ibld.. p . 311.
*1 AA
Lee, o£, c i t . ,  pp . Iii2-1$3. 
^^^Rutland, o£. c H . ,  pp . 231-232.
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25, 1788, fo llow ed by th e  r a t i f i c a t i o n  by New York the fo llow ing day 
doomed A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts ' hopes o f  amending the  C o n stitu tio n  o r submit­
t in g  i t  to  a second convention . With th ese  two s ta te s  in  support of 
th e  C o n s titu tio n , the  Union was fo m ed j only Rhode Is lan d  and North 
C arolina^^^ and the  l a t t e r  was soon to  jo in  i t s  s i s t e r
s t a t e s .
The A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  fo rc e s  o f North C arolina had no co n test in  
t h e i r  debates w ith  th e  F e d e ra l is ts .  D espite th e  e f fo r ts  o f James I r e ­
d e l l  and W illiam  R. P ev ie , two v e iy  capable o ra to rs  and d eb a te rs , and 
t h e i r  F e d e ra l is t  c o llea g u es , th e  'A ntis* o f  th e  convention, under the  
le a d e rsh ip  o f  W illie  Jones, had no problem in  securing  a  vote o f no 
r a t i f i c a t i o n  w ithou t p r io r  amendments. So com pletely d id  the 'A n tis ' 
c o n tro l th e  convention th ey d id  no t f e e l  i t  necessa iv  to  go to  any 
g re a t le n g th s  to  a ttem p t to  convince any o f the de legates of the  value 
o f th e i r  p o s i t io n :  indeed , beyond th e  r e p e t i t io n  of fe a rs  of the fu tu re  
o f th e  American r ig h t  o f  n a v ig a tio n  on the  M iss iss ip p i R iver should
th e  r ig h t  o f concluding fo re ig n  t r e a t i e s  be given to  th e  Senate and
112the  P re s id e n t a lo n e , th e  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  arguments from North Caro­
l in a  a re  o f  no p a r t i c u l a r  i n t e r e s t .
llO fhe  North C aro lina  r a t i f y in g  convention was c a lle d  Ju ly  21, 
1788. The A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  o f th e  s t a te  were in  complete c o n tro l o f 
■Ü1C convention, having 193 d e leg a tes  to  th e  F e d e ra l is ts ' 75 d e le g a te s . 
A fte r  l is te n in g  to  t h e i r  opponents' speeches f o r  two weeks, th e  North 
C arolina * A ntis ' c a l le d  f o r  and secured  a vo te  o f no r a t i f i c a t i o n ,  by 
the  same m argin as th a t  o f  th e i r  number o f  d e le g a te s , th a t  i s ,  193 
v o ted  a g a in s t r a t i f i c a t i o n  to  75 vo tes  fo r  r a t i f i c a t i o n .
^l^N orth  C aro lina  r a t i f i e d  th e  C o n stitu tio n  l a t e  in  1789.
l l ^ E i i i o t ,  D ebates, 17, 168.
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CONCLUSION
This th e s is  has been concerned w ith  an exam ination and the 
docum entation o f  th e  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts ' f e a rs  o f the  strong  c e n tra l  
government proposed by the fe d e ra l  C o n stitu tio n  o f  the  United S ta te s .  
From a read ing  o f the debates on the  C o n stitu tio n  in  the  sev era l 
s t a t e s '  r a t i f y in g  conven tions, o r o f th e  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts ' arguments 
expressed  in  newspapers and b roadsides, i t  i s  q u ite  easy to  c a l l  the  
A n ti-F e d e ra lis t  p o s i t io n  co n triv ed  and i t s  arguments u n r e a l i s t i c .  To 
do so , however, i s  to  m iss a g re a t d ea l o f th e  s ig n if ic an c e  of th e  
A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  in  th e  development o f  American c o n s titu tio n a l  and 
p o l i t i c a l  tiieory^j to  ignore th e  f a c t  th a t  th e  A nti-Fe d e ra l is ts  and 
the  F e d e ra l is ts  were f a r  c lo s e r  to  each o th e r  than they were a p a r t .
F in a lly , to  c a l l  t h e i r  arguments and p o s it io n  u n r e a l is t ic  is  to  m is­
rep re se n t an im portan t c h a r a c te r is t ic  o f  American p o l i t i c a l  th in k e rs  
in  th e  e a r ly  N ationa l P e rio d ,
The Anti-F e d e ra l  i s  t s , l ik e  v i r tu a l ly  a l l  Americans o f th e i r
age, were g re a t  con s t i tu t i o n a l i s t s .  A reading  o f th e  M assachusetts
2
C o n s titu tio n  o f  1780, f o r  example, p re sen ts  an e x c e lle n t in d ic a tio n  
o f  th e  g re a t le n g th s  to  which American p o l i t i c a l  th in k e rs  went in  t h e i r  
c o n s tru c tio n  o f  c o n s t i tu t io n s .  The Americans ty p ic a l ly  wanted a l l  
d e lega ted  powers in  w r i t te n  form, and s ta te d  in  such a way as to  leave
^C ecelia  M. Kenyon, The A n ti f e d e ra l is ts  (New York, 1966), p .
Ix x v i,
^Robert J .  T ay lo r, M assachusetts, Colony to  Commonwealth g Docu- 
ments on th e  Formation o f  i t s  C o n s titu tio n , 177S-17Ü0 (Chapel H i l l ,imr...................... . .....  . .....
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very  l i t t l e  to  Idie d is c re t io n  o r in te rp re ta t io n  o f t h e i r  re p re se n ta tiv e s . 
M oreover, the  ’A n tis ' c h a r a c te r i s t ic a l ly  had l i t t l e  f a i t h  in  a  re p u b li-
w » ■ iw r r — r — — — — ......    "■ ' ' —— -  — ..... ......... — — — —r ,  ,  , ,
can government th a t  could no t be c lo se ly  watched by th e  c o n s titu e n ts , 
and which was n o t so arranged as to  m ain tain  a se p a ra tio n  o f powers and 
branches o f  the  government* I h e i r  c r i t ic ism s  and th ei r  fe a rs  o f  th e  
C o n s titu tio n  r e s u l te d * in  p a r t  a t  l e a s t ,  p re c is e ly  from the ' e l a s t i c i t y ' 
o f  th e  C o n s titu tio n . The C o n stitu tio n , as Horton Borden p o in ts  o u t,^  
in s t i tu t io n a l iz e d  th e  fundam ental u n c e r ta in tie s  and am biguities in h eren t— - - . . --------- —  " « '  iTi.w
in  th e  American form o f democracy. I t s  so lu tio n s  were no t to  have any 
so lu tio n s  except a  b a s ic  agreement to  l iv e  by repub lican  p r in c ip le s  o f 
government and a s so c ia te d  m echanics, and to  so lve problems in  a s p i r i t  
o f m oderation and compromise* In  s h o r t ,  th e  C o n stitu tio n  d id  no t a t -  
tsm pt to  s e t t l e  perm anently th e  ex te rn a l issu es  o f government, but 
in s te a d  p rovided  th e  b a s is  whereby each genera tion  of Americans might 
apply i t s  own d e f in i t io n s  and in te rp re ta t io n s  to  the problem s.
I t  must no t be thought th a t  th e  p ic tu re  o f the C o n stitu tio n  
developed in  th e  above paragraph i s  an a ttem pt to  apologize fo r  th e  
A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts .  Nothing could  be fu r th e r  from th e  t r u th .  The A nti- 
F e d e ra l is ts  do n o t need, and c e r ta in ly  do no t deserve any attem pt a t  
apology* R ather, what i s  needed i s  an understanding o f the  A n ti- 
F e d e ra l is t  m e n ta li ty , t h e i r  conception  o f  man as a human being and as 
a p o l i t i c a l  be ing , and th e  consequent d e sc r ip tio n  o f th e i r  framework 
o f government.
B asic to  th e  understand ing  o f  th e  A n ti-F e d e ra lis t mind i s  tJ ie ir  
conception  o f th e  n a tu re  o f  man as a  human being and p o l i t i c a l  organism.
% k rto n  Borden, The A n t i f e d e r a l is t  Papers (Ann Arbor, 1961), 
p . x i i i .
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In  th is  reg a rd , th e  'A n tis ’ c lo se ly  resembled the F e d e ra l is ts .  Both 
saw any p o l i t i c a l  th eo ry  as n e c e ssa r ily  based on c e r ta in  p resupposi­
t io n s  o f  human n a tu re , m an's c h a ra c te r , and h is  behavior. Much of 
th i s  in s ig h t  was to  be gained from th e  study  o f  human h is to ry , and men 
o f both s id e s  made freq u e n t re fe ren ces  to  the  development o f man's 
governm ental and p o l i t i c a l  in s t i t u t io n s ,  e sp e c ia lly  American h is to ry  
in  th i s  re g a rd . N e ith e r th e  F e d e ra lis ts  nor the A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  were 
deceived in to  th in k in g  th a t  Americans were o th e r  than  human beings w ith 
a l l  th e  d e fe c ts  and c h a r a c te r is t ic s  o f human beings. Alexander Hamilton, 
f o r  example, in  F e d e ra l is t  Number 6 sa id , "Has i t  not . . . been found 
th a t  momentary p a ss io n s , and immediate in te r e s ts  have a more a c tiv e  and 
im perious c o n tro l over human conduct than  general o r remote considera­
tio n s  o f  p o lic y , u t i l i t y ,  o r  ju s t ic e ? " ^  In  F e d e ra lis t  Number 37. James 
Madison examined human n a tu re  and saw th a t  " . . .  the  h is to ry  of alm ost 
a l l  g re a t  councils  o f  mankind he ld  among mankind fo r  re c o n c illin g  th e i r  
d isc o rd an t op in ions . . .  i s  a h is to ry  o f  fa c tio n s , con ten tions, and 
disappointm ents . . . c la ssed  among the most dark and degraded p ic tu re s  
which d isp la y  the  in f i rm i t ie s  and d e p ra v itie s  o f the  human ch a rac te r ."  
In te re s t in g ,  to o , i s  th a t  f a c t  th a t  throughout the  ra th e r  depressing 
p ic tu re  o f human h is to ry  and n a tu re , th e  authors o f The F e d e ra lis t  
never attem pted  to  f l a t t e r  th e i r  read ers  by p ic tu rin g  them as d if fe re n t  
from o th e r  men. For example, th e  remark made in  F e d e ra lis t  Number ^  
th a t  " . . .  th e  v ig i l a n t  and manly s p i r i t  which nourishes freedom, and 
in  re tu rn  i s  nourished  by i t "  comes Immediately a f te r  th e  statem ent
^Alexander Ham ilton, James Madison, John Jay , The F ed e ra lis j^  
C lin to n  R o ss ite r  ( e d .) (New York, 1961), p . S7.
^ I b id . ,  p . 231.
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th a t  , th e  c ap rice s  and wickedness o f mankind" a re  " . . .  f a i l in g s
from Tdiich Americans a re  n o t expected to  be exempt."^ In  sh o r t , the  
F e d e ra l is ts ,  l ik e  th e  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts , had no ex p ec ta tio n  th a t Ameri­
cans were o th e r  th an  human be ings, and th a t  government must be designed 
around and must tak e  in to  co n sid e ra tio n  th e  f a c t  th a t  man i s  in h e re n tly  
c o rru p tib le  and s e l f - in te r e s te d .  The d i f f erence^ th en , between t he men 
o f  the  two p o s itio n s  i s  the  willin g n e s s  and th e  degree to  \riiich the  men 
c o n tro llin g  th e  government were to  be tru s te d  to  use th e i r  d is c re tio n
in  e x e rc is in g  th e  powers o f th a t  government, and in  ab id ing  by the de-
 ̂ ip m , nil I ' '-------- -------------------------------------------- --------------- — ..............  -nf^  -II m ip im  ................. **
gree o f  t r u s t  p laced  in  them by th e  people o f the  country . As Madison 
sa id  in  F e d e ra l is t  Number S l , ^ " .  . . I n  framing a  government which i s  
to  be adm in istered  by men over men, th e  g re a t d i f f ic u l ty  l i e s  in  th is :  
you must f i r s t  enable th e  government to  c o n tro l the  government; and in  
the  nex t p lac e  o b lig e  i t  to  c o n tro l i t s e l f . "  The A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  
agreed in  both p r in c ip le  and substance w ith Madison on th is  p o in t. The 
issu e  o f  r a t i f i c a t i o n  a ro se  because th e  'A n tis ' believed  the fram ers o f 
the C o n s titu tio n , and th e re fo re  a lso  the  F e d e ra l is ts ,  were too lax  in  
the  checks and b a lan ces, and th e  degree o f se p a ra tio n  o f  powers they 
proposed in  th e  C o n s titu tio n .
Because th e  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  were p resen ted  w ith a f in ish e d  
document w ith th e  demand f o r  immediate and uncond itional acceptance o r 
t o t a l  r e je c t io n ,  th ey  tended to  dem onstrate a certain^degree o f in f le x -
Q
i b i l i t y  and d o c tr in a ir e  th in k in g , This i s  not suggesting th a t  they 
were incapab le  o f a b s t r a c t  p o l i t i c a l  th e o r iz i i^ ,  though n e ith e r  s ide
^Ib id . .  p . 353. ^ I b id , , p . 322 .
op . c i t . .  p . x c i i .
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indulged in  such th e o riz in g  to  any ap p rec iab le  degree. I t  i s ,  r a th e r ,  
to  suggest th a t  in  the  face o f  th e  C o n s titu tio n , t r u ly  a new p o l i t i c a l
and governm ental fo ra ,  ^ e  * A ntis* could and d id  r e s o r t  to  t r a d i t io n a l
a n ^  as has been s tr e s s e d  rep ea ted ly  throughout th is  th e s is ,  
p roo fs  o f  t h e i r  own n o l i t i c a l  b e l ie f s .
g i ■. I .w   .......... ...... . T ,#r. # ,u,
Thus, th e  concern o f the  A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  in  the  r a t i f i c a t i o n
s tra g g le  o f  1787-1788 was ,.tJPL.P.Kea£ant- th e  acceptance o f a fo ra  o f gov­
ernment which_^ # @ y j2 s lla y a iL ja ra b ^ ^  of  a l l  th a t  Americans
had fough t f o r  and achieved by the  Revolution and independence—the, 
p e rso n a l and p o l i t i c a l  r ig h ts  and freedoms o f a l l  men. For them, the
p r eference  was fo r  a l im ite d  government, a h e rita g e  which, as C ecelia  
9
Kenyon sa y s , was d i r e c t ly  a t t r ib u ta b le  to  th e i r  English background 
and a n c e s try , ac.companie(l by_M rittep ..xonatitu tions c rea tin g  the s tru c ­
tu re  o f  and c lo s e ly  d e fin in g  the  powers and lim ita t io n s  of th a t  govern­
m ent. I t  was to  be a government on lA ich the  people could exerc ise  as
much d i r e c t  c o n tro l as p o s s ib le , and from which they  could derive  as
much b e n e f it  in  th e  form o f p ro te c tio n  o f th e i r  r ig h ts  and freedoms as
p o ss ib le .
The A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts ,  l ik e  th e  F e d e ra lis ts ,  were se lf-consc ious 
men in  t h e i r  re s p e c tiv e  p o s i t io n s . They were working and ac tin g  and 
th ink ing  n o t only  in  term s o f  the  p re se n t, but ju s t  as im portant, fo r  
what m ight be th e  co n d itio n s Of th e  f u t u r e . T h e i r  b e lie fs  of human 
na tu re  made them c a re fu l ly  consider governmental changes th a t  might 
a f f e c t  them and th e i r  p o s te r i ty  a l ik e .  Though the A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  
nowhere l a i d  down a framework o f  t h e i r  p o s it io n  on government as d id
^Ib id . . p . x x v i i i .  ^^ Ib id . ,  p . x lv .
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th e  F e d e ra l is ts  in  The F e d e ra l is t ,  t h e i r  basic  ideas o f government can 
be derived  from th e i r  speeches and e ssay s . And, though they were wrong 
in  t h e i r  m ajor prem ise—th a t  th e  O onstitu tion  would f a i l  and so bring 
an a r is to c ra c y  o r  monarchy upon America—i t  does not fo llow  th a t  the  
A n ti-F e d e ra lis ts  were wrong e i th e r  in  t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  philosophy o r 
t h e i r  v is io n  o f  th e  American fu tu re .  Indeed, i t  seems l ik e ly  th a t  
t h e i r  own s o lu tio n s  to  th e  problems o f  American government in  the E arly  
N ationa l P erio d  could have opera ted  and re s u lte d  in  as much p ro g ress , 
p ro s p e r ity  and democracy as has been achieved under th e  C o n stitu tio n .^^
r --------_ _  f 7  —  I III-------------------------------- ----- ■ - -n-~i I ~i- iffi - II n riiT iii — i...........  i i n i i i— m 'l-n i i  rw »i i ii ' ~ i i r - r m - |r  a  ' ' *".. .............
^^Borden, c i t «, p .  x v i i i .
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